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Abstract 
In our work, we study the issues between production and sales planning processes in an oil 
company. The planning problems involve decisions regarding procurement of crude oil, 
generation of components, blending of products, internal transportation of components and 
products, operation of depots, and sales and distribution of products to markets. We formulate 
two separated planning problems in a decoupled setting i.e. production model solved by the 
production department (PD) and sales model solved by the sales department (SD). Sales planning 
problem is formulated in several ways, considering different scenarios for allocation of depot 
operation decision and calculation of departmental premium. In addition, we consider two 
different formulations of revenue functions in each of the sales problems. The first way assumes 
quadratic programming model with linear demand functions, whereas the second one assumes a 
piecewise linear approximation of the revenue function and is a mixed integer programming 
model. The sales model maximizes the premium received by SD, whereas the production model 
minimizes the costs based on the demand from SD. We also present integrated models that 
assume centralized planning and maximize the company's total profit. Because in many cases 
integrated planning is not possible in practice, these models serve only as a theoretical 
benchmark.  
We assume that coordination between the departments is achieved through internal prices. We   
propose two mechanisms for setting internal prices. The first mechanism includes two cost based-
methods, whereas the second mechanism is based on Lagrangean Decomposition (LD). Then we 
present numerical example to illustrate the methodologies. We study the performance of each of 
the mechanisms and compare the results achieved under different scenarios. We illustrate the 
potential advantages and possible disadvantages of LD over the cost-based methods and discuss 
the allocation of decision-making and sharing rule, in which the company attains a better 
outcome under the decoupled planning.  
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Introduction 
1 Motivation 
Petroleum is a huge and global industry. Major companies operating in this industry have 
complicating supply chains and have their facilities spread all over the world. Supply chain in 
petroleum companies includes many different processes. At the highest level of the chain is 
exploration of potential petroleum fields, where decisions regarding design and planning of oil 
field infrastructure must be taken. Next processes are drilling and operating of wells together with 
extraction of oil and gas. These processes are followed by transportation of raw materials with 
tankers to terminals, which are connected to refineries through a pipeline network. Some of the 
decisions at these levels are transportation nodes and supply scheduling. Next processes are: 
refinery operations, transportation of products to distribution centers, and marketing of petroleum 
products. Planning and controlling of all these processes create many challenges. Some of these 
challenges are: uncertainty in wells productivity, finding the optimal schedule for company’s 
rigs, dealing with complicated equipment, uncertainty in demand and oil/gas prices, government 
regulations, and many others. Because of global competition and high turnover of products, 
petroleum companies have to find an effective way to deal with these challenges and be able to 
provide a rapid response to change in environments. To address the challenges quantitative 
models and mathematical programming techniques have been developed for several decades. 
Their use have significantly increased company’s ability to plan and control their activities 
(Bengtsson and Nonås, 2009). Van den Heever and Grossmann (2001) have proposed multi-
period MINL problem for the long-term design and planning of offshore hydrocarbon field 
infrastructures with complex economic objectives. As a solution method the authors have used a 
specialized heuristic algorithm which relies on the concept of Lagrangean decomposition. Neiro 
and Pinto (2006) have presented a stochastic multiperiod model for representing a petroleum 
refinery. Uncertainty has been taken into account in parameters such as demands, product sale 
prices and crude oil prices. Lagrangean Decomposition has been applied in order to reduce 
computational effort.  
 
Oil refinery system is a part of petroleum supply chain, it stretches from the purchase of crude oil 
to the sale of petrochemical products. To build a modern refinery is a huge investment and 
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requires covering of fixed cost in the future. In addition to determining efficient processes within 
the refineries itself, an important task that major refining companies have been focusing in the 
past few years is to integrate those processes with other functions in the supply chain, such as 
distribution and sale to markets (Bengtsson and Nonås, 2009). Integrated planning has proved to 
be of significant relevance, where the basic idea is to optimize simultaneously decisions of 
different functions, which traditionally have been optimized independently of each other 
(Erengüc et al. 1999).  Guyonnet et al. (2009) have explored the potential benefits of an 
integrated model involving three parts of the crude oil supply chain: unloading, oil processing, 
and distribution. The authors have argued, that integrated model would achieve better functional 
cooperation between different planning problems and avoid suboptimal solutions.  
 
 
 
2 Background 
Refinery production system is a part of Supply Chain in Petroleum Industry. Refinery process is 
linked up-stream with oil platforms, which produce crude oil of different qualities (Bredström 
and Rönnqvist, 2008). Refinery converts crude oil into components, which are blended into 
products in hubs. Downstream the refinery system is linked with sales and distribution processes. 
The part of logistic network that we consider in our work is composed of refineries, hubs, depots 
and sale offices, owned by the same company. Refineries and hubs are production units where the 
inflow of raw material is transformed through several processes into multiple products. Finished 
products are stored in depots close to customer regions. Sale offices are the channel responsible 
for distribution of products from depots to customers. 
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Supply chain management of this logistic network involves many decisions, both short term and 
long term. These decisions are usually taken on different levels in the company. Supply chain 
literature distinguishes between three main decision levels: strategic, tactical and operational 
(Simchi-Levi et al. 2003).  
The strategic level deals with decisions that have a long-lasting effect on the firm (Simchi-Levi et 
al. 2003). This includes decisions regarding manufacturing and logistics investments, such as 
utilization of production capacities and nodes of transport, location and size of new depots, 
product development, and entrance to new markets. Not only existing capabilities have to be 
considered, but also new opportunities in all areas have to be evaluated. Fernandes et al. (2013) 
and Oliveira et al. (2012) have raised some of the problems related to this decision level. 
Fernandes et al. (2013) have developed a deterministic MILP for strategic design and planning of 
downstream petroleum supply chain network to decide optimal depot locations, transport modes, 
resource capacities, routes and network affectations for long term planning. Oliveira et al. (2012) 
have addressed the strategic multi-product, multi-period oil supply chain investment planning 
problem of network design and discrete capacity expansion under demand uncertainty.  
 
The tactical level includes purchasing and production decisions, inventory policies and 
transportation strategies based on forecasts of future demand. Examples of decisions at this level 
are: amount of each product to produce, distribution and storage of products and other materials, 
and pricing of products. Normally time horizon for such decisions in an oil company is 3 month 
(Guajardo et al. 2013a). Neiro and Pinto (2004) have developed a multi-period MINL model for 
petroleum supply chain in context of the Brazilian company, Petrobas. This model considered 
several refineries connected with pipelines and storage tanks, and included decisions regarding 
oil type selection, production levels, operating of processing units at refineries, product 
distribution plan and inventory management.   
The operational level refers to day–to-day decisions such as scheduling, lead time quotations, 
routing, and truck loading (Simchi-Levi et al. 2003).  Due to complexity of the supply chain in an 
oil company and huge amount of data that needs to be manipulated at this level, operational 
planning is often separated into different subproblems. As Alabi and Castro (2009) have pointed 
out, in most cases the refinery-planning problem is decomposed into three subproblems: crude oil 
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supply, refining and blending, and product distribution.  Jia and Ierapetritou (2004) have 
developed a continuous time MILP model for the efficient scheduling of oil refinery operations. 
In their approach the authors decomposed the overall problem into three subproblems: the crude-
oil unloading and blending, the production unit operations, and the product blending and 
delivery. Each of these subproblems has been modeled and solved in a most efficient way. Alabi 
and Castro (2009) have modeled and implemented an integrated refinery-planning problem, in 
which the authors have considered decisions from crude oil purchase through to products 
distribution. The problem has been approached by interior-point algorithms and two 
decomposition techniques, Dantzig–Wolfe and block coordinate-descent. 
The tactical level connects long-term strategic level to day-to-day operational level: it ensures 
that operative planning follows the direction that has been set out at strategic level (Bredström 
and Rönnqvist, 2008). This issue has been raised by Mouret et al. (2011). The authors of the 
paper have used Lagrangean decomposition approach to integrate and solve two main 
optimization problems appearing in the oil refining industry: refinery planning and crude-oil 
operational scheduling.  
Guajardo et al. (2013a) have studied another coordination issue at tactical level in an oil 
company. The authors have considered a decoupled setting in which decisions about production 
and distribution of products down to depots were taken by operational unit, while decisions about 
distribution of products from depots to customers were decentralized to individual sellers. In a 
numerical example the authors have showed that an integrated modeling approach, where 
decisions about production and sale were made simultaneously, outperform the decoupled 
planning.  
In the real world due to large size and complexity of organizations, an integrated optimization 
model would be significantly challenging. In such cases coordination between divisions in a 
decentralized company can be achieved through the use of transfer pricing system, also called 
internal prices. Dean (1955), referred in (Abdel-Khalik and Lusk, 1974; p.8), has argued that a 
rationally conceived and systematically applied transfer pricing system would allow divisions to 
maintain their autonomy while making decisions that benefit the entire organization.  
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3 Aim of the Dissertation 
The focus of our work is coordination between production and sales divisions at the tactical level, 
in an integrated oil company. We use internal prices as the main coordination mechanism 
between these two divisions. In our thesis we study two planning mechanisms for setting internal 
prices. The first one, is a pure cost based mechanism. However, our main focus is on the second 
mechanism in which we employ Lagrangean decomposition (LD). We also compare these two 
mechanisms.  
Each of the mechanism includes several methods. The methods we consider, are possible to 
realize in a decoupled setting, without knowledge of the optimal solution. In order to measure 
results from the proposed methods, we develop integrated models in which decisions about 
production and sales are made simultaneously, and use these as the theoretical benchmark for 
performance.   
In our work we use relative simple models to represent the tactical planning, without going into 
too much details about production specifics. As the base for our models, we adapt models from 
previous studies of coordination between production and sales divisions in oil companies 
(Guajardo et al., 2013a, 2013b; Bredström and Rönnqvist, 2008). We also make an extension of 
those models, by introducing fixed costs associated with operations of distribution centers, called 
depots and include possibility of closing them down. Based on this extension we consider various 
scenarios assuming different allocation of decisions and premium rules. We study the 
performance of the proposed methods according to these scenarios.  
The aim of our master thesis is to investigate how Lagrangean decomposition mechanism can 
be used to find internal prices and how does the efficiency of this mechanism changes with 
different model formulations. In addition we also compare LD with the cost based mechanism, 
and try to determine which allocation of decisions and premium rule are best.  
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4 Disposition 
The remaining of our work is organized as follows.  
Part 1 – Problem Description. We start by general description of parts of petroleum supply chain 
which will be analyzed, in chapter 1. In chapter 2, we introduce coordination problem and 
describe what is meant by internal price. In chapter 3, some of the constraints which are used in 
our models are formulate and described. We start with constraints associated with production 
process and depots use in 3.1. Next in 3.2 we give an overview over how our models pick up 
competition in markets, before we formulate related constraints. In 3.3 we introduce a piecewise 
linear revenue function and associated constraints. In chapter 4, the production model, together 
with sales models are formulated. Integrated models which serve as our benchmarks are 
formulated in chapter 5.  
Part 2 – Internal Price mechanisms. We propose our cost based methods for setting of internal 
prices in chapter 6. In chapter 7, we give theoretical explanation of LD, before we apply this 
mechanism to our problem.  
Part 3 – Computational study. In chapter 8, data used in our models are described. In Chapter 9, 
we present results from cost-based methods that have been described in chapter 6. In chapter 10, 
we make computational experiments with LD methods.  
Part 4 – Conclusion. Concluding remarks are presented in chapter 11. 
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PART 1: PROBLEM DESCRIPTION   
Chapter 1 - Oils Supply Chain 
In this chapter we give a brief description of the part in an oil company that represents the 
application to be analyzed. We start by explaining what we mean by crude oil, components and 
products, terms which we use through the rest of our work.  
1.1 Crude oil, components, and products 
The basic raw material for refineries is crude oil. The price of each crude oil is a function of its 
quality. Crude oils which are easier to refine have a higher price in the market relative to crudes 
which require extra treating (Kutz et al. 2014). Acquisition of crude oils account for a large 
portion of refineries costs (Bengsson and Nonås, 2009). Two properties that have greatest 
influence on the value of crude oil are sulfur content and density (expressed in terms of API 
gravity). Sulfur content is expressed as percent sulfur weight and varies from less than 0.1% to 
greater than 5%. Crudes with greater than 0.5% sulfur generally require more expensive 
processing than those with lower sulfur content (Gary and Handwerk, 2001).  
Components refer to semi-finished products. In a refinery, components can be obtained from 
crude oils or they can be purchased from outside. Qualities of components depend upon the crude 
oil they are obtained from. Components can either be used as input to processing unit or as 
blending components. Examples of components, which are obtained from crude distillation unit, 
are light and heavy naphtha. Both are used in gasoline blending.  
Products refer to finished goods which are saleable in the markets. The basic refinery processes 
are based on large-quantity products such as gasoline, diesel, jet fuel etc. The value of products 
depends on location, demand in the markets, products characteristics, and other things. Gasoline 
is one of the most high-valued due to large margins and high volumes (Bredström et al., 2008). 
The main part of gasoline made by refineries is used as fuel in automobiles. Most refineries 
produce gasoline in three grades: regular, premium, and super-premium. Jet fuel is used by both 
commercial aviation and military aircraft. Automotive Diesel Fuels is used in high-speed engines 
in automobiles, trucks, and buses. (Gary and Handwerk, 2001) 
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In the rest of this chapter we describe the main parts of the supply chain (Figure 1.1) of an oil 
company which we later include in our model. We start by giving a general overview of these 
parts, before we explain in chapter 3 how these are modeled. 
 
Figure 1.1- Supply Chain  
 
1.2 Procurement of crude oil 
Because of scheduling and transportation time, an oil company orders crude oils two-four months 
before processing (Kutz et al. 2014). Amount and type of crude that should be purchased is a 
huge decision for an oil company, because crude oil costs typically represent 70-80 % of 
company’s total costs (Kutz et al. 2014). It's important to choose crude oils that make the 
production cheaper: if the company manages to get small reduction in production costs, it will 
lead to huge increase of profit because of large scale of production. To order the "right" amount 
of crude oils, company must have some strategic forecasts of future demand. Some parts of future 
demand can be known, while other parts may be unknown. For example, company may already 
have some ordered amount of products which must be delivered, on the other hand company may 
have customers who buys different amount of products each time.  Too little amount of 
purchased crude oil leads to unsatisfied demand, unsatisfied demand leads to loose in profit and 
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in addition possible loose of reputation and customers. On the other hand, too high purchase 
volume leads to additional storage costs.    
 
1.3 Processing of crude oil 
When crude oils have been delivered at refineries, they are exposed to a series of processes in order 
to generate salable products. The first major step in refinery is to separate crude oils by distillation 
into fraction according to their boiling points. Gary and Handwerk, (2001) have described this step 
as follows. Volumes of crudes are processed through Crude Oil Distillation Unit (CDU) where 
different components are produced. During this process many compounds that are present in crude 
oil are separated. The longer the carbon chain is, the higher is the temperature at which the 
compounds will boil. The crude oil is heated and changed into a gas. The gasses are passed through 
a distillation column which becomes cooler as the height increase. When a compound in the 
gaseous state cools below its boiling point, it condenses into a liquid. The liquids may be drawn 
off the distilling column at various heights.  
These liquids are the components. The characteristics of the components depend on which crude 
oil has been used. Some of these components can be directly used in blending, however most are 
used further in processes where properties of components changes (Bredström et al., 2008). One 
typical example of further processes is cracking process (Kutz et al. 2014) where heavy molecules 
are cracked into lower molecular weight. From cracking unit components are improved in qualities 
by hydro treatment process, where components receive desired properties such as density and some 
of sulfur content is removed, and reforming process where components are reformed to meet octane 
specification (Kutz et al. 2014). In reality refinery operations are very complex and no one of the 
refineries are identical in their operations (Kutz et al. 2014). A refinery has available crude oils and 
information about products that must be produced, based on that the refinery must find an economic 
practical way to process crude oils and generate components, which will further be used in blending 
of products. 
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1.4 Blending 
From refineries, components are sent to hubs, where blending takes place. Relevant decision in the 
blending process is how to blend components in order to meet all critical specifications and demand 
requirements most economically. Each product has specific quality restriction on e.g. density, 
octane, and sulfur content, while each component has some values of these qualities (Gary and 
Handwerk, 2001). However, in reality some qualities may be unknown and may not show linear 
relationships, what makes the problem nonlinear. For example octane limits are typically specified 
with fourth-order expressions, while volatility quality measure perform logarithmically (DeWitt et 
al. 1989) In addition one product may be blended in many different ways, what makes blending a 
complicated process.  
1.5 Storage 
Storage locations are important in order to achieve flexibility in manufacturing and in case of 
shutdowns. Both crude oils, components, and finished products are possible to store. As Hu et al. 
(2011) have pointed out, in a firm a potential conflict exists between manufacturing and sales 
departments: salespersons prefer to order from manufacturing departments in advance so that 
they can secure products in the amount they need to satisfy customers in time. While this strategy 
is good for the sales department to guarantee the right quantity at the right time for customers, it 
adds additional costs and pressure to the manufacturing department.  
Therefore it should be a balance between benefit from storage availability against cost of holding 
extra stock.  
While crude oils and semi-finished products are usually stored in tanks at refineries, salable 
products are sent to depots for storage. Depots are warehouses which serve as "distribution centers 
and storage locations for final products" (Guajardo et al. 2013b; p.892). Depots are located closer 
to the markets than refineries and hubs. 
1.6 Transportation 
In general, crude oils are supplied to refineries with two type of ships (Bengtsson and Nonås, 
2009): very large crude carriers and small vessels carries. Large crude carriers may carry 
different crudes, while small vessels carries only single crude (Bengtsson and Nonås, 2009). 
Typically oil refineries receive crude oils from ships through a pipeline. From refineries products 
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are sent to hubs, and thence to depots. Because of large volumes that needs to be distributed, 
transportation is generally undertaken using pipeline, maritime ships or railway (Fernandes et al., 
2013). From depots products are sent to customers in different markets. Volumes are typically 
smaller and transportation is normally undertaken by road using tank trucks (Fernandes et al., 
2013). However, when large volumes are transported in the case of Jet Fuel to airports, pipeline 
or railroad may be used (Fernandes et al., 2013).  
In our work transportation from refineries to depots is called primary transportation. 
Transportation from depots to markets is called secondary transportation.  
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Chapter 2 - Coordination between departments 
2.1 The planning problem 
In large organizations, it is usual that different functions are divided between organizational 
subunits called departments or divisions. In petroleum firms, such divisions may include one or 
several echelons of the supply chain. A firm may consist of a headquarters group and several 
departments. Each department controls a set of activities. In the case of petroleum firm these 
activities may relate to purchase of crude oil, production of petroleum products, transportation 
planning, and sales to outside customers. Also each department usually has limited local 
resources. Such restrictions can be storage capacity, customers demand etc. In addition to local 
restrictions, it may exist corporation restrictions which affect all departments. Joint resources, for 
example available crude oil, may restrict amount of products it is possible to produce and hence 
sale to customers. Another example is coupling constraints, which affect resource exchange 
between departments. We can formulate a general planning problem (M) in the following abstract 
way: 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒:                    𝑧 =  𝑥1 × 𝑐1 + 𝑥2 × 𝑐2      (𝑀)  
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜:                   𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2) ≤ 𝑎         (𝑀1) 
𝑔1(𝑥1) ≤ 𝑏1                
(𝑀2) 
𝑔2(𝑥2) ≤ 𝑏2              (𝑀3)  
𝑥1, 𝑥2 ≥ 0             (𝑀4)  
 
This problem formulation has the following interpretation. The company consists of two 
departments. Each of these departments has some activity levels 𝑥𝑗 which it has control over. The 
objective of this problem is to maximize the total contribution of the company z, where the 𝑐𝑗 
vector expresses the contribution from the activities. The constraint (M1) is a corporation 
constraint which affect all departments, while constraints (M2) and (M3) are departmental 
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constraints, where 𝑏𝑗 represents the available resources at department j. Dirickx and Jennergren 
(1979) have pointed out that this type of problem formulation does not contain a detailed 
scheduling of individual jobs.  
One problem that arises in this type of model formulation is that it is not possible to solve the 
model in one place. This may be because information is dispersed between different subunits in 
organization. For example a production process of products may be known only in production 
department, while the demand forecast is information available only for sales division. In 
addition some departments may not be willing to share some of the information with other units 
in organization.  
When it is not possible to solve the overall problem in one place, we can divide it into several 
smaller subproblems. Dirickx and Jennergren (1979) have distinguished between three different 
situations which can appear when the overall problem is divided: (1) the subproblems do not 
correspond to organizational subunits in the real world and the subproblems has no meaningful 
institutional interpretation; (2) the subproblems do correspond to organizational subunits, but this 
correspondence is not used in the actual solution process; (3) there is correspondence between 
organizational subunits and the subproblems, and this correspondence is utilized in the solution 
process.  
 
2.2 Decomposition methods 
In large scale optimizations, one of the fundamental techniques are decompositions. 
Decomposition methods use different relaxations and decompose the original problem into 
smaller subproblems. Then, the subproblems are solved repeatedly in a systematic way until an 
optimal solution is found (Lundgren et al. 2009). Coordinating divisions in a multi-divisional 
firm using mathematical decomposition has been a subject for OR research (Karabuk and Wu, 
2000). Dirickx and Jennergren (1979) have pointed out that it is customary to divide planning 
procedures for solving problems like (M) founded on decomposition methods into two groups: 
price-directive and resource-directive. The main difference between these two groups is in 
information exchange between the headquarters and the departments. Dirickx and Jennergren, 
(1979) have described that in a price-directive approach headquarter sends price information to 
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divisions. Based on the prices announces by headquarter, the divisions decide on quantities and 
send this information back to headquarter. The Dantzig-Wolfe and Lagrangean decomposition 
methods are used as price-directive approaches (Dirickx and Jennergren, 1979), we refer to these 
in the next subchapter. The second resource-directive approach is based on budget, and involves 
headquarter distribute the common resources directly among the subdivisions and requires from 
them fixed contributions to the common aims. Then subdivisions calculate their respective 
optimal programs and report the prices they can pay for the common constraints to headquarter. 
This decomposition technique has been presented by ten Kate (1972).  
Dirickx and Jennergren (1979) have pointed out that one important property of the solution 
method to the planning problem is that a relative “good” solution should be obtained with only 
small number of iterations of information exchange. The authors have claimed that not many 
iterations of information exchange between different organizational subunits will be undertaken 
in a real company. Another aspect for a solution methods in real companies is that each 
department should have a clear information about what it supposed to do in each planning stage 
and what information it must exchange with other units. An assumption that is implied here is 
that each department send the true information, and doesn’t act out of self-interests.  
 
 
2.3 Internal Price Mechanisms 
In many of multidivisional firms, there are two profit centers: manufacturing cost center that 
seeks lower costs and operational efficiency, and marketing revenue center that controls pricing 
and other marketing elements (Balasubramanian and Bhardwaj, 2004). The benefits of 
decentralization are for instance: (1) greater responsiveness to local needs; (2) quicker decision 
making; and (3) sharpened focus of business unit managers (Pfeiffer, 1999). However, 
decentralization can also lead to suboptimal solutions, which are not necessarily in line with 
firm’s goals. Transferring (internal) pricing mechanism is supposed to deal with this coordination 
issue. Transfer pricing mechanism attempt to “generate prices for internally produced and 
consumed commodities” (Abdel-Khalik and Lusk, 1974; p.8). Also the mechanism should 
motivate, coordinate, and control the allocation of economic resources and factors of production 
so that the overall organizational goals can be achieved (Abdel-Khalik and Lusk, 1974). 
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Different approaches of transfer pricing models have been developed. Kouvelis and Lariviere 
(2000) have proposed a mechanism based on linear transfer prices for the intermediate output. 
This mechanism has been implemented through an internal market. In this internal market the 
authors have assumed a principal who acted as market maker, buying all output from upstream 
managers and reselling it to downstream managers. The principal was not obliged to buy and sell 
at the same price. Dorestani (2004) has considered two divisions: one of the divisions produced, 
while the other used an intermediate good. Each of the divisions had some information which 
was not available to the center. Dorestani has showed how the center of the firm can ‘control’ 
division’s actions with transfer price and a penalty factor, assuring that divisions are sensitive 
both to profit opportunities of seeking outside trades and to benefits of internal trade. 
   
In some of the papers, game theory has been applied in order to deal with the coordination issue. 
Erickson (2012) has proposed a transfer price mechanism to coordinate the strategies of 
marketing and operations functional areas, recognizing differing and often conflicting objectives 
of these areas in a decentralized firm. The transfer price was included in the differential game 
model, which allowed the coordination of equilibrium marketing and production strategies to 
achieve a maximum profit for the firm. Hu et al. (2011) have considered potential issues between 
manufacturing and sales departments as a result of ‘‘lead-time hedging” strategy which has been 
used by sales department. The authors have introduced internal price in two different 
coordination models for different structure of the firm. In the Nash game model, the 
manufacturing and the sales departments decided the internal price and the lead-time hedging 
simultaneously. In the Stackelberg game model, the manufacturing department served as the 
leader and the sales department acted as the follower. It has been showed that the suggested 
approaches, compared to the traditional model, are effective to reduce the lead-time hedging and 
improve the entire firm’s profit. Pekgün et al. (2008) have studied a decentralized system where 
price and lead time decisions have been made by the marketing and the production departments 
in an MTO firm. The authors have focused on evaluating marketing as a revenue center and 
production as a cost center, and have formulated the problem as a Stackelberg game with 
alternative decision making sequences. The authors have showed that coordination can be 
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achieved using a transfer price contract with bonus payments, as long as production receives a 
satisfactory incentive as a fraction of total revenues.  
Guajardo et al. (2013b) have presented models for joint optimization of internal pricing and 
planning decisions in an oil company. In the described approach, producer incorporated sellers’ 
behavior by expressing demand as a function of the internal price. The authors have showed that 
this joint optimization model outperform traditional cost-based methods.  
Also decomposition methods have been used to determine internal/transfer prices.  Baumol and 
Fabian (1964) have suggest utilization of the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition procedure to provide 
internal prices for decentralized decision making in a multidivisional firm. Karabuk and Wu 
(2002) have studied the coordination issues between local marketing and manufacturing decision 
problems as separate stochastic programs. In their models the authors have considered 
uncertainty of demand and capacity in a semiconductor industry. Two coordination mechanisms 
have been presented, in which transfer prices have been used in order to achieve coordination. 
Mechanisms were motivated by mathematical decomposition via Augmented Lagrangean 
(nonlinear penalty methods). Bredström and Rönnqvist (2008) have studied coordination issue 
between refinery production and sales planning. The authors have showed that Lagrangean 
decomposition can provide a more stable methodology than standard approaches used in many 
industries. Kong and Rönnqvist (2012) have studied coordination between sales and production 
planning at a refinery, in a working paper. The authors have proposed two mechanisms for setting 
internal prices. The first mechanism used marginal values as internal prices whereas the second 
employed Lagrangean decomposition.  
 
 
2.4 Coordination between Sales and Production Departments in an Oil Company 
In our work we consider an oil company in which sales and production departments make their 
decisions separately and each of the departments have their own objectives. Owned by the 
company, the sales department (SD) is managed independently and is seeking to maximize its 
profit from sales. Based on the estimated demand in markets, costs associated to purchase of 
products, and secondary transportation costs, the sales department makes orders from the 
production department (PD). These orders include type and amount of each product, in addition 
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to locations products must be available at. According to the orders from SD, PD decides how to 
produce and distribute the products such that costs associated to production and primary 
transportation are minimized.  
We assume that coordination between the departments is achieved through the use of internal 
prices of products. In our models, the internal prices are the costs that SD has to pay in order to 
"buy" products from PD. These internal prices must be decided for each product at each storage 
location, and stimulate the sales department to make decisions that will maximize the profit for 
the whole company.  
We assume that the production department is integrated with headquarter (the company). In 
addition to satisfy orders from SD, the department decides internal prices.  
In the same way as Guajardo et al. (2013a, 2013b) we assume that SDs premium to a great deal 
depends on the margin between the sale price and the value chain cost of the products. The value 
chain cost includes the price SD pays to PD for the product (internal price) and secondary 
distribution costs. 
Value chain cost = internal price + secondary distribution cost 
The sales department receives a percentage premium Δ from the “profit” it achieves.  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 =  Δ(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) ∗ 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡                                            (𝐸2.1) 
In our model we also consider possibility in which SD takes into account fixed costs associated 
with operation of depots.  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 =  Δ{(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) ∗ 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 − 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡}              (𝐸2.2) 
We can argue that the premium proportion Δ, doesn’t affect decisions made by SD, because the 
department will always maximize (𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) ∗ 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 −
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 independently of Δ (as long as Δ  is a positive number), therefore we can ignore it.  
In order to increase the difference between price and cost, SD will tend to choose the lowest 
possible combination of internal price + transport cost, for each product that it sells. As Guajardo 
et al. (2013b) have pointed out, this way may not be the most cost efficient way to distribute for 
the company as whole. If the sales department takes fixed costs into account then the problem is 
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no longer be straight forward. However, the conclusion doesn’t change: if internal prices are 
"wrong" it may exist conflicts between the objective of SD and the company’s goals, because SD 
will not fully take into account the costs imposed by its activities on the production. Therefore, it 
is important to find an appropriate mechanism for setting of internal prices.  
Often economic literature that has studied transferring pricing, has made following assumptions 
(Abdel-Khalik and Lusk, 1974):  selling division produce only one type of product, it is possible 
to determine unit variable cost of the product, and the product of one (or both) divisions has 
external markets. In our problem there are multiple products and there are dependencies between 
them, unit variable cost varies and it is difficult to determine. In addition, we assume that there 
are no external market company can sell or buy intermediate product to/from. 
As it was pointed out by Erickson (2012, p.226): “If there is no market outside the firm for the 
selling profit center’s product, the transfer price needs to be determined internally. In such a case, 
an appropriate transfer price is one that maximizes the firm’s profit”.  
In practice in oil companies, it is not uncommon that internal prices are decided manually or 
through a simple cost based method (Guajardo et al., 2013b). These prices are intended to reflect 
costs caused by products up to the depot locations. However, because of divergent supply chain 
which is characterized by multiple components and products, and dependencies between 
products, it is difficult to distribute costs among these products.  
If we assume that PD knows the mechanism used by SD when it makes decisions, then PD has 
indirect control over SDs decisions, because it can change input factors to sales optimization 
model. The input factors that PD has control over are internal prices. By changing internal prices 
PD can force SD to act in company’s best interests, while at the same time SD will be able to 
make decisions which will maximize its own premium. These assumptions were made by 
Guajardo et al. (2013b) in their model formulation, in which the authors suggested method of 
setting internal prices. They assumed that demand functions in markets are known by PD, 
together with secondary distribution costs.  
In our models we do not make the same assumptions, and instead assume that some information, 
like demand in the markets, is available only for the sales department. Therefore, company will 
not be able to predict the response from the sales department, unless information exchange 
between departments would find place in some step of the planning process. 
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2.5 The Planning Approach  
In the rest of our work we consider a two level approach for planning in sales and production 
departments. At the first level, the internal prices for products are decided by production 
department. We consider two possible mechanisms of how these prices can be decided. The first 
mechanism is based on costs incurred at production department and doesn’t require information 
exchange between departments. The second mechanism is based on Lagrangean decomposition 
and requires information exchange between production and sales departments. This mechanism 
can involve solution of real divisional local problems corresponding to category (3) defined in 
2.1, as well as other subproblems which may correspond to category (2), implying that 
representation of such problems is not used in the actual solution process. This level is a pure 
planning level, later denoted as planning level, and no concrete actions are taken at this level.  
At the second level of the approach, when internal prices are decided, the production department 
announces these prices for the sales department. Based on it, the sales department solves its 
"naturally" local subproblem and makes decisions on type and amount of products to order, and 
which locations to order from. Then, the production department solves its subproblem in which it 
should match the orders from SD at the lowest possible costs. This level will be denoted as 
decision level.   
Whenever internal or external market conditions change, the internal prices or/and production 
and sales plans can be decided again. Depending on the changes that have occurred, parts or the 
whole two level approach is recalculated. Also we assume that the company repeats the whole 
procedure after a certain amount of time has passed.  
Local subproblems, which are solved by departments at the decision level are formulated in 
chapter 4. In chapter 6 and chapter 7 we suggest planning processes which correspond to the 
planning level, in which internal prices are determined. But first, we formulate departmental 
constraints and explain the intuition behind these in chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3 - Problem Formulation 
The processes that we have described in chapter 1 are very complex, and there are some aspects 
that are difficult to include in an optimization model. Therefore, we have identified aspects that 
are relevant for our problem and at the same time decided which aspects are less important. 
Increased level of details leads to better realism in the model, but at the same time it leads to a 
larger model with decreased solvability. Therefore it is important to identify the formulation of 
real problem with reasonable level of details and complexity.  In this chapter we formulate the 
basic constraints that must be taken into account by the departments. These constraints are used 
as fundament for the models formulated throughout our work.   
Because, the aim of our thesis is to study coordination between two departments, we use 
formulation in which it is more clear which parts affect the coordination issue. Also, because later 
in our work we formulate integrated models, which include all decisions, we need to specify the 
problem such that the optimization models are possible to solve.  
In what follows, we introduce the notation of sets and parameters that are used through the 
remainder of our work. 
 
3.1 Indexes  
Sets 
r ∈ 𝑅:   Set of refineries 
h∈ 𝐻:   Set of hubs 
i ∈  I:   Set of crude oils 
d  ∈ D:   Set of depots 
k  ∈ K:   Set of markets 
a ∈ A:    Set of components which cannot be processed 
b ∈ B: Set of components which can either be processed or directly used  in 
blending 
c  ∈ C :             Set of components which are generated from components from set B 
p  ∈ P:   Set of  products 
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e  ∈ E:   Union of sets A and B 
qmin ∈ QMIN:        Set of minimum qualities 
qmax ∈ QMAX:        Set of maximum qualities 
n ∈ M:   Number of breakpoints  
   
 
Parameters 
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑖,𝑟:    Available volume of crude oil i at refinery r 
ρi,e:     Amount of component e generated from one unit of crude oil i 
ρ2c,b:     Amount of component c generated from one unit of component b 
𝑠𝑝𝑚𝑝,𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛:   Value of required quality qmin in product p 
𝑠𝑏𝑚𝑒,𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛:    Value of quality qmin in component e 
𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑐,𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛:    Value of quality qmin in component c 
𝑠𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑝,𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥:   Value of required quality qmax in product p 
𝑠𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑒,𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥:   Value of quality qmax in component e obtained from crude oil i 
𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑐,𝑏,𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥:   Value of quality qmax in component c obtained from component b which is 
again obtained from crude oil i 
𝐶𝑖,𝑟
𝐵𝑢𝑦
:     Cost of purchasing one unit of crude oil i at refinery r 
Ci,r
PRO
:     Cost of processing one unit of crude oil i at refinery r 
Cb,r
PRO2
:    Cost of processing one unit of component b at refinery r 
Cp,h
BLEND
:    Cost of producing one unit of product p at hub h 
Cr,h
TRAN1
:    Cost of transporting one unit of any product from refinery r to hub h 
Ch,d
TRAN2
:    Cost of transporting one unit of any product from hub h depot d 
Cd,k
TRAN3
:    Cost of transporting one unit of any product from depot d to market k 
𝐶𝑑
𝐹𝐼𝑋
:     Fixed cost to operate depot d 
𝑚𝑑:   Maximum capacity at depot d 
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𝐴𝑝 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑝:   Coefficients of price function 
𝑑𝑒𝑚
𝑝,𝑘
, 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝,𝑘:  Minimum and maximum demand of product p at market k 
𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑚.𝑝:  Sold amount of product p corresponding to breakpoint m 
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑚.𝑝:  Revenue from product p corresponding to breakpoint m 
 
Decision variables 
xi,r:     Amount of crude oil i purchased and processed at refinery r 
ye,i,r:     Amount of component e generated from crude oil i at refinery r 
vb,i,r:   Amount of component b generated from crude oil i, used for further 
processing at refinery r 
?̃?c,b,i,r:   Amount of component c generated from component b which is again 
produced form crude oil i at refinery r 
?̃?e,i,r:   Amount of component e obtained from crude oil I at refinery r, which is 
sent directly to blending  
?̅?p,e,i,r,h:   Amount of component e obtained from crude oil i used in product p sent 
from refinery r to hub h 
?̅?p,c,b,i,h:   Amount of component c obtained from component b which is again 
obtained from crude oil i, used in product p which is sent from refinery r to 
hub h 
q̃p,d,h:    Amount of product p at depot d which is sent from hub h 
𝑞𝑝,𝑑:    Amount of product p at depot d  
zp,d,k:     Amount of product p transported from depot d to market k 
ℎ𝑑:    Binary variable which have value 1 when depot d is used, and 0 otherwise 
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘:   Revenue from product p at market k 
𝑤𝑚,𝑝,𝑘:    Weight for product p, breakpoint m  
𝑙𝑚,𝑝,𝑘: Binary variable, takes value 1 if segment m for product p is used, and 0 
otherwise 
𝜃𝑝,𝑘: Price of product p at market k 
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3.2 The supply chain 
This section presents the mathematical formulation of each element in the supply chain and 
highlights its particularities. Constraints for purchase and processing of crude oils, together with 
blending constraints correspond to the production problem. While correspondence of depot 
operation constraint will be discussed.   
3.2.1 Procurement of crude oil 
In our model there is a limitation on supply of each type of crude oil at each refinery. We assume 
that the decision about supply of crude oil is made on strategic decision level and is based on 
historical data or some forecasts. We also assume that quality of crude oils are well known. The 
following constraint is formulated: 
𝐱𝐢,𝐫 ≤ 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒊,𝒓    ∀𝐢 ∈ 𝐈, ∀𝐫 ∈ 𝐑      (𝐏𝟏) 
(P1) states that amount of each crude oil that is used in each refinery, must be less than purchased 
amount for that crude oil. Quality of crude oils are not given directly in our model, but instead 
considered indirectly through qualities of components generated from the crude oils. We assume 
that it is not possible to exchange crude oils, and other commodities between refineries.  
In order to simplify our model we assume that (P1) only concerns PD in such a way that it only 
sets a restriction on purchase of crude oil type. But in general, demand constraints (described in 
section 3.3) are given in a way that there is always enough crude oil to satisfy the demand from 
SD. Thus constraint (P1) will only affect the production department.  
 
3.2.2 Processing of crude oil 
Depending on properties of crude oil, fixed fractions of components are generated from it. Use of 
such conversion factor is common in optimization models for supply chain planning involving 
natural resources, and is used by e.g. Guajardo et al. (2013a, 2013b) and Bredström and 
Rönnqvist, (2008). In our model we assume that there is only one possible way to separate each 
type of crude oil into components. In reality there can be several ways to divide the fractions 
contained within a crude oil, depending for example on refinery and which CDU crude oil goes 
through.  
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We assume that qualities of components which are generated from crudes are known and that 
these qualities vary according to characteristics of crude oils.  
Some of the components obtained from crude oils can be processed further, in order to improve 
qualities. In our model we divide the components into three groups:   
- A components  - components that can be used in blending only 
- B components  - components those qualities can be improved, or alternatively 
components can be used directly in blending  
- C components – “new” components with improved qualities generated from A 
components 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Processing of components 
 
We assume that each B component can generate one or several C components. Some of C 
components can be generated from different B components. Further we assume that there is only 
one way to break B component into C components. Characteristics of C component depend both 
on characteristics of B component and crude oil B component is generated from. These 
characteristics are known. In order to simplify our model we do not distinguish between cracking 
process, hydro treatment process, and reforming process, but instead combine them into one 
additional process.  
𝛒𝐢,𝐞  ×  𝐱𝐢,𝐫   =  𝐲𝐞,𝐢,𝐫   ∀𝐞 ∈ 𝐄, ∀𝐢 ∈ 𝐈, ∀𝐫 ∈ 𝐑    (𝐏𝟐) 
?̃?𝐚,𝐢,𝐫 ≤  𝐲𝐚,𝐢,𝐫    ∀𝐚 ∈ 𝐀 ⊆ 𝐄,   ∀𝐢 ∈ 𝐈 , ∀𝐫 ∈ 𝐑    (𝐏𝟑) 
?̃?𝐛,𝐢,𝐫 + 𝐯𝐛,𝐢,𝐫  ≤ 𝐲𝐛,𝐢,𝐫
                         ∀𝐛 ∈ 𝐁 ⊆ 𝐄,   ∀𝐢 ∈ 𝐈, ∀𝐫 ∈ 𝐑    (𝐏𝟒)                                    
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𝛒𝟐𝐜,𝐛 ×  𝐯𝐛,𝐢,𝐫 = ?̃?𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫             ∀𝐛 ∈ 𝐁 ⊆ 𝐄, ∀𝐢 ∈ 𝐈 , ∀𝐜 ∈ 𝐂, ∀𝐫 ∈ 𝐑  (𝐏𝟓)             
Constraint (P2) sets the amount of each component which is produced from each crude oil. 
Constraint (P3) ensures that amount of each A component obtained from a given crude oil and 
used in blending, cannot be more than the actual amount of this A component obtained from this 
crude oil. Constraint (P4) ensures that amount of each B component which is used in blending 
plus amount of the same B component used in processing, cannot be more than the actual amount 
of this B component which is generated in the refinery. Constraint (P5) sets the amount of each C 
component which is obtained from each B component which is used in processing.  
In our models it is not possible to buy components or other commodities except the crude oils. In 
reality refineries can have possibility to buy some components which are ready for blending 
externally. Also refineries can have possibility to exchange components between refineries 
internally.  
3.2.3 Blending 
From the refineries components are sent to hubs, where blending takes place. In contrast to the 
models used by Guajardo et al. (2013a, 2013b), we do not use fixed recipes for how products 
should be mixed. In our models, we specify quality requirements for final products, for example 
maximum percent of sulfur content and minimum amount of octane. According to these 
requirements products can be mixed in any suitable way. Because characteristics of the 
components are fixed, the blending problem doesn’t create non-linearity. This method of 
blending problem formulation in optimization models has been used by Bredström and Rönnqvist 
(2008) and Bredström et al. (2008).  
 
∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒉∈𝑯
 ≤
𝒑∈𝑷
?̃?𝐞,𝐢,𝐫                                    ∀𝐞 ∈ 𝐄, ∀𝐢 ∈ 𝐈, ∀𝐫 ∈ 𝐑                                                      (𝐏𝟔) 
         
∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢.𝐫
𝒉∈𝑯
≤ ?̃?𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫                                   ∀𝐛 ∈ 𝐁 ⊆ 𝐄, ∀𝐢 ∈ 𝐈 , ∀𝐜 ∈ 𝐂, ∀𝐫 ∈ 𝐑   
𝒑∈𝑷
                      (𝐏𝟕) 
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∑ ?̃?𝒑,𝒅,𝒉
𝐝∈𝐃
𝒔𝒑𝒎𝒑,𝒒𝒎𝒊𝒏  ≤  ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒓∈𝑹
  𝒔𝒃𝒎𝒆,𝒒𝒎𝒊𝒏
𝐢∈𝐈𝐞∈𝐄
 + ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒓∈𝑹
 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒄,𝒒𝒎𝒊𝒏           
𝒄∈𝑪𝒃∈𝑩𝒊∈𝑰
 
   
              ∀𝒑 ∈ 𝑷,   ∀𝒒𝒎𝒊𝒏 ∈ 𝑸𝑴𝑰𝑵 , ∀𝐡 ∈ 𝐇       (𝐏𝟖)
                  
 
∑ ?̃?𝒑,𝒅,𝒉
𝐝∈𝐃
𝒔𝒑𝒎𝒂𝒑,𝒒𝒎𝒂𝒙 ≥   ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒓∈𝑹
  𝒔𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒊,𝒆,𝒒𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝐢∈𝐈𝐞∈𝐄
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒓∈𝑹
 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒊,𝒄,𝒃,𝒒𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒄∈𝑪𝒃∈𝑩𝒊∈𝑰
 
          ∀𝒑 ∈ 𝑷,   𝒒𝒎𝒂𝒙 ∈ 𝑸𝑴𝑨𝑿,  ∀𝐡 ∈ 𝐇       (𝐏𝟗)
                                     
 
∑ ?̃?𝒑,𝒅,𝒉
𝐝∈𝐃
≤ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒓∈𝑹
  
𝐢∈𝐈𝐞∈𝐄
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒓∈𝑹
               ∀𝐩 ∈ 𝐏, ∀𝐡 ∈ 𝐇               (𝐏𝟏𝟎)
𝒄∈𝑪𝒃∈𝑩𝒊∈𝑰
 
       
 Constraints (P6) and (P7) ensure that the amount of each component sent to hubs and used for 
product blending cannot be more than produced amount of this component. Constrains (P8) and 
(P9) make sure that product quality is reached in the blending process. Constraint (P10) sets mass 
balance. 
 
3.2.4 Depots   
From hubs, products are sent to depots. Transportation costs depend both on hubs and depots 
locations. In our model we use already existing depots: location and capacity of depots are 
decided at strategic level. Each depot has fixed costs associated to its operation. If depot is used, 
these costs are higher than when depot is not used. We focus only on the extra charge of using 
depots. Because an oil company has a large number of depots, it can be reasonable to assume that 
the company doesn’t need to have all depots open at all times. Hence, for a given planning period 
company can decide to close down some of available depots.   
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In our work we investigate the behavior of solution under alternative allocations of the decision 
regarding operation of depots. We consider that this decision can be either taken by PD or SD. 
∑ ?̃?𝒑,𝒅,𝒉
𝐡∈𝐇
= 𝒒𝒑,𝒅                                                       ∀𝐩 ∈ 𝐏, ∀𝐝 ∈ 𝐃                                                      (𝐏𝟏𝟏)  
Constraint (P11) sets a mass balance between products produced at hubs and products available 
at depots.  
In order to deal with fixed costs it is necessary to include binary variables in the model. 
∑ 𝒒𝒑,𝒅
𝐝∈𝐃
≤ 𝒎𝒅 ⋅ 𝒉𝒅                                                ∀𝐝 ∈ 𝐃                                                                       (𝐆𝟏) 
 
Constrain (G1) ensures that company only uses depots which are open. When the depot is used 
the binary variable ℎ𝑑  is 1, and 0 otherwise. The constraint also ensures that depots capacity is 
not exceeded.  
If SD doesn’t include fixed costs into its model the constraint (G1) will be replaced with the 
following constraint: 
∑ 𝒒𝒑,𝒅
𝐝∈𝐃
≤ 𝒎𝒅                                                       ∀𝐝 ∈ 𝐃                                                                        (𝐆𝟐) 
 Constraint (G2) sets a restriction on amount of products that can be stored at depots.  
 
3.3 Product demand 
In our models we consider deterministic demand in markets. This assumes that SD have a perfect 
information about the demand process in the markets, which is a strong assumption. However, 
this assumption makes our model easier to analyze, also deterministic models are commonly used 
in practice (Bitran and Caldentey, 2003). Further we assume that demand is given exogenously 
and customers are price takers, meaning that they observe price set by seller and react by buying 
or not buying the product. Another assumption that we make, is that demand between products 
and markets is not correlated. In other words, markets are isolated from each other, thus 
customers from one market cannot buy products from other markets. This is a reasonable 
 35 
assumption because markets are geographically spread. Similarly, price of one type of product 
doesn’t affect demand for other products. This assumption is reasonable for a short run, because 
if for example diesel becomes relatively cheaper than gasoline, it should not affect demand for 
gasoline in a short run. In a long run, this assumption may not be reasonable because demand for 
diesel transport can go up and demand for gasoline will decline. However, we do not take this 
possibility into account because we consider only short-run models. 
Petroleum industry has high barrier to entry as a result of large investment costs and government 
regulations. We assume therefore, that firms are strategically adapted in markets, and markets are 
typically characterized by competition between a small numbers of firms. Each type of product 
offered by oil companies has the same qualities and covers the same customer needs. Because 
petroleum’s products can be considered as substitutes, it is reasonable to assume that all 
companies are facing the same price. Therefore, we assume that competition occurs only through 
quantum.  
If we assume that each firm operating in a given market maximizes its profit and takes into 
account the quantities chosen by its competitors in the same market, and at the same time the 
company knows that other companies will also take into account its actions, then we can use 
Cournot model (Tirol, 1988).  We will now analyze one-stage game in which firms choose their 
quantities simultaneously. In order to describe demand in a market for a given product we assume 
that demand function looks as follows: 
𝜃 = 𝑎 − 𝑏 ∑ 𝑧𝑖              
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                         (𝐸3.1) 
Where 𝜃  is the price of the product, 𝑧𝑖 is quantity produced by company i, n is total number of 
companies operating in market and a and b are demand parameters.  
As we can observe from (E3.1) price decreases when quantity sold in the market increases. Hence 
one firm cannot decide price alone. As long as companies are rational, each of them will optimize 
their own profit. Profit for company i is given by (E3.2): 
𝜋𝑖  = 𝜃 × 𝑧𝑖 – C(𝑧𝑖)                                                              (E3.2) 
Where C (𝑥𝑖) is the cost function of company i. 
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Assuming that the profit function is strictly concave in 𝑥𝑖 and twice differentiable, from the 
production theory we know that profit is maximized when 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑧𝑖
= 0 . 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑧𝑖
= 𝑎 − 𝑏 ∑ 𝑧𝑗
𝑛−1
𝑗=1
− 2𝑏𝑧𝑖 −
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝜕𝑧𝑖
= 0                                               (𝐸3.3) 
From (E3.3) follows: 
𝑧∗𝑖 =
a – b ∑ 𝑧𝑗
𝑛−1
𝑗=1 −  
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝜕𝑧𝑖
 
2b
                                                              (𝐸3.4) 
As we can observe from (E3.4) optimal quantity produced by company i ,𝑧𝑖 , is a function of 
production in other companies∑ 𝑧𝑗
𝑛−1
𝑗=1 . (E3.4) indicates how much company i should produce 
given the quantity produce by other companies.  
To illustrate our point, we use example of two firms and the Cournot model. However, the 
conclusion will not change if there are more than two firms. One important assumption that we 
make here is that companies know marginal cost functions of other companies. This is a strong 
assumption, which may not correspond to the real world.  
We start by claiming that company 1 knows that company 2 has the following response function 
(based on the assumption that company 2 is rational and maximizes its profit): 
 
𝑧2 =
a – b 𝑧1  −  
𝜕𝐶2
𝜕𝑧2
 
2b
                                                         (𝐸3.5) 
Further we assume that company 2 has the following cost function 𝐶(𝑧2) = 𝐷2 + 𝑐2𝑧2. We 
assume linear form, and hence constant return to scale, in order to simplify calculation. 
Then 
𝜕𝐶2
𝜕𝑥2
=  𝑐2. Now we can rewrite (E3.5). 
 
 𝑧2 =
a – b𝑧1  −  𝑐2 
2b
                                                                 (𝐸3.6) 
Assume that cost function of company 1 is of the same form:  𝐶(𝑧1) = 𝐷1 + 𝑐1𝑧1 
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Then company 1 has following response function: 
 
𝑧1 =
a – b𝑧2  − 𝑐1 
2b
                                                                 (𝐸3.7) 
Because we have made assumption that company 1 knows the response function for company 2, 
we can insert (E3.6) instead of  𝑧2 in (E3.7).  
 
𝑧1 =
a – b 
a – b𝑧1  −  𝑐2 
2b  − 𝑐1 
2b
                                                  (𝐸3.8) 
We simplify (E3.8): 
𝑧1 =  
a + 𝑐2  − 2𝑐1 
3b
                                                                (𝐸3.9) 
Then we do exactly the same for company 2 and get: 
𝑧2 =  
a + 𝑐1  − 2𝑐2 
3b
                                                               (𝐸3.10) 
We have found optimal quantities for both firms.  
On the other hand, if we assume that company 1 knows that company 2 will produce quantum 
calculated in (E3.10) then company 1 can calculate optimum quantum in the following way.  
Insert (E3.10) into (E3.2) and derivate with respect to 𝑧1. 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑧1
=
2a − 𝑐1 + 2𝑐2 
3 
− 2𝑏𝑧1 − 𝑐1 = 0                                           (𝐸3.11) 
 
Derive 𝑧1 from (E3.11): 
𝑧1 =  
a − 2𝑐1 + 𝑐2 
3 
                                                             (𝐸3.12) 
As we can observe (E3.12) is identical to (E3.9).  
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In analogues manner, equilibrium price and quantities can be derived for a larger number of firms 
and costs functions with decreasing return to scale.   
In our example we have used Cournot Analysis and showed how optimal quantity can be derived. 
This implies that a company makes estimates of quantum to other companies and chooses its 
quantum according to these estimates. In our models we assume that company has done some 
forecasts on produced quantity of other companies, without going in details of how this is done.  
So, back to our problem. Price for a given type of product at a given market is given as: 
𝜃 = 𝑎 − 𝑏 (𝑧1 + ∑ 𝑧𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=2
)                                                             (𝐸3.13) 
Assume that company 1 makes forecast on aggregated production from other companies           
?̂? = ∑ 𝑧?̂?
𝑛
𝑖=2  
Then estimated revenue from sales for company 1 is:  
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒1 = 𝑎𝑥1 − 𝑏𝑧1
2 − 𝑏?̂?𝑧1 = (𝑎 − 𝑏?̂?)𝑧1 − 𝑏𝑧1
2                         (E3.14) 
Let 𝐴 = 𝑎 − 𝑏?̂? 
Then we can rewrite revenue function: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒1 = 𝐴𝑧1 − 𝑏𝑧1
2                                                      (𝐸3.15) 
In our work we use A and b as demands parameters, where we assume that A picks up 
competitors action. We assume that A and b parameters are given in our models and we do not 
focus on their calculations. 
So, we are ready to formulate constraint which will be used in our models: 
𝜽𝒑,𝒌 = 𝑨𝒑 − 𝒃𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝒅∈𝑫
                                              ∀𝒑 ∈ 𝑷, ∀𝒌 ∈ 𝑲                                                        (𝑺𝟏) 
Constraint (S1) gives the market price for products.  
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Revenue will be: 
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑝,𝑘zp,d,k
𝑑∈𝐷
                                                                        (𝐸3.16)
𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
 
∑ ∑ {(𝐴𝑝 − 𝑏𝑝 ∑ zp,d,k
𝑑∈𝐷
) ∑ zp,d,k
𝑑∈𝐷
}
𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
  = ∑ ∑ (𝐴𝑝 ∑ zp,d,k
𝑑∈𝐷
− 𝑏𝑝 ∑ zp,d,k
2
𝑑∈𝐷
)
𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
                  (𝐸3.17) 
 
This is a quadratic problem. In order to avoid non-convexity we use equation (E3.17) in our 
objective function instead of (E3.16).  
In our model we assume that for each product and at each market is exists some minimum and 
maximum demand quantities which company must adhere to. Minimum demand may arise 
naturally in a short-run planning situation where company may have contracted to deliver certain 
minimum quantities of each products to the markets. We formulate the following constraint: 
 
𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒑,𝒌 ≤ ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤 ≤ 𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒑,𝒌                             ∀𝐩 ∈ 𝐏   ∀𝐤 ∈ 𝐊                                                        (𝐒𝟐)
𝐝∈𝐃
 
(S2)  Ensures that distribution from depots to market is within upper and lower bound for each 
product at each market.  
 
3.4 Piecewise linear Revenue Function 
In this section we formulate an alternative way of describe revenue, by use of piecewise linear 
approximation of revenue function. This will allow our models to remain linear. However, this 
approach will require inclusion of binary variables. 
We can avoid non-linearity in (E3.17) by dividing the revenue function in a number of segments. 
The new revenue function has the following interpretation. If sold amount of a product lies within 
a given segment then the revenue from this amount will be within corresponding segment. In this 
segment the relationship between sold amount and revenue is linear. We find values for revenue 
by weighting the breakpoints. The following numerical example illustrate the method: 
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Suppose that for a given product at a given market the demand lies within following 
interval [0,300]. Further this interval is divided into three equal segments, illustrated by 𝑙𝑚 in 
Figure 3.2. 
For each breakpoints we define a variable 𝑤𝑗 
Suppose sold amount is 150, which is within segment 𝑙2 =  [100,200]. Corresponding revenue 
segment is [1000,1500]. The weights between breakpoints for sold amount are 𝑤2 = 𝑤3 = 0.5   
100 ∗ 0,5 + 200 ∗ 0,5 = 150. In order to find revenue we use the same weights: 1000 ∗ 0,5 +
1500 ∗ 0,5 = 1250 
 
Figure 3.2 – Piecewise linear Revenue function 
The more breakpoints we include, the more precise linear approximation of revenue will be. 
However, this will be achieved at the expense of increased number of integer variables.  
How will approximation of revenue influence the solution of the problem? A linear 
approximation will not give precise values for revenue, and hence the sold amount and explicitly 
calculated price can deviate from values found with quadratic revenue function. However, as we 
have pointed out earlier, the demand functions are forecasts made by sales department, hence the 
values calculated in these functions do not fully represent the reality. Also, in the real world the 
price can be fixed for a given quantity segment, and not change with each sold amount.  
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We are now ready to formulate constraints which will be used in linear-revenue sales model.  
∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝒅∈𝑫
= ∑ 𝒂𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒎.𝒑𝒘𝒎,𝒑,𝒌
𝒎∈𝑴
                 ∀𝐩 ∈ 𝐏,   ∀𝐤 ∈ 𝐊                                                  (𝐒𝐋𝟏) 
𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆𝒑,𝒌 = ∑ 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒎.𝒑𝒘𝒎,𝒑,𝒌                        ∀𝐩 ∈ 𝐏,   ∀𝐤 ∈ 𝐊  
𝒎∈𝑴
                                               (𝐒𝐋𝟐) 
∑ 𝒘𝒎,𝒑,𝒌 = 𝟏                                                        ∀𝐩 ∈ 𝐏, ∀𝐤 ∈ 𝐊                                                    (𝐒𝐋𝟑)
𝒎∈𝑴
 
∑ 𝒍𝒎,𝒑,𝒌 = 𝟏                                                         ∀𝐩 ∈ 𝐏,   ∀𝐤 ∈ 𝐊                                                 (𝐒𝐋𝟒)
𝒎∈𝒊𝑴
 
𝒘𝒎,𝒑,𝒌 ≤ 𝒍𝒎−𝟏,𝒑,𝒌 + 𝒍𝒎,𝒑,𝒌                                    ∀𝐩 ∈ 𝐏 , ∀𝒎 ∈ 𝑴,   ∀𝐤 ∈ 𝐊                              (𝐒𝐋𝟓) 
 
Sold amount lies between two breakpoints (can also be only at one point), constrain (SL1) finds 
how these breakpoints are weighted for each product. Each sold amount corresponds to a certain 
revenue value, constrain (SL2) calculates this revenue value. Constraint (SL3) ensures that the 
sum of weights sums to one. (SL4) ensures that sold amount can correspond to only one segment. 
(SL5) ensures that the weights which are used to create a point can lie only between two breaking 
points which correspond to one segment 
Revenue term in the objective function will look as follows:  
∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘                                                                  (𝐸3.18)
𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
 
 
Because revenue is a variable which is calculated in constraint (SL2) for each product at each 
market, in the objective function we sum over all products and all markets in order to calculate 
the total revenue.  
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Chapter 4– Production and Sales Models 
In this chapter, we develop models to represent two divisional subproblems. Production model 
(PM) includes production at refineries, blending at hubs, and primary distribution. Sales models 
(SM) include sales planning and secondary distribution. Under such decoupled setting, divisional 
planning is performed separately. Because the sales department is assumed to be managed 
independent from the rest of the company, its objective is seeking for local optimality. 
This way of problem formulation has a lot in common with decoupled models used in Guajardo 
et al. (2013a, 2013b). The main differences are in a way we formulate blending constraints, 
further we consider only one time period, and we include possibility of closing depots. We 
consider two possible ways the sales department’s premium can be calculated: in the first 
alternative sales department takes fixed costs associated with depots operation into account, while 
in the second alternative premium doesn’t depend on fixed costs and hence department doesn’t 
include these costs in its objective function. Therefore we formulate two alternative sales models: 
SM1 and SM2. 
We assume that there is infinite capacity for processing crude oils at refineries and producing 
products at hubs. Further we assume that feedstock and commodities that have not been used in 
processing or blending, and products that have not been sold, have zero value. 
 
4.1 Production model (PM) 
In the production model the main goal is to match estimated sales from SD while at the same 
time minimizing costs. The estimated sales are given by the parameter q̅𝑆p,d. 
New parameters: 
q̅𝑆p,d:    Amount of product p which must be available at depot d 
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Production model (PM) 
Objective function 
𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝑷𝑴:     ∑ ∑ 𝑪𝒊,𝒓
𝑩𝒖𝒚
𝒓∈𝑹𝒊∈𝑰
𝐱𝐢,𝐫 + ∑ ∑ 𝑪𝒊,𝒓
𝑷𝑹𝑶
𝒓∈𝑹
 
𝒊∈𝑰
𝐱𝐢,𝐫 + ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐞,𝐫
𝐏𝐑𝐎𝟐
𝒓∈𝑹
𝐯𝐞,𝐢,𝐫
𝒊∈𝑰𝒆∈𝑬
 
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐩,𝐡
𝐁𝐋𝐄𝐍𝐃
𝒉∈𝑯
?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
 
+ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐫,𝐡
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟏 (∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒑∈𝑷𝒊∈𝑰𝒆∈𝑬
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢.𝐫
𝒃∈𝑩𝒑∈𝑷𝒊∈𝑰𝒄∈𝑪
)
𝒉∈𝑯𝒓∈𝑹
 
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐡,𝐝
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟐
𝒑∈𝑷𝒅∈𝑫
?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡
𝒉∈𝑯
                                                                           (𝑷𝑴) 
Subject to (P1) to (P11) 
?̅?𝑺
𝐩,𝐝
≤  𝒒𝐩,𝐝                                                         ∀𝐩 ∈ 𝐏 , ∀𝐝 ∈ 𝐃                                            (𝐏𝟏𝟐) 
𝐱𝐢,𝐫, 𝐲𝐞,𝐢,𝐫, 𝐯𝐛,𝐢,𝐫, ?̃?𝐞,𝐢,𝐫, ?̃?𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫, ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡, ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡, ?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡, 𝒒𝐩,𝐝 ≥ 𝟎 
The first term of the objective function represents costs related to purchasing of crude oil. Second 
term represents costs of processing crude oils. The next term is processing cost for components. 
Fourth term represents blending costs. The last two terms represent transportation costs. 
We have included costs of purchasing crude oils in the model, because this ensure a more 
efficient use of crude oils. If these costs have not been included, the crude oil of “good” quality 
would be “overused”, because it's cheaper to process and easier to satisfy quality requirements of 
final products with. 
Constraints (P1) to (P11) are explained in details in chapter 3.2. Constraint (P12) ensures that 
producer generates at least what is ordered from SD.  
PM is a linear problem. That makes it “easy” to solve and we can be sure that the solution of this 
model is optimal (but may not be unique).  
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4.2 Sales Models (SM)  
The goal of SD is to maximize its premium, assuming that forecasts about demand will be 
realized. As we have argued in chapter 2, the premium proportion doesn’t affect departmental 
decisions, and therefore is not included in the model. One of the decisions that sales department 
makes is type and amount of products, and which depots to order from. It is given by variable 
q𝑆p,d. 
New parameters: 
πp,d:    Internal price sales department has to pay for product p at depot d 
New variables: 
q𝑆p,d:   Amount of product p ordered by sales department at depot d 
 
Sales Model 1 (SM1) 
Objective function  
𝑴𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝑺𝑴𝟏 :            ∑ ∑ (𝑨𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝒅∈𝑫
− 𝒃𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝟐
𝒅∈𝑫
)
𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
− ∑ ∑ 𝝅𝒑,𝒅 × 𝐪
𝑺
𝐩,𝐝
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
 
 − ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐝,𝐤
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟑 × 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤 − ∑ 𝑪𝒅
𝑭𝑰𝑿𝒉𝒅
𝒅∈𝑫𝒅∈𝑫𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
                                       (𝑺𝑴𝟏) 
 
Subject to (S1) to (S2) and (G1) 
∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝒌∈𝑲
≤ 𝐪𝑺𝐩,𝐝                                                     ∀𝐩 ∈ 𝐏,   ∀𝐝 ∈ 𝐃                                                    (𝐒𝟑) 
𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤 ≥ 𝟎, 𝐪
𝑺
𝐩,𝐝 ≥ 𝟎, 𝜽𝒑,𝒌 ≥ 𝟎     𝒉𝒅 ∈ {𝟎, 𝟏}                 
Objective function (SM1) expresses SDs maximization function. The first term includes revenue 
from sales which is explained in more details in chapter 3.3. The second term represents products 
purchase costs. The third term represents fixed costs from depots, and the last term represents 
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transportation costs from depots to markets. Constraint (G1) is explained in chapter 3.2, while 
(S1) and (S2) in chapter 3.3. Constraint (S3) ensures that the amount of ordered products is 
bigger or equal than the amount of sold products.  
Sales Model 2 (SM2) 
Objective function 
𝑴𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝑺𝑴𝟐 :           ∑ ∑ (𝑨𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝒅∈𝑫
− 𝒃𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝟐
𝒅∈𝑫
)
𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
 
− ∑ ∑ 𝝅𝒑,𝒅 × 𝐪
𝑺
𝐩,𝐝
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
− ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐝,𝐤
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟑 × 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤 
𝒅∈𝑫𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
                  (𝑺𝑴𝟐) 
Subject to (S1) to (S3) and (G2).  
𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤 ≥ 𝟎, 𝐪
𝑺
𝐩,𝐝 ≥ 𝟎 𝜽𝒑,𝒌 ≥ 𝟎                   (S5) 
SM2 differs from SM1 in the objective function: the part that is associated with fixed costs is 
removed in SM2.  Also constraint (G2) is used instead of (G1). 
 
Discussion about the sales subproblem 
SM1 is used when SD chooses depots for operation and at the same its premium depends upon 
fixed costs. SM2 is used when premium to SD doesn’t depend on fixed costs. In this case we 
consider two possibilities. The first one is that production department decides in advance which 
depots will be in operation. In this case, the available depots in SM2 are determined by PD. The 
second possibility is that sales department makes decision about the operation of depots. In this 
case there are no binary variables because fixed costs are not taken into account in SDs objective 
function. Depots that sales department doesn’t choose for operation will be indicated by zero 
inventory.  
If we consider SM2, where fixed costs from depots are ignored, and assume that 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑆𝑀2(zp,d,k) is concave for zp,d,k ≥ 0, we know that function has its maximum when 
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑆𝑀2
𝜕zp,d,k
 = 0. If the feasible region to this maximization problem defined by the constraints is a 
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convex set then we have a convex problem, and a local maximum is also a global maximum 
(Lundgren et al. 2010). Because constraints (S1) and (S3) are linear we know that we have a 
convex set. Hence when we are ignoring fixed costs from depots, we can easily find the global 
optimal solution to this problem. When we include binary variables to our problem, in SM1, we 
make the problem mixed integer nonlinear. However under the assumptions that we have just 
made the problem SM1 is convex MINL. For problems of this type there exist some solution 
methods which guarantee to find an optimal solution. One such method is branch and bound for 
nonlinear problems (Gupta and Ravindran, 1985). By relaxing the integer constraints, 
subproblems which are solved are convex-problems.  
 
Linear Sales Problem 
Below we formulate sales model based on piecewise linear revenue forecasts. 
Linear Sales Model 1 (SM1-Linear)  
Objective function 
𝑴𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝑺𝑴𝟏−𝑳 : ∑ ∑ 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆𝒑,𝒌
𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
 − ∑ 𝑪𝒅
𝑭𝑰𝑿𝒉𝒅
𝒅
 
− ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐝,𝐤
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟑 × 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤 
𝒅∈𝑫𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
 
− ∑ ∑ 𝝅𝒑,𝒅 × 𝐪
𝑺
𝐩,𝐝
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
                                             (𝑺𝑴𝟏 − 𝑳)  
 
Subject to (SML1) to (SML5), (S3) and (G1) 
 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤, 𝐪
𝑺
𝐩,𝐝, 𝒘𝒎,𝒑,𝒌, 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆𝒑,𝒌 ≥ 𝟎  𝒉𝒅, 𝒍𝒎,𝒑,𝒌 ∈ {𝟎, 𝟏}      
The objective function to SM1-L differs from SM1 only in the first term, because revenue is 
defined as the variable. Constraints (SML1) to (SML5) are explained in chapter 3.4. (S3) and 
(G1) are also used in SM1. The linear sales model SM2-L, which is the alternative to SM2, is 
formulated in Appendix A.  
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4.3 Coordination between PM and SM/SM-L 
In SM/SML internal prices for products are given as a parameters 𝜋𝑝,𝑑. How these prices are 
calculated, is discussed in part 2, which concerns the planning level. The models that we have 
defined in this chapter, are solved at the decision level. At this level internal prices are already 
decided.  
Solution of SM/SML gives quantities q𝑆
p,d
 ordered by the sales department. These are used as 
demand in PM. In other words q𝑆
p,d
= q̅𝑆
p,d
 and constraint (P12) ensures that produced amount 
satisfies this demand.  
Because at the decision level, the production department has to satisfy a concrete demand from 
the sales department, PM doesn’t include the depot operation constraint. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 – Decision level 
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Chapter 5 – Integrated Models (IM) 
In this chapter, we propose an Integrated model (IM1). The optimal solution to IM1 is the best 
achievable result for the whole company. When sales and production planning are integrated into 
one model, the company as whole decides on production, distribution and sales, and maximizes 
the total profit of the organization. The advantage with integrated planning is that decisions about 
distribution to markets are made together with production decisions, and hence provide a better 
match between sale and production. However, as we have pointed out earlier, because such 
planning is not possible in practice we can only use solution from this model as theoretic 
benchmark for performance of other approaches.  
We maintain the notation and definition from previous chapters for all parameters, sets and 
variables.  
 
Integrated Model 1 (IM1): 
Objective function 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑀1 : ∑ ∑ (𝑨𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝒅∈𝑫
− 𝒃𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝟐
𝒅∈𝑫
)
𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
− ∑ 𝑪𝒅
𝑭𝑰𝑿𝒉𝒅
𝒅∈𝑫
 
− ∑ ∑ 𝑪𝒊,𝒓
𝑩𝒖𝒚
𝒓∈𝑹𝒊∈𝑰
𝐱𝐢,𝐫 − ∑ ∑ 𝑪𝒊,𝒓
𝑷𝑹𝑶
𝒓∈𝑹
 
𝒊∈𝑰
𝐱𝐢,𝐫 
             − ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐞,𝐫
𝐏𝐑𝐎𝟐
𝒓∈𝑹
𝐯𝐞,𝐢,𝐫
𝒊∈𝑰𝒆∈𝑬
− ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐩,𝐡
𝐁𝐋𝐄𝐍𝐃
𝒉∈𝑯
?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
 
                                                 − ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐫,𝐡
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟏 (∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒑∈𝑷𝒊∈𝑰𝒆∈𝑬
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢.𝐫
𝒃∈𝑩𝒑∈𝑷𝒊∈𝑰𝒄∈𝑪
)
𝒉∈𝑯𝒓∈𝑹
 
− ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐡,𝐝
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟐
𝒑∈𝑷𝒅∈𝑫
?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡 −
𝒉∈𝑯
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐝,𝐤
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟑 × 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤 
𝒅∈𝑫𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
       (𝑰𝑴𝟏) 
     
Subject to (P1) to (P11), (S1) to (S2), (G1) 
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𝒒𝒑,𝒅 = ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝒌∈𝑲
                                                  ∀𝐩 ∈ 𝐏    ∀𝐝 ∈ 𝐃                                                        (𝐈𝟏) 
𝐱𝐢,𝐫, 𝐲𝐞,𝐢,𝐫, 𝐯𝐛,𝐢,𝐫, ?̃?𝐞,𝐢,𝐫, ?̃?𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫, ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡, ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡, 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤 , ?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡, 𝒒𝒑,𝒅, 𝜽𝒑,𝒌 ≥ 𝟎   and 𝒉𝒅 ∈ {𝟎, 𝟏}   
       
In IM1 the objective function represents the goal of the company: maximize contribution, which 
is the revenue from sales minus the costs. No internal price for products are present, as there are 
no need for them in integrated planning. 
The IM1 has almost the same constraints as SM1 and PM. The only difference is that constraints 
(S3) and (P12) are replaced with the new constraint (I1).  
Similar as SM1, IM1 is a quadratic programming (QP) problem with linear constraints.  
In the same way as we did in SM1-L, we can formulate Linear Integrated Model (IM1-L), 
assuming piecewise revenue function. This model is formulated in Appendix A.  
Also we analyze a case in which decision about depots operation is taken by PD in advance. The 
best achievable solution, in this case, may be different from the solution of IM1. Therefor in 
order to know what the optimal result is in this case we need to formulate another model, which 
we call IM2. The objective function of IM2 is the same as in IM1 except the fixed cost term 
which is removed. Also the constraints are almost the same, the only difference is that instead of 
(G1), (G2) is used. We note, that because which depots are used in operation is decided in 
advance, the set of available depots D, may be different from the one which is used in IM1. IM2 
together with L-IM2 are formulated in Appendix A.  
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PART 2: INTERNAL PRICES MECHANISMS 
In chapter 4 we have formulated two different sales models: SM1 and SM2, each corresponding 
to different ways how premium received by the sales department is calculated.  Depending on 
which of the models is used and how decisions are allocated, internal prices can be calculated in 
different ways at the planning level. When we formulate methods for calculation of internal 
prices, we consider four different scenarios for how information is taken into account by the 
departments.  
Scenario 1 – Both production and sales departments take into account operating costs of depots 
Scenario 2 – Only production departments takes these costs into account. 
Scenario 3 - Only sales department takes these costs into account. 
Scenario 4 – The decision about which depot will operate, is taken by production department in 
advance and none of the departments take these costs into account when internal prices are 
decided. 
If SM1, where sales department takes fixed costs into account, is used then the scenarios 1 or 3 
can be used in the planning process. If instead of SM1, SM2 is used and PD decides which depots 
should operate, then scenario 4 is possible to use in the planning process. If SM2 is used, but all 
depots are available for use, then scenario 2 should be used to decide internal prices. The 
intuition behind scenario 2 is as follows: the production department should set internal prices in 
such a way that depots operating costs should be reflected in these prices. Internal prices should 
stimulate the sales department to choose "right" depots, hence it should not be necessary for SD 
to take depot costs into account directly.  Figure 6.1 summarizes the choice of scenarios.  
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Figure 6.1- Choice Scenarios  
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Chapter 6 – The Cost-Based Mechanism 
We starting with proposition of cost-based pricing mechanism, which assigns internal price for 
each product p at each depot d, based on the cost that the product has incurred in the supply chain 
until the depot stage.  
Bitran and Caldentey (2003) have pointed out that there is a tendency in practice to set prices 
based on costs. The authors have asserted that the reason for that is probably “a mixture of 
managers’ incentives based on margins and the classical advice from economic theory where 
marginal cost plays a central role in pricing decisions” (Bitran and Caldentey, 2003; p.211). 
Bredström and Rönnqvist (2008) have claimed that a common approach to find internal prices is 
to use shadow prices or marginal values from models used in production planning. However, as 
Guajardo et al. (2013b) have pointed out, calculating a true marginal cost becomes a difficult task 
in a situation with multiple products, echelons and locations.  
Guajardo et al. (2013b) have presented three methods of setting the internal prices based on cost 
calculations. In these methods the authors took into account dependencies between products due 
to one raw material yielding several products. The dependencies between products are also 
present in our problem. But since in those three methods the final products were blended 
according to well specified recipes, we cannot use them directly, because our models don't 
include such recipes. Therefore we will introduce two methods that are more useful in our case.  
These relative simple methods will be used as a comparison to Lagrangean decomposition 
method which is described in the next chapter. Cost based methods do not require any exchange 
of information between departments at the planning level. And PD doesn’t take into account 
possible orders from SD when it decides internal prices. 
 
6.1 Method 1 
In our first cost based method, we start by calculating how much it costs to produce one unit of 
product p, when company produces only this type of product. In other words, we assume that the 
company produces only one type of product at a time. This calculation is relative easy, because 
when company produces just one product there are no dependencies between products. Therefore 
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we can easily calculate variable costs related to the product. In our problem, the production 
model (PM) is linear. It implies that producing 10 units of one product, costs 10 times more than 
producing one unit of the same product, under the assumption that company produces only one 
type of product. The linear model also guarantees that the company is able to find the lowest 
possible production cost.  
Because of many variables and constraints, which are involved in the production process, to 
ensure that the lowest cost is achieved we use PM to calculate product costs. The PM requires an 
input matrix q̅𝑆
p,d
, which specifies how many units of product p should be delivered to depot d. 
As long as we are interesting in cost of one product at a time, the input is one unit of product p to 
depot d and zero to other depots and other products.  
The objective function value of PM indicates how much it costs to produce and deliver ordered 
products to the depots. When only one product is ordered at one depot, the objective of PM will 
show exactly what we are looking for. Because we are interesting to price product at all depots, 
we solve PM n times, where n indicates how many depots company has.  
Then we repeat the same procedure for other products, and at the end we have a matrix with 
internal prices for each product at each depot.  
 
6.2 Method 2 
Method 2 is a modification of method 1. It considers possibility that several products can be 
ordered simultaneously. 
The idea behind this modification comes from the cost allocation methods. Due to dependencies 
between products it can be cheaper to produce two type of products at the same time than each 
product separately. This is the case because, when one type of product is produced there can be 
some components that are left. These components can be used in production of other type of 
products. 
The cost allocation problems arise when individuals, all with their own propose, decide to work 
together. One problem that arise in this situation, is how to divide the joint costs and the costs 
savings which results from the cooperation, among the participants (Tijs and Driessen, 1986). We 
 54 
have a similar problem: some costs are related to several products and the question is how to 
allocate these costs between these products.  
Above we have described how to calculate costs of producing and transport product p to depot d, 
denoted later as ∁𝑝,𝑑. Supposing that the company produces four types of products we can 
find ∁1,𝑑, ∁2,𝑑 , ∁3,𝑑 and ∁4,𝑑 for all depots d. In what follows, we describe how we can calculate 
how much it costs to produce two different products at the same time.  
In the same way as we have done in method 1, we use PM. But now we require that two products 
must be available at one depot d.  The cost of producing and transport product 1 and product 2 to 
depot d, is denoted as  ∁1,2,𝑑.  As we have mentioned we expect that  ∁1,2,𝑑 ≤  ∁1,𝑑 + ∁2,𝑑.  
When we have calculated ∁1,2,𝑑, we calculate a new term:  𝐷1,2,𝑑= (∁1,𝑑 + ∁2,𝑑) -  ∁1,2,𝑑. 
This term can be interpreted as a discount which company gets when product 1 and product 2 are 
produced at the same time. The main idea behind the modification is to find discounts for each 
product type when we consider production of two products at the same time, and hence more 
correct cost than we have found in method 1.  
In order to calculate internal prices with this method, we need to find discount factors for all 
possible combination of two products at each depot. Therefore we repeat the same procedure for 
 ∁1,3,𝑑 and ∁1,4,𝑑. When we have calculated 𝐷1,2,𝑑,  𝐷1,3,𝑑 and 𝐷1,4,𝑑 we can find “the final 
discount” for product 1 at depot d. Because  𝐷1,2,𝑑 includes discount for both product 1 and 
product 2, we divide it by two to find discount for product 1 and 2 separately.  
 Then the total discount for product 1 at depot d will equal to the average of 
 𝐷1,2,𝑑
 2
,   
 𝐷1,3,𝑑
 2
, 
 𝐷1,4,𝑑
 2
 . 
 𝐷1,𝑑 =
∑
 𝐷1,𝑗,𝑑
 2
4
𝑗=2
3
 
 
Now we are ready to calculate internal price of product 1 at depot d. 
𝜋1,𝑑
∗ =  ∁1,𝑑 −  𝐷1,𝑑     
We use this procedure to find internal prices for other products at each depot.  For each next 
product we have to do less calculations, because the production of product 1 + product 2 gives 
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exactly the same costs as the production of product 2 + product 1. Therefore, we don’t need to 
calculate discount  𝐷2,1,𝑑, because it's exactly the same as  𝐷1,2,𝑑. 
6.3 Comments on the cost-based methods 
The two methods that we have described, don’t fully represent costs related to production of 
products, and therefore give just some indication of costs created by each product. Methods don’t 
take into account restriction on purchase of crude oils at refineries. As long as the methods 
calculate how much it will cost to produce only one unit of each product, the solution will always 
be based on the most profitable crude oil type and the "cheapest" refinery for this type of product. 
In reality, amount of each product ordered by SD is big, and it cannot be possible to produce all 
products in the cheapest way. Also, the second method (and the first method) doesn’t take into 
account that when more than two types of products are ordered at the same time the costs may 
decrease even more. We don’t expect that our methods of internal price calculation will give an 
optimal solution to the overall company's problem. However, these methods are relative simple 
and don't require information exchange between SD and PD at the planning level. These methods 
can also serve as a starting point for more advanced methods. For example, internal prices 
calculated in these methods can be used as initial values of Lagrangean multipliers in the 
Lagrangean decomposition method which we describe in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 - Lagrangean Decomposition   
7.1 – The Theory behind LD 
Lagrangean relaxation is a solution strategy used for solving large structured problems. The idea 
behind this method is to relax some constraints in the original problem formulation and consider 
them implicit through the objective in the Lagrangean function. The use of Lagrangean 
multipliers lead to penalty of the objective function if the relaxed constrains are violated 
(Lundgren et al. 2009).  
Guignard and Kim (1987b) have proposed Lagrangean decomposition as a generalization of 
conventional Lagrangean relaxation.  The authors have introduced copies of the original variables 
for a subset of constraints and dualized the equivalence conditions between the original variables 
and the copies.  
In the Lagrangean decomposition method, Lagrangean subproblems keep all the original 
constraints. The method is applicable when the original model consists of two (or more) 
subproblems with common variables. The method involves reformulation of the original problem 
using variable splitting. The original variables that occur in both subproblems are replaced with 
copies, and at the same time a coupling constraints are added. These new constraints then are 
relaxed and the original model is decomposed into separate subproblems. This implies that we get 
subproblems that have identical constraints with the original model, but can be solved 
individually now. When variables are duplicated the problem becomes larger, but on the other 
hand duplication enables decomposition of the model into parts which will be easier to solve. 
Guignard and Kim (1987a) have showed that applying the Lagrangean decomposition method to 
integer programming problems may yield a stronger bounds than the conventional Lagrangean 
relaxation method.  
The Lagrangean decomposition technique has been applied in many different applications. For 
instance, Lidestam and Rönnqvist (2011) have applied Lagrangean heuristic method based on 
Lagrangean decomposition to an integrated planning problem in a supply chain for a large pulp 
company. As a result of applying the proposed approach, feasible solution of high quality was 
generated in a short time. As we have mentioned in the introduction, Mouret et al. (2011), Neiro 
and Pinto (2006), and Oliveira et al. (2012), have used different versions of LD method to solve 
various problems that arise in oil companies. Also, as it has been pointed out in chapter 2, the 
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method has been used as price-directive approach for coordination between departments. LD has 
been applied as a coordination approach between refinery production planning and sales planning 
in a SNF report written by Bredström and Rönnqvist, (2008), and in a working paper written by 
Kong and Rönnqvist (2012). 
We use an example to illustrate Lagrangean decomposition method. Consider the following 
optimization problem [𝑃] 
max:
𝑥
 𝑧 = 𝑐𝑇𝑥            [𝑃] 
𝑠. 𝑡:    𝐴𝑥 = 𝑎,  𝐵𝑥 = 𝑏, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 
Where c, a, b, A and B are vectors and matrices, and X is integer requirements on variables.  
We start with coping of variables 𝑥 →  𝑥 = 𝑦  
And express the objective function coefficients in the following way: 𝑐 = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2.  
The reformulated problem [𝑃] looks now as following: 
max:
𝑥
𝑧 = 𝑐1
𝑇𝑥 + 𝑐2
𝑇𝑦           [𝑃𝑅] 
𝑠. 𝑡:    𝐴𝑥 = 𝑎, 𝐵𝑦 = 𝑏, 𝑥 = 𝑦,  𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 
The problem [𝑃𝑅] is equivalent to [𝑃] for any set Y containing X (Guignard and Kim, 1987a). 
The next step is to relax the new constraint with Lagrangean multiplier 𝜆: 
max:
𝑥,𝑦
𝐿(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝜆) = 𝑐1
𝑇𝑥 + 𝑐2
𝑇𝑦 +  𝜆(𝑥 − 𝑦)          [𝑃𝐿]      
𝑠. 𝑡:    𝐴𝑥 = 𝑎,  𝐵𝑦 = 𝑏,  𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 
We can now easily split the problem into two subproblems  
max:
𝑥
𝐿1 =  (𝑐1 + 𝜆)
𝑇𝑥   𝑠. 𝑡:    𝐴𝑥 = 𝑎,  𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 
max:
𝑦
𝐿2 =  (𝑐2 + 𝜆)
𝑇𝑦   𝑠. 𝑡:    𝐵𝑦 = 𝑏,  𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 
From the optimization theory we know that in order to find an optimal solution to problem [𝑃], 
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which we call for the primal problem, we need to maximize the Lagrangean function, 𝐿(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝜆) 
with respect to 𝑥, 𝑦 and minimize it with respect to 𝜆 (Lundgren et al. 2009). Hence we are 
interesting to find solution to the following problem: 
min
𝜆
   max
𝑥,𝑦
𝐿(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝜆)        
The Lagrangean decomposition dual function [𝐷] to the problem [𝑃], which is the problem of 
finding the tightest upper bound on problem [𝑃] is defined as: 
min
𝜆
 ℎ(𝜆)                                                                                     [𝐷] 
Where ℎ(𝜆) = max
𝑥,𝑦
𝐿(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝜆).  
For each dual solution 𝜆, the Lagrangean dual problem provides an optimistic bound on the 
optimal objective function value 𝑧(𝑥∗, 𝑦∗) (Lundgren et al. 2009). 
If the original problem [𝑃] is convex, the optimal objective function value of dual and primal 
problems are equal: ℎ(𝜆∗) = 𝑧(𝑥∗, 𝑦∗). However, if the problem is non-convex, then we may get 
a duality gap: 
ℎ(𝜆∗) > 𝑧(𝑥∗, 𝑦∗) 
Suppose, we have found optimal solution of [𝑃𝐿]: (𝑥(?̂?), 𝑦(?̂?)). If 𝑥(?̂?) and 𝑦(?̂?) are identical, 
then 𝑥(?̂?) is an optimal solution of [𝑃], ?̂? is an optimal solution of [𝐷] and there is no duality gap 
(Guignard and Kim, 1987a; 1987b ).  
When we use Lagrangean decomposition, one important question that we need to answer is 
which variables and constraints should be duplicated. One criteria is to achieve subproblems 
which are relative easy to solve. If we relax too many constraints, problems will be easy to solve, 
however the quality of optimistic bound will be worse.  
When we have decided which variables and constraints should be duplicated and formulated the 
dual function, we need to choose some initial Lagrangean multipliers. Often these are set to zero 
as a starting point, meaning that relaxed constraints are ignored (Lundgren et al. 2009). Once we 
solve the dual problem with some chosen multipliers we obtain an optimistic bound, which is 
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given by the objective function value of the Lagrangean problem. If the solution is feasible we 
can also calculate a pessimistic bound. However, if the solution is infeasible another question 
arise: How to deduce a good feasible solution to the original problem given the solution to the 
relaxed problem? Often, some heuristic methods are used to make the solution feasible. As 
Guignard (2003) has pointed out, Lagrangean heuristics are essentially problem dependent. 
A standard convergence criterion is to stop when difference between lower bound (LBD) and 
upper bound (UBD) is small enough. A difficulty in the solution process is how to update and 
compute good Lagrangean multipliers. Because we are interesting in that the dual objective 
function moves in the direction of the optimal objective function of the primal problem, we must 
find a way in which we choose the right search direction and step length for the Lagrangean 
multipliers. In other words we are interesting to obtain the tightest bound by adjusting 𝜆 such 
that: 
ℎ(𝜆) = min
𝜆
𝐿(𝜆, 𝑥, 𝑦) 
Some of Lagrangean dual problems may be non-differentiable. This can be the case if we solve 
an integer programming problem, where dual problem may give multiple solutions for some 
multipliers and hence not be differentiable at these points (Lundgren et al. 2009). This implies 
that gradient method cannot be used to find a search direction. A typically iterative technique 
which is employed in such cases is a subgradient method, which can be thought as a gradient 
method with some adaptation at the points where Lagrangean function is non-differentiable 
(Fisher, 1985; Guignard 2003; Lundgren et al., 2009). Subgradient optimization has a wide 
acceptability among researches and is one of the most elective and useful technique for large 
problems with complex structure (Fumero, 2001).   
The subgradient is calculated in the same way as the gradient: 
𝛾 =
𝜕𝐿(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝜆)
𝜕𝜆
 
However at points where 𝐿(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝜆) is non-differentiable, the subgradient method chooses 
arbitrarily from the set of alternative optimal solutions. In our example 𝛾(𝑘) = 𝑥(𝑘) − 𝑦(𝑘).  
In the subgradient method the sequence of multipliers is generated as follows: 
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𝜆(𝑘+1) = 𝜆(𝑘) + 𝑡(𝑘)𝛾(𝑘) 
Where 𝑡(𝑘) is the step length at iteration k.  
One of the problems with subgradients is that they cannot guarantee that found search direction is 
ascent and hence that the objective function will be improved in each iteration (Lundgren et al. 
2009). It is therefore important to choose step length carefully. In order to guarantee 
convergence, theoretical requirement is that the step length 𝑡(𝑘)should be selected so that it 
converge to 0, but not too quickly. The results has shown that if  𝑡(𝑘) → 0 and ∑ 𝑡(𝑘) → ∞𝑘𝑖=1  
when 𝑘 → ∞ then 𝐿(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝜆(𝑘)) will converge to its optimal value (Fisher, 1985).  The suitable 
step size may be determined by the following formula (Fisher, 1985): 
𝑡(𝑘) =
𝜎(𝑘) (ℎ (𝜆
(𝑘)
) − 𝑧∗)
∥ 𝛾(𝑘) ∥
2
 
Where 𝜀1 ≤ 𝜎
(𝑘) ≤ 2 − 𝜀2 (𝜀1, 𝜀2 > 0) is a scalar and 𝑧
∗ is the optimal solution of (P). If we 
know the optimal solution, it will be possible to assure geometric convergence to the optimal 
point (Fumero, 2001).   
Obviously, the optimal solution in most cases is unknown. In these cases, the formula for step 
length that works well in practice (Fisher, 1985) is: 
𝑡(𝑘) =
𝜎(𝑘) (ℎ (𝜆
(𝑘)
) − 𝑧𝐿𝐵𝐷)
∥ 𝛾(𝑘) ∥
2
 
Where  𝑧𝐿𝐵𝐷 is a best known feasible solution. Frequently, one start with 𝜎(𝑘) = 2, and then 
reduce 𝜎(𝑘) by some factor whenever 𝐿(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝜆(𝑘)) has failed to decrease in a specified number of 
iterations (Fisher, 1985).  
Guignard (2003) has mentioned that many authors have studied subgradient method and 
improved its algorithmic behavior. Fumero (2001) has suggested a modified subgradient 
algorithm, in which the author presented more accurate step length calculation and search 
direction. Also other methods has been proposed to solve Lagrangean duals. Some of these, 
combined subgradient method with other methods. Oliveira et al. (2012) suggested a novel hybrid 
algorithmic framework for updating the Lagrangean multiplier based on the combination of 
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cutting-plane, subgradient and trust-region strategies. The authors have showed in a numerical 
example that this framework may lead to significant savings in computational times compared 
with the traditional subgradient algorithm. Mouret et al. (2011) have introduced a new hybrid 
dual problem to update the Lagrangean multipliers, in which the authors used the classical 
concepts of cutting planes, subgradient, and boxstep. The results obtained in a case study showed 
that the new Lagrangean decomposition algorithm was more robust than the other approaches and 
produces better solutions in reasonable times.  
In our work we consider only traditional subgradient method. 
7.2 - Implementation of Lagrangean Decomposition (LD) 
The main idea of using LD in our problem, is to find values for internal prices of products, which 
will be used as input to optimization model used by sales department. These prices should 
stimulate SD to make optimal orders.  
Because the solution of IM1/IM2 is the best achievable solution, we will use these models as the 
base for the decomposition. The integrated models consist of two interesting subproblems: sales 
and production subproblems.  As we have pointed out in the previous section, one should 
carefully consider which variable and constraints should be duplicated and which subproblems 
will appear as the result duplication. When we apply LD method to planning problems, it can be a 
good idea to create subproblems that will correspond to the local problems of the departments, 
because it will give a realistic interpretation of these subproblems. It's desirable that constraints 
associated to each of the departments remain in the departmental subproblems. We are therefore 
interesting to decouple IM1/IM2 in such a way that obtained subproblems will be as close as 
possible to each of the departmental local problems, while at the same time we are still interesting 
to obtain a solution which will be optimal to IM1/IM2.  
7.2.1 Decomposition of IM1/IM2 
As we have discussed in Chapter 4, there are several possible ways to allocate some of the 
decisions between departments. Therefore, we will consider four alternative scenarios (described 
in at the beginning of part 2) of decompose IM1/IM2. 
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From IM1/IM2 we can observe that activities in PD and SD are linked together through variable 
𝑞𝑝,𝑑, which shows how many units of product p are delivered to depot d. We choose to split this 
common variable and add a coupling constraint 𝑞(𝑃)𝑝,𝑑 = 𝑞
(𝑆)
𝑝,𝑑. Then, this copy constraint is 
dualized (relaxed) with Lagrangean multiplier 𝜆𝑝,𝑑. We find it reasonable to do in all four 
scenarios. The base for scenarios 1, 2 and 3 is IM1, while IM2 is the base for scenario 4.  
In what follows, we start by formulating subproblems for each of the four scenarios before we 
describe the solution algorithm. The linear sales models, which are decomposed from IM1-L and 
IM2-L, are formulated in Appendix A (the production models are the same in both nonlinear and 
linear cases).  
 
Scenario 1 
If both departments take into account fixed costs associated with operation of depots, in addition 
to 𝑞𝑝,𝑑 variable, we duplicate the decision variable ℎ𝑑 which shows whether depot d is operating 
or not. We define copies of variable and add a coupling constraint: ℎ𝑑
(𝑃) = ℎ𝑑
(𝑆)
, then we relax 
this new constraint with Lagrangean multiplier 𝜇𝑑 . Because we include these variables in both 
production and sales subproblems, we replicate the associated objective function 
coefficient,  𝐶𝑑
𝐹𝐼𝑋. As it was pointed out by Guignard and Kim (1987a), when some of the 
constraints are kept in both subproblems a stronger bound is usually obtained at the expense of 
having possibly more difficult problems to solve.  
New parameters 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑝, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑝;   Minimum and maximum production of product p 
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Lagrangean 1 IM 
Objective function  
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿1𝐼𝑀 : ∑ ∑ (𝑨𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝒅∈𝑫
− 𝒃𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝟐
𝒅∈𝑫
)
𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
− ∑ ∑ 𝑪𝒊,𝒓
𝑩𝒖𝒚
𝒓∈𝑹𝒊∈𝑰
𝐱𝐢,𝐫
− ∑ ∑ 𝑪𝒊,𝒓
𝑷𝑹𝑶
𝒓∈𝑹
 
𝒊∈𝑰
𝐱𝐢,𝐫 − ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐞,𝐫
𝐏𝐑𝐎𝟐
𝒓∈𝑹
𝐯𝐞,𝐢,𝐫
𝒊∈𝑰𝒆∈𝑬
− ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐩,𝐡
𝐁𝐋𝐄𝐍𝐃
𝒉∈𝑯
?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
− ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐫,𝐡
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟏 (∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒑∈𝑷𝒊∈𝑰𝒆∈𝑬
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢.𝐫
𝒃∈𝑩𝒑∈𝑷𝒊∈𝑰𝒄∈𝑪
)
𝒉∈𝑯𝒓∈𝑹
− ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐡,𝐝
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟐
𝒑∈𝑷𝒅∈𝑫
?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡 −
𝒉∈𝑯
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐝,𝐤
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟑 × 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤 
𝒅∈𝑫𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
− ∑
𝑪𝒅
𝑭𝑰𝑿
𝟐
𝒉(𝑷)𝒅
𝒅
− ∑
𝑪𝒅
𝑭𝑰𝑿
𝟐
𝒉(𝑺)𝒅 − ∑ ∑ 𝝀𝒑,𝒅 (𝐪
(𝑺)
𝐩,𝐝
− 𝐪(𝑷)
𝐩,𝐝
)
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
− ∑ 𝝁𝒅(𝒉𝒅
(𝑺)
− 𝒉𝒅
(𝑷)
)
𝒅∈𝑫𝒅
 
 
Subject to:  
𝐱𝐢,𝐫 ≤ 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒊,𝒓                                                      ∀𝐢 ∈ 𝐈, ∀𝐫 ∈ 𝐑                                                                 (𝐋𝟏) 
𝛒𝐢,𝐞  ×   𝐱𝐢,𝐫   =  𝐲𝐞,𝐢,𝐫                                        ∀𝐞 ∈ 𝐄, ∀𝐢 ∈ 𝐈, ∀𝐫 ∈ 𝐑                                                  (𝐋𝟐) 
?̃?𝐚,𝐢,𝐫 ≤  𝐲𝐚,𝐢,𝐫                                                      ∀𝐚 ∈ 𝐀 ⊆ 𝐄,   ∀𝐢 ∈ 𝐈 , ∀𝐫 ∈ 𝐑                                      (𝐋𝟑) 
?̃?𝐛,𝐢,𝐫 + 𝐯𝐛,𝐢,𝐫  ≤ 𝐲𝐛,𝐢,𝐫
                                 ∀𝐛 ∈ 𝐁 ⊆ 𝐄,   ∀𝐢 ∈ 𝐈, ∀𝐫 ∈ 𝐑                                 (𝐋𝟒) 
𝛒𝟐𝐜,𝐛 ×  𝐯𝐛,𝐢,𝐫 = ?̃?𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫                       ∀𝐛 ∈ 𝐁 ⊆ 𝐄, ∀𝐢 ∈ 𝐈 , ∀𝐜 ∈ 𝐂, ∀𝐫 ∈ 𝐑          (𝐋𝟓) 
∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒉∈𝑯
 ≤
𝒑∈𝑷
?̃?𝐞,𝐢,𝐫                                    ∀𝐞 ∈ 𝐄, ∀𝐢 ∈ 𝐈, ∀𝐫 ∈ 𝐑                                                (𝐋𝟔) 
               
∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢.𝐫
𝒉∈𝑯
≤ ?̃?𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫                                     ∀𝐛 ∈ 𝐁 ⊆ 𝐄, ∀𝐢 ∈ 𝐈 , ∀𝐜 ∈ 𝐂
𝒑∈𝑷
, ∀𝐫 ∈ 𝐑                     (𝐋𝟕) 
        
∑ ?̃?𝒑,𝒅,𝒉
𝐝∈𝐃
𝒔𝒑𝒎𝒑,𝒒𝒎𝒊𝒏  ≤  ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒓∈𝑹
  𝒔𝒃𝒎𝒆,𝒒𝒎𝒊𝒏
𝐢∈𝐈𝐞∈𝐄
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒓∈𝑹
 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒄,𝒒𝒎𝒊𝒏
𝒄∈𝑪𝒃∈𝑩𝒊∈𝑰
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∀𝒑 ∈ 𝑷,   ∀𝒒𝒎𝒊𝒏 ∈ 𝑸𝑴𝑰𝑵 , , ∀𝐡 ∈ 𝐇                   (𝐋𝟖) 
 
∑ ?̃?𝒑,𝒅,𝒉
𝐝∈𝐃
𝒔𝒑𝒎𝒂𝒑,𝒒𝒎𝒂𝒙 ≥   ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒓∈𝑹
  𝒔𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒊,𝒆,𝒒𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝐢∈𝐈𝐞∈𝐄
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒓∈𝑹
 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒊,𝒄,𝒃,𝒒𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒄∈𝑪𝒃∈𝑩𝒊∈𝑰
 
∀𝒑 ∈ 𝑷,   ∀𝒒𝒎𝒂𝒙 ∈ 𝑸𝑴𝑨𝑿,  ∀𝐡 ∈ 𝐇                 (𝐋𝟗) 
 
∑ ?̃?𝒑,𝒅,𝒉
𝐝∈𝐃
≤ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒓∈𝑹
  
𝐢∈𝐈𝐞∈𝐄
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒓∈𝑹
 
𝒄∈𝑪𝒃∈𝑩𝒊∈𝑰
          ∀𝐩 ∈ 𝐏, ∀𝐡 ∈ 𝐇                     (𝐋𝟏𝟎 
 
 
∑ ?̃?𝒑,𝒅,𝒉
𝐡∈𝐇
= 𝒒(𝑷)𝒑,𝒅                                            ∀𝐩 ∈ 𝐏, ∀𝐝 ∈ 𝐃                                                             (𝐋𝟏𝟏) 
∑ 𝒒(𝑷)𝒑,𝒅
𝐩∈𝐏
≤ 𝒎𝒅 ⋅ 𝒉
(𝑷)
𝒅                                ∀𝐝 ∈ 𝐃                                                                           (𝐋𝟏𝟐) 
∑ 𝒒(𝑺)𝒑,𝒅
𝐩∈𝐏
≤ 𝒎𝒅 ⋅ 𝒉
(𝑺)
𝒅                                 ∀𝐝 ∈ 𝐃                                                                           (𝐋𝟏𝟑) 
𝒒(𝑺)𝒑,𝒅 = ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝒌∈𝑲
                                             ∀𝒑 ∈ 𝑷, ∀𝒌 ∈ 𝑲                                                                    (𝑳𝟏𝟒) 
𝜽𝒑 = 𝑨𝒑 − 𝒃𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝒅∈𝑫
                                   ∀𝒑 ∈ 𝑷, ∀𝒌 ∈ 𝑲                                                                    (𝑳𝟏𝟓) 
𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒑,𝒌 ≤ ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤 ≤ 𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒑,𝒌                        ∀𝐩 ∈ 𝐏   ∀𝐤 ∈ 𝐊                                                          (𝐋𝟏𝟔)
𝐝∈𝐃
 
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒑 ≤ ∑ 𝐪
(𝑷)
𝐩,𝐝 ≤ 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒑                       ∀𝐩 ∈ 𝐏                                                                            (𝐋𝟏𝟕)
𝐝∈𝐃
 
𝐱𝐢,𝐫, 𝐲𝐞,𝐢,𝐫, 𝐯𝐛,𝐢,𝐫, ?̃?𝐞,𝐢,𝐫, ?̃?𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫, ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡, ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡,?̃?𝒑,𝒅,𝒉, 𝐪
(𝑺)
𝐩,𝐝, 𝐪
(𝑷)
𝐩,𝐝, 𝜽𝒑,𝒌 ≥ 𝟎     
𝒉
(𝑺)
𝒅, 𝒉
(𝑷)
𝒅 ∈ {𝟎, 𝟏}    
Constraints (L1)-(L11) and (L12)-(L13) are the same/ have the same interpretation as constraints 
(P1)-(P11) and (G1) described in chapter 3.2. Constraints (L14)-(L16) have the same 
interpretation as constraints (S1)-(S3) described in chapter 3.3 and chapter 4. We have also added 
a new constraint (L17). This constraint tells what should be the minimum and maximum 
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production of each product and is aligned with constraint about minimum and maximum demand 
in the markets (L16) from the sales model.  
∑ 𝑑𝑒𝑚
𝑝,𝑘
=
𝑘∈𝐾
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
𝑝
∀p ∈ P    
∑ 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝,𝑘 =
𝑘∈𝐾
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
𝑝
∀p ∈ P    
 
This new constraint should ensure a better convergence. Without it, the solution could be that 
𝑞(𝑃)𝑝,𝑑 doesn’t meet the minimum or maximum demand requirements. We note, that when we 
add this constraint we don’t restrict the original feasible set of IM1. 
The solution of L1-IM will be an upper bound of the solution of IM1. It is obviously that model 
L-IM1 can be decomposed into two subproblems.  One for the production department and one for 
the sales department, each with corresponding constraint sets.  
 
Lagrangean 1 Production Model (L1-PM) 
Objective function  
𝐿1𝑃𝑀 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡:                 ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑝,𝑑q
(𝑃)
p,d
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑟
𝐵𝑢𝑦
𝑟∈𝑅𝑖∈𝐼
xi,r 
− ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑟
𝑃𝑅𝑂
𝑟∈𝑅
 
𝑖∈𝐼
xi,r − ∑ ∑ ∑ Ce,r
PRO2
𝑟∈𝑅
ve,i,r
𝑖∈𝐼𝑒∈𝐸
− ∑ ∑ ∑ Cp,h
BLEND
ℎ∈𝐻
q̃p,d,h
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃
 
− ∑ ∑ Cr,h
TRAN1 (∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?p,e,i,r,h
𝑝∈𝑃𝑖∈𝐼𝑒∈𝐸
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?p,c,b,i.r
𝑏∈𝐵𝑝∈𝑃𝑖∈𝐼𝑐∈𝐶
)
ℎ∈𝐻𝑟∈𝑅
 
− ∑ ∑ ∑ Ch,d
TRAN2
𝑝∈𝑃𝑑∈𝐷
q̃p,d,h
ℎ∈𝐻
− ∑
𝐶𝑑
𝐹𝐼𝑋
2
ℎ(𝑃)𝑑
𝑑
+ ∑ 𝜇𝑑ℎ𝑑
(𝑃)
𝑑∈𝐷
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Subject to (L1) to (L12) and (L17) 
𝐱𝐢,𝐫, 𝐲𝐞,𝐢,𝐫, 𝐯𝐛,𝐢,𝐫, ?̃?𝐞,𝐢,𝐫, ?̃?𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫, ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡, ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡,  , ?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡, 𝐪
(𝑷)
𝐩,𝐝
  ≥ 𝟎    and 𝒉𝒅
(𝑷)
 ∈ {𝟎, 𝟏} 
Lagrangean 1 Sales Model (L1-SM) 
Objective function 
𝐿1𝑆𝑀 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡:                ∑ ∑ (𝑨𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝒅∈𝑫
− 𝒃𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝟐
𝒅∈𝑫
)
𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
− ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑝,𝑑q
(𝑆)
p,d
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃
 
− ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑪𝒅,𝒌
𝑻𝑹𝑨𝑵𝟐 × 𝒛𝒑,𝒅,𝒌 
𝒅∈𝑫𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
− ∑
𝑪𝒅
𝑭𝑰𝑿
𝟐
𝒉
(𝑺)
𝒅
𝒅
− ∑ 𝝁𝒅𝒉𝒅
(𝑺)
      
𝒅∈𝑫
 
Subject to (L13) to (L16) 
𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤, 𝐪
(𝑺)
𝐩,𝐝, 𝜽𝒑,𝒌 ≥ 𝟎    and 𝒉𝒅
(𝑺)
 ∈ {𝟎, 𝟏} 
We make assumption that information about minimum and maximum demand of each product is 
available at production department.  
 
Scenario 2 
Assuming that sales department doesn’t include information about operating costs of depots in 
their model, subproblems are formulated in the following way: 
Lagrangean 2 Production Model (L2-PM) 
Objective function 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐿2𝑃𝑀 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡:      ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑝,𝑑q
(𝑃)
p,d
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑ ∑ 𝑪𝒊,𝒓
𝑩𝒖𝒚
𝒓∈𝑹𝒊∈𝑰
𝐱𝐢,𝐫 − ∑ ∑ 𝑪𝒊,𝒓
𝑷𝑹𝑶
𝒓∈𝑹
 
𝒊∈𝑰
𝐱𝐢,𝐫 
− ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐞,𝐫
𝐏𝐑𝐎𝟐
𝒓∈𝑹
𝐯𝐞,𝐢,𝐫
𝒊∈𝑰𝒆∈𝑬
− ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐩,𝐡
𝐁𝐋𝐄𝐍𝐃
𝒉∈𝑯
?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
 
− ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐫,𝐡
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟏 (∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒑∈𝑷𝒊∈𝑰𝒆∈𝑬
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢.𝐫
𝒃∈𝑩𝒑∈𝑷𝒊∈𝑰𝒄∈𝑪
)
𝒉∈𝑯𝒓∈𝑹
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− ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐡,𝐝
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟐
𝒑∈𝑷𝒅∈𝑫
?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡
𝒉∈𝑯
− ∑ 𝐶𝑑
𝐹𝐼𝑋ℎ(𝑃)𝑑
𝑑
 
Subject to (L1) to (L12) and (L17) 
𝐱𝐢,𝐫, 𝐲𝐞,𝐢,𝐫, 𝐯𝐛,𝐢,𝐫, ?̃?𝐞,𝐢,𝐫, ?̃?𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫, ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡, ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡,  , ?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡, 𝐪
(𝑷)
𝐩,𝐝
  ≥ 𝟎    and 𝒉𝒅
(𝑷)
 ∈ {𝟎, 𝟏} 
 
Lagrangean 2 Sales Model (L2-SM) 
Objective function 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐿2𝑆𝑀 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡:     ∑ ∑ (𝑨𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝒅∈𝑫
− 𝒃𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝟐
𝒅∈𝑫
)
𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
 
− ∑ ∑ 𝝀𝒑,𝒅𝐪
(𝑺)
𝐩,𝐝
−
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐝,𝐤
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟐 × 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤 
𝒅∈𝑫𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
 
Subject to (L14) to (L16)  
∑ 𝒒(𝑺)𝒑,𝒅
𝐩∈𝐏
≤ 𝒎𝒅                                                 ∀𝐝 ∈ 𝐃                                                                     (𝐋𝟏𝟖)   
𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤, 𝐪
(𝑺)
𝐩,𝐝, 𝜽𝒑,𝒌 ≥ 𝟎     
When only the production department takes fixed costs into consideration there is no need for 
duplicating of ℎ𝑝,𝑑 variable, and hence corresponding Lagrangean multiplier. Production model 
L2-PM is almost identical to L1-PM, the only difference is in the objective function: the term 
with Lagrangean multiplier 𝜇𝑑is removed and the fixed costs coefficient of depots is not divided 
by 2. All constraints remain the same. 
In the sales model L2-SM, the expressions connected to depot operation do not exist anymore. 
However, because maximum capacity of depots should still be taken into account we add another 
constraint (L18), which sets a restriction on the amount of products that can be stored at depots. 
This constraint has the same interpretation as (G2) described in chapter 3.2. Again, we note that 
the new constraint doesn’t restrict the original problem.  
 68 
In this scenario, sales subproblem L2-SM doesn’t include any binary variables and hence is now 
a simple QP problem. This of course simplify the solution of the model. On the other hand 
because now the sales department doesn’t consider information about how costly it is to operate 
depots, the subproblems will be less coordinated and we expect that it will take longer time to 
achieve "a good solution". In this situation coordination between departments takes place only 
through Lagrangean multipliers 𝜆𝑝,𝑑. 
 
Scenario 3 
Assuming that production department doesn’t take into account information about fixed costs of 
depots in their model, IM1 is decomposed as follows: 
Lagrangean 3 Production Model (L3-PM) 
Objective function  
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐿2𝑃𝑀 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡: ∑ ∑ 𝝀𝒑,𝒅𝐪
(𝑷)
𝐩,𝐝
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑ ∑ 𝑪𝒊,𝒓
𝑩𝒖𝒚
𝒓∈𝑹𝒊∈𝑰
𝐱𝐢,𝐫 
− ∑ ∑ 𝑪𝒊,𝒓
𝑷𝑹𝑶
𝒓∈𝑹
 
𝒊∈𝑰
𝐱𝐢,𝐫 − ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐞,𝐫
𝐏𝐑𝐎𝟐
𝒓∈𝑹
𝐯𝐞,𝐢,𝐫
𝒊∈𝑰𝒆∈𝑬
− ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐩,𝐡
𝐁𝐋𝐄𝐍𝐃
𝒉∈𝑯
?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
 
− ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐫,𝐡
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟏 (∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒑∈𝑷𝒊∈𝑰𝒆∈𝑬
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢.𝐫
𝒃∈𝑩𝒑∈𝑷𝒊∈𝑰𝒄∈𝑪
)
𝒉∈𝑯𝒓∈𝑹
 
− ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐡,𝐝
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟐
𝒑∈𝑷𝒅∈𝑫
?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡
𝒉∈𝑯
 
Subject to (L1) to (L11), (L17) 
∑ 𝒒(𝑷)𝒑,𝒅
𝐩∈𝐏
≤ 𝒎𝒅                                                   ∀𝐝 ∈ 𝐃                                                                     (𝐋𝟏𝟗) 
𝐱𝐢,𝐫, 𝐲𝐞,𝐢,𝐫, 𝐯𝐛,𝐢,𝐫, ?̃?𝐞,𝐢,𝐫, ?̃?𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫, ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡, ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡,  , ?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡, 𝐪
(𝑷)
𝐩,𝐝
  ≥ 𝟎 
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Lagrangean 3 Sales Model (L3-SM) 
Objective function   
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐿2𝑆𝑀 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡: ∑ ∑ (𝑨𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝒅∈𝑫
− 𝒃𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝟐
𝒅∈𝑫
)
𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
 
− ∑ ∑ 𝝀𝒑,𝒅𝐪
(𝑺)
𝐩,𝐝
−
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐝,𝐤
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟐 × 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤 − ∑ 𝑪𝒅
𝑭𝑰𝑿𝒉(𝑺)𝒅
𝒅𝒅∈𝑫𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
 
Subject to (L13) to (L16)  
𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤, 𝐪
(𝑺)
𝐩,𝐝, 𝜽𝒑,𝒌 ≥ 𝟎    and 𝒉𝒅
(𝑺)
 ∈ {𝟎, 𝟏} 
In the same way as in scenario 2, when only one department takes fixed costs into consideration, 
there is no need for duplicating of ℎ𝑝,𝑑 variable, and hence corresponding Lagrangean multiplier. 
Production model L3-PM doesn’t include any binary variables, while L3-SM is now taking into 
account fixed costs from depots operation. We add a new constraint (L19) to the production 
subproblem, which is of the same type as (L18).  
 
Scenario 4 
Lagrangean 4 Production Model (L4-PM) 
Objective function 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐿4𝑃𝑀 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡: ∑ ∑ 𝝀𝒑,𝒅𝐪
(𝑷)
𝐩,𝐝
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑ ∑ 𝑪𝒊,𝒓
𝑩𝒖𝒚
𝒓∈𝑹𝒊∈𝑰
𝐱𝐢,𝐫 
− ∑ ∑ 𝑪𝒊,𝒓
𝑷𝑹𝑶
𝒓∈𝑹
 
𝒊∈𝑰
𝐱𝐢,𝐫 − ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐞,𝐫
𝐏𝐑𝐎𝟐
𝒓∈𝑹
𝐯𝐞,𝐢,𝐫
𝒊∈𝑰𝒆∈𝑬
− ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐩,𝐡
𝐁𝐋𝐄𝐍𝐃
𝒉∈𝑯
?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
 
− ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐫,𝐡
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟏 (∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡
𝒑∈𝑷𝒊∈𝑰𝒆∈𝑬
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢.𝐫
𝒃∈𝑩𝒑∈𝑷𝒊∈𝑰𝒄∈𝑪
)
𝒉∈𝑯𝒓∈𝑹
 
− ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐡,𝐝
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟐
𝒑∈𝑷𝒅∈𝑫
?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡
𝒉∈𝑯
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Subject to (L1) to (L11), (L17) and (L19) 
𝐱𝐢,𝐫, 𝐲𝐞,𝐢,𝐫, 𝐯𝐛,𝐢,𝐫, ?̃?𝐞,𝐢,𝐫, ?̃?𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫, ?̅?𝐩,𝐞,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡, ?̅?𝐩,𝐜,𝐛,𝐢,𝐫,𝐡,  , ?̃?𝐩,𝐝,𝐡, 𝐪
(𝑷)
𝐩,𝐝
  ≥ 𝟎 
 
Lagrangean 4 Sales Model (L4-SM) 
Objective function  
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐿4𝑆𝑀 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡:     ∑ ∑ (𝑨𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝒅∈𝑫
− 𝒃𝒑 ∑ 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤
𝟐
𝒅∈𝑫
)
𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
 
− ∑ ∑ 𝝀𝒑,𝒅𝐪
(𝑺)
𝐩,𝐝
−
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐝,𝐤
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟐 × 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤 
𝒅∈𝑫𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
 
Subject to (L14) to (L16) and (L18) 
𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤, 𝐪
(𝑺)
𝐩,𝐝, 𝜽𝒑,𝒌 ≥ 𝟎     
In this scenario, the base for decomposition is IM2. If none of the departments take into account 
costs connected to operation and possibility to close and open depots at this planning stage, 
decision variable  ℎ𝑑 should not appear in any of the subproblems. The sales subproblem is the 
same as under scenario 2 and the production subproblem is the same as under scenario 3. 
However, because depot usage is predetermined, the set of available depots in the subproblems 
under this scenario may be smaller than in other scenarios. This new set should be within the set 
used in other scenarios. In our work we are not going into explanations of how PD can choose 
which depots should be in operation. In our examples, we will assume that depots with highest 
fixed costs are closed.  
 
Interpretation of Lagrangean Multipliers 
The Lagrangean multipliers penalize the objective functions when the relaxed constraints are 
violated. In the production models the Lagrangean multiplier 𝜆𝑝,𝑑 can be interpreted as the price 
PD receives for selling products from depots to SD. In the sales models, 𝜆𝑝,𝑑 can be compared 
with costs of buying products from PD. Hence, this multiplier can be referred to as internal price 
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for specific product at specific depot. When we solve the sales and production subproblems 
independently to each other, it is high possibility that PD wants to produce and deliver products 
to other depots than SD wants to purchase these products at. This difference should be regulated 
by setting the right Lagrangean multipliers. If PD produces and delivers more product to depot 
than SD wants to buy of this product at this depot, then the Lagrangean multiplier (for this 
specific product and depot) should be reduced. If the Lagrangean multiplier will be reduced, it 
will be less attractive for PD to produce this product and deliver to this depot, while on the other 
hand for SD it will be cheaper and hence more attractive to buy this product at this depot. If the 
opposite is the case: SD wants to buy more than PD wants to produce, then the corresponding 
multiplier should increase.  
In scenario 1, we have also used another Lagrangean multiplier 𝜇𝑑. It can be interpreted as extra 
value or extra cost for using depots. The updating mechanism for this multiplier is the same as for 
the first one: if production and sales departments have decided to use different depots, 
Lagrangean multiplier should be updated in such a way that depots which have been attractive for 
one part and not used by the other part, should become more attractive for the last mentioned part 
and less attractive for the first part. In other words, if production department decides to use one 
depot which has very high Lagrangean multiplier (high value has positive effect on the objective 
function in L1-PM) then sales department will not use this depot because high Lagrangean 
multiplier represents costs. If depot is chosen only by production department, then Lagrangean 
multiplier will be reduced. This will make depot less attractive for PD but more attractive for SD. 
Opposite happens if depot is used just by SD. When we include the depot operation constraint in 
both subproblems we get a double regulation for depots use, because we use two Lagrangean 
multipliers which should stimulate departments to choose the same depots.  
The regulation of Lagrangean multipliers will be done through subgradient method which will be 
described below. 
 
7.2.2 The Solution Algorithm 
We start by initialize Lagrangean multipliers 𝜆𝑝,𝑑 (and 𝜇𝑑 in scenario 1). Then sales and 
production subproblems are solved separately with given Lagrangean multipliers.  
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When these two subproblems are solved, the sum of the objective function values, that is the 
objective value of Lagrangean function, will give an optimistic bound for the objective function 
of IM1 in scenarios 1,2 and 3 and IM2 in scenario 4.  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 𝑈𝐵 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
Because we have a maximization problem, the optimistic bound is an upper bound. We update 
upper bound in each iteration by choosing the lowest of the new calculated UB and the previous 
UBD.  
𝑈𝐵𝐷 = min (𝑈𝐵, 𝑈𝐵𝐷) 
As we have mentioned above, the solution that we obtain may be infeasible: 𝑞(𝑃)𝑝,𝑑 < 𝑞
(𝑆)
𝑝,𝑑 
or/and ℎ𝑑
(𝑃) ≠ ℎ𝑑
(𝑆)
 for any p and d. If this is the case, we will use a heuristic method to modify 
the solution into a feasible solution. When this is done, we obtain a pessimistic bound which in 
our case is a lower bound of the original problem. 
 
Heuristic used to obtain feasible solutions 
After both subproblems are solved, we obtain amount of supplied products  𝑞(𝑃)
𝑝,𝑑
 from the 
production model and amount ordered products 𝑞(𝑆)
𝑝,𝑑
  from the sales model. As we have 
mention, if  𝑞(𝑃)
𝑝,𝑑
≥ 𝑞(𝑆)
𝑝,𝑑
 then the solution is feasible. If this is not the case, the easiest way to 
obtain a feasible solution is to use one of these outputs (either from PM or SM) and define it as 
amount that have to be supplied/sold.  
In our heuristic method we use local optimal values 𝑞(𝑆) from the sales subproblem. We use these 
values as input to PM, described in chapter 4 by requiring that PD has to satisfy this demand from 
the sales department. In particular we set parameter q̅𝑆p,d in PM equal to 𝑞
(𝑆) from the 
Lagrangean sale subproblem. The objective function value of PM will represent production costs, 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑃𝑀. Below, we formulate expressions for calculation of feasible solutions for each of the 
scenarios: 
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Scenario 1: 
𝐿𝐵 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐿1𝑆𝑀 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑃𝑀 +  ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑝,𝑑q
(𝑆)
p,d
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃
+ ∑ 𝜇𝑑ℎ𝑑
(𝑆)
𝑑∈𝐷
− ∑
𝐶𝑑
𝐹𝐼𝑋
2
ℎ(𝑆)𝑑
𝑑
           (𝑫𝟏 − 𝟏) 
From the profit of L1-SM we subtract costs of producing ordered products. However, because we 
are interesting to find the solution which concerns the whole company, we should add back costs 
sales department paid for products to PD and extra costs for using depots in scenario 1. This is 
because they are internal transactions, which do not affect the profit of the company. Because in 
the sales objective function we have only considered half of the fixed costs, we also need to 
subtract the other part of these costs. 
Scenario 2:  
𝐿𝐵 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐿1𝑆𝑀 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑃𝑀 + ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑝,𝑑q
(𝑆)
p,d
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑ 𝐶𝑑
𝐹𝐼𝑋ℎ
(𝑆)
𝑑
𝑑
                             (𝑫𝟏 − 𝟐) 
In this scenario fixed costs are not included in the sales subproblem, and we need to subtract 
them. In the same way as in (D1-1) we add back internal price costs. 
 
Scenario 3: 
𝐿𝐵 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐿3𝑆𝑀 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑃𝑀 + ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑝,𝑑q
(𝑆)
p,d
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃
                                                              ( 𝑫𝟏 − 𝟑) 
In this scenario fixed costs are included in the sales subproblem and we need only to add back 
internal price costs. 
Scenario 4 
𝐿𝐵 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐿4𝑆𝑀 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑃𝑀 + ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑝,𝑑q
(𝑆)
p,d
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃
−   𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠                              (𝑫𝟏 − 𝟒) 
In this scenario, PD has decided in advance which depots will be in operation, hence fixed costs 
is a constant.  
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Now we have found the feasible solution. In each scenario, in each iteration the lower bound 
(LBD) is calculated as the highest of LB value (fount in this iteration) and the previous lower 
bound. We update the lower bound as follows: 
𝐿𝐵𝐷 = max (𝐿𝐵, 𝐿𝐵𝐷) 
Instead of using output from the sales subproblem we could use output from the production 
subproblem  𝑞(𝑃)
𝑝,𝑑
 as a starting point for modification, and obtain a feasible solution based on 
production department's result. The feasible solution could be obtained by requiring that sales 
department must distribute products that production department has found optimal to produce. 
But as long as we are interesting in method for setting internal prices, this heuristic will not 
provide results which we are looking for. Lower bound should represent a feasible solution, 
however in our problem it should be possible to obtain this feasible solution by use of internal 
prices which we obtain at each iteration. If we insert these internal prices in SM the results may 
differ from the lower bound found by the heuristic, and the total profit may not be the same. 
Hence this way of calculating of lower bound doesn’t make any sense, because the company will 
not be able to obtain the same result in reality.  
Step length calculation 
After each iteration we compute new values for Lagrangean multipliers, which will be used as 
input to subproblems in the next iteration. We do it according to the subgradient method 
described in the previous section. In our decomposition we have added an equality constraint 
𝑞(𝑃)𝑝,𝑑 = 𝑞
(𝑆)
𝑝,𝑑. However, because the solution can still be feasible if 𝑞
(𝑃)
𝑝,𝑑
≥ 𝑞(𝑆)
𝑝,𝑑
, the 
corresponding Lagrangean multiplier should be restricted in sign 𝜆(𝑛)𝑝,𝑑 ≥ 0. Hence: 
𝜆(𝑛+1)𝑝,𝑑 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {0, 𝜆
(𝑛)
𝑝,𝑑 + 𝑡
(𝑛)𝛾𝑝,𝑑
(𝑛)}                                       (𝑫𝟐)  
where 𝛾𝑝,𝑑 is the subgradient:  
𝛾𝑝,𝑑
(𝑛) = 𝑞(𝑆)𝑝,𝑑 − 𝑞
(𝑃)
𝑝,𝑑                                                            (𝑫𝟑)  
and 𝑡  is the step length: 
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𝑡(𝑛) =
𝜎(𝑛)(𝑈𝐵(𝑛) − 𝐿𝐵𝐷)
∑ ∑ (𝜆𝑝,𝑑
(𝑛))
2
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃
                                                       (𝑫𝟒) 
In scenario 1 we also need to update another multiplier: 
𝜇(𝑛+1)𝑑 = 𝜇
(𝑛)
𝑑 + 𝑡2
(𝑛)𝜂𝑑
(𝑛)                                                    (𝑫𝟓)  
where 𝜂𝑑is the subgradient: 
 𝜂𝑑
(𝑛) = ℎ
(𝑆)
𝑑 − ℎ
(𝑃)
𝑑                                                                 (𝑫𝟔)  
Because the subgradient 𝜂𝑑
(𝑛) will always be 1 or 0, the use of standard step length formula may 
lead to very large step length. A numerator will be very big when there is a big gap between 
upper and lower bounds, while denominator will be relative small. Therefore we use another 
formula that has showed a better convergence. This step length calculation is a version of formula 
used by (Jörnsten and Nasberg, 1986), where it has been applied for calculation of step length for 
binary variables in LD of generalized assignment problem.  
𝑡2
(𝑛) =
1
𝑘
∑ 𝐶𝑑
𝐹𝐼𝑋
𝑑∈𝐷
1 + 𝑛
                                                                (𝑫𝟕) 
 
Where k is the total number of depots. The numerator of (D7) calculates the average fixed costs 
of depots. Denominator is the number of current iteration plus one.  
In addition, we have tried an alternative way of calculating the step length 𝑡1
(𝑛) for Lagrangean 
multiplier 𝜆𝑝,𝑑
(𝑛)
, which has been used in the working paper written by Kong and Rönnqvist  
(2012).  In this alternative way of calculating the step length, instead of using upper bound 
obtained in the current iteration 𝑈𝐵(𝑛), we use the best achievable upper bound so far (the lowest 
upper bound) UBD.  
𝒕(𝒏) =
𝝈(𝒏)(𝑼𝑩𝑫 − 𝑳𝑩𝑫)
∑ ∑ (𝝀𝒑,𝒅
(𝒏))
𝟐
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
                                                 (𝑫𝟖) 
 
 76 
We use the following convergence criteria: 
𝑈𝐵𝐷−𝐿𝐵𝐷
𝐿𝐵𝐷
≤ 𝜀 or 𝑛 = 𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑥 
If UBD has not been improved during the last k iterations, 𝜎(𝑛) should be updated as follows: 
𝜎(𝑛+1) ≔ 𝛼𝜎(𝑛)      (𝑫𝟗)  where 0 < 𝛼 ≤ 1 
 
The Algorithm  
The algorithm is summarized below.  
Step 0 Choose initial multipliers 𝜆(0) (and 𝜇(0)𝑑 in scenario 1). Set n = 0, 𝐿𝐵𝐷 = −∞  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑈𝐵𝐷 = +∞. Choose initial values for 𝜎(0) ∈ (0, 2], and decide 𝜀, 𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑥  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘 
Step 1 Solve the subproblems for a given 𝜆(𝑛)𝑝,𝑑 and (and 𝜇
(𝑛)
𝑑 in scenario 1). Let 
𝑈𝐵(𝑛) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 Production + Profit Sale. Update UBD = min(UBD, 𝑈𝐵(𝑛)) 
Step 2 Let parameter q̅𝑆p,d in PM be equal to q
(𝑆)
p,d from the sales subproblem. Solve 
PM. Calculate 𝐿𝐵 according to (D1-i) 
Step 3   Update 𝐿𝐵𝐷 = max (𝐿𝐵(𝑛), 𝐿𝐵𝐷)  
Step 4 Check the convergence criteria. If 
𝑈𝐵𝐷−𝐿𝐵𝐷
𝐿𝐵𝐷
≤ 𝜀 or 𝑛 = 𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑥  ⟹ Stop. Let 𝜆
(𝑛)
𝑝,𝑑 be 
the internal prices for products 
Step 5 Update 𝜎(𝑛) according to (D9) if UBD has not been improved during the last k 
iterations 
Step 6   Compute the subgradient according to (D3) (and (D6) in scenario 1) 
Step 7   Determine the step length according to (D4)/(D8) and (and (D7) in scenario 1) 
Step 8  Update the Lagrangean multipliers according to (D2) and (and (D5) in scenario 1). 
Set n = n+1 and go to Step 1.  
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7.2.3 Comments on the solution of LD  
Information exchange between departments 
As it was pointed out in chapter 2, each department should have a clear information about what it 
supposed to do at each planning stage and what information it should exchange with other 
departments. In our approach the planning stage should start with definition of the departmental 
subproblems, which departments will solve at the planning level.  
In the production subproblems we have added one extra constraint, which define the minimum 
and maximum production of each product. Except for this constraint, the constraints that appear 
in the subproblems under LD, are the same as in PM and SM. This implies that the departmental 
constraints have to be known only by the departments themselves.  
The process of information exchange between the departments is as follows: 
1. Production department initializes some values of internal prices. These could be for 
example some estimates or historical prices. These values are sent to sales department. 
2. Each of the departments solves its own subproblems, based on the internal price values 
decided by PD. After that, SD submits information about its objective function value and 
the quantities it will order to PD. 
3. According to the information received from SD and its own calculations, PD calculates 
upper bound, lower bound, and new internal prices. 
4. New internal prices are sent back to SD. And departments resolve their subproblems, 
based on new internal prices. SD submits new plans to PD. 
5. The procedure is repeated (with recalculation of subproblems, internal prices, and upper 
and lower bounds) until the company arrives at the optimal solution or maximum number 
of iterations is reached.   
 
Figure 7.1 – Information Exchange 
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In our work we have assumed that the production department is connected to the rest of the 
company, and therefore is interested to obtain the best possible result for the whole company. 
While the sales department is more independent unit that maximizes only its premium. We could 
also assume that both departments act separately and optimize their own goals. In this case all 
information should go through headquarter, which would be responsible for calculation of 
Lagrangean multipliers, and upper and lower bounds.  
 
Comments to scenarios 
Sales subproblems in scenarios 2, 3 and 4 correspond to the sales models formulated in chapter 4. 
Sales model in scenario 1 includes two Lagrangean multipliers at the planning level. These 
require more information exchange between the departments at the planning level, at the same 
time SM solved in the decision phase doesn’t include second multiplier associated with depots. 
Therefore, the second Lagrangean multipliers should be incorporated into fixed cost parameters, 
which are used as input to SM in the decision phase. Otherwise, the solution from SM may 
deviate from the lower bound obtained in LD. So, if the company uses scenario 1 at the planning 
level, fixed cost parameters used by SD at the decision level should be adjusted according to the 
optimal Lagrangean multiplier values 𝜇𝑑. When this is done, the subproblem solved by SD at the 
planning level in scenario 1, will also correspond to the sales model solved at the decision level. 
The production subproblems in LD at the planning level deviate from PM at the decision level, in 
all scenarios. The main difference is that at the planning stage, the department decides how many 
units of products it will supply, while in the decision stage the supply is predetermined by orders 
from the sales department. It means that under the decision stage, the production department has 
no influence on how much of each product will be produced and which depots these will be 
delivered to. However, during the planning phase the department has a clear influence on the 
determination of internal prices. This way of formulating subproblems, corresponds to the second 
situation, described in chapter 2: representation of the subproblems corresponds to organizational 
subunits but this correspondence is not used in the actual solution process.  
In scenario 4 it may not be possible to obtain the same solution as in other scenarios, if "wrong" 
depots have been closed. However, the problem excludes binary variable (in nonlinear case) and 
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we expect that after a small number of iterations the solution will be better than in other 
scenarios. Also we expect a faster convergence.  
 
Depot usage in different scenarios 
When the relaxed constraints are violated the objective function is penalized through Lagrangean 
multipliers. In our problem the relaxed constraints are violated when the demand from the sales 
department is bigger than the supply from the production department for any of the products at 
any of the depots. This implies that the departments must supply products at and order products 
from the same depots. Below we discuss which conditions must be satisfied in order this should 
hold. 
The sales model in scenarios 2 and 4 doesn’t include any costs associated with depots.  If internal 
prices of products are similar for all depots, SD will use all depots in order to reduce 
transportation costs (we assume that for each depot there is at least one market, for which this 
depot is the most profitable starting point). In these scenarios SD will not use depot, if the 
internal prices of all products at this depot are significantly higher than internal prices for these 
products at other depots. With significantly higher, we mean that savings from the transportation 
from this depot are less than the difference between internal prices  
The PDs subproblem in scenarios 3 and 4, is formulated in a similar way. The department will 
choose to deliver products to depots in which it can obtain the highest difference between internal 
prices and transportation costs. At the same time PD will close depots where the difference is 
small.  
Fixed costs add more complexity to these problems. In PDs subproblems (in scenarios 1 and 2), 
low difference between internal prices and transportation costs in a depot, and at the same time 
low fixed costs of this depot can be more profitable than high difference and high fixed costs. In 
the same way, in SDs subproblems (in scenarios 1 and 3) depots that have a good combination of 
internal prices and transportation costs can be closed because of high fixed costs.  
In order that both departments choose the same depots, the internal prices in these depots must be 
high enough to ensure that PD will use them, but at the same time these prices must be low 
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enough to ensure that SD will use them as well. If this is the case, internal prices are balanced and 
it is possible to obtain a more realistic upper bound, because none of the departments make a 
super profit.   
We illustrate with a small example, that it may exist a case in scenario 2 in which it is not 
possible for both departments to choose the same depots.  
Suppose that we have: one hub, two depots, two markets, and one product. Let's assume that 
demand at both markets is fixed at 50 units, so that the production department always produces 
100 units, and sales department always sales 50 units to each market. Fixed costs of depots are 
1000 and 1500.  
Transportation costs to depots: 
Depot 1 10,00 
Depot 2 4,00 
 
Transportation costs to markets: 
  Market 1 Market 2 
Depot 1 4,00 5,00 
Depot 2 6,00 4,00 
 
Let X be the internal price at depot 1 and Y the internal price at depot 2. We can easily calculate 
that costs to the production department will be 2000 if it decides to use depot 1 and 1900 if depot 
2 is used. If both depots are used, the costs will be 2500+. We can exclude the last possibility 
because it isn't optimal. 
 The production department has the following simple algorithm: 
Condition Choice 
X-Y > 1 Depot 1 
X-Y ≤ 1 Depot 2 
Table 7.1 – Example 1 
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Based on the transportation costs to the markets, the sales department has the following 
algorithm:  
Condition Choice 
2 < X-Y  Depot 2 
-1< X-Y ≤2 Depot 1 & 2 
X-Y ≤ -1 Depot 1 
Table 7.2 – Example 2 
If we combine these to algorithms we obtain the following: 
Condition Choice S Choice P 
2< X-Y  Depot 2 Depot 1 
1< X-Y ≤ 2 Depot 1 & 2 Depot 1 
-1< X-Y ≤  1 Depot 1 & 2 Depot 2 
X-Y ≤ -1 Depot 1 Depot 2 
Table 7.3 – Example 3 
From the Table 7.3 we observe that there are no internal prices for which it would be optimal for 
both departments to choose the same depots. 
When instead sales department takes fixed costs into account, it is easier to find internal prices 
that will lead to the same depot use. Also, in scenarios where fixed costs are included in both 
models or there are no fixed costs, it is more likely that such internal prices will exist. In scenario 
4 there are no extra costs for using depots and the set of depots is smaller than in other scenarios, 
while in scenario 1 in addition to fixed costs the choice of depots is also regulated by additional 
multiplier.  
Upper bound  
In addition to the criteria of the same depot usage, we are also interesting that the departments 
supply and order the same amount of products from the same depots (or the supply is bigger than 
the demand). This is more strong criteria, and it can be the case that it doesn’t exist internal prices 
(Lagrangean multipliers) that would ensure that it holds, in any of the scenarios. If we discover 
price values for which the supply and the demand are equal or very close to each other, then these 
values will also give a tighter bound. Instead, upper bound becomes high and unrealistic when 
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internal prices are low at some depots and SD orders too much products from these depots, while 
at other depots the prices are high and PD supplies too much to these depots. In this case both 
departments are making good profits which are impossible to realize in reality.  
Lower bound 
In our models it is important to find internal prices that will ensure that SD makes a good choice. 
Because the sales subproblems correspond to the real problems SD solves at the decision level, it 
is also possible to calculate the real profit the company would obtain at each iteration. And 
because we know that upper bound calculated during each iteration is greater or equal to the 
optimal profit that can be achieved by the company, we also know when internal prices lead to "a 
near" optimal solution. That is when feasible solution is very close to the upper bound. When this 
is the case, we can stop and let Lagrangean multipliers be internal prices.  
 
Alternative decompositions of the original problem  
In addition to the alternatives that we have considered, there are of course other possible ways of 
decompose IM1/IM2. More variables could be duplicated and subproblems could have more 
constraints in common. For example, Bredström and Rönnqvist, (2008) and Kong and Rönnqvist 
(2012) have included blending decisions in both sales and production subproblems, in order to 
achieve a better convergence. We have not considered such alternatives because it would lead to 
unrealistic subproblems. Information about blending (or other production activities) may be 
complex, and it may require a lot of effort to incorporate such information in sales subproblem. 
And vice versa. Therefore, in our decomposition we have not considered alternatives in which 
departments would be dealing with the constraints of other departments. 
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PART 3: COMPUTATIONAL STUDY 
 
We divide the computational study into three parts. First, we give a description of the refinery 
system and data used in our models. Next, we employ the cost-based methods and study the 
results. Then, we employ Lagrangean decomposition methods on our numerical example and 
study the results, as well as compare with the previous results.  
 
The mathematical models are programmed by AMPL modeling language (version 20140224). 
The Linear models and Mixed-Integer Linear models are solved by CPLEX 12.6 and the 
Quadratic models by MINOS 5.51. Models which are Non-Linear Mixed Integer are solved by 
KNITRO 9. KNITRO MINL code is designed for convex mixed integer programming. As we 
have discussed earlier our MINL models are only of this type and hence can be solved by 
KNITRO to find global optimum. Also KNITRO has been used when several functional forms 
are used in the same “run file”. We have used the default parameters of solvers.  
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Chapter 8 – Numerical Example  
To describe the refinery process we have used case study in Bredström et al. (2008). The 
explanation of abbreviations which are used further, is given in Table 8.1  
 
Abbreviation Explanation   Abbreviation Explanation 
Raw material     
Additional components out from reformer and 
cracker 
CR1 Crude oil 1  C1 Reformulated FG 
CR2 Crude oil 2  C2 Reformulated GA 
   C3 Cracker FG 
Components out from CDU  C4 Cracker GA 
A1 Fuel Gas fraction  C5 Cracker GO 
A2 Gasoline fraction    
A3 Residuals bottoms  Blended products   
B1 Naphtha fraction  P1 Premium Gasoline 
B2 
Light distillates 
fraction  P2 Regular Gasoline 
B3 
Heavy distillates 
fraction  P3 Distillates 
      P4 Fuel Oil 
Table 8.1 - Explanation of abbreviations 
We consider a company with two refineries: r1 and r2. Each refinery purchases two types of 
crude oil: CR1 and CR1. CR1 costs 108$ and 107.5$ per barrel at r1 and r2, and has lower sulfur 
content than CR2 which costs 69.5 $ and 70.1$ per barrel at r1 and r2 respectively. Maximum 
supply of CR1 per period is 12 000 barrels, while it is 25 000 barrels for CR2 at each of the 
refineries. Crude oils are used as input to CDU, where they are broken into six components. It 
costs 26$ and 27$ per barrel to process CR1 at CDU at r1 and r2, while it costs 29$ and 28$ per 
barrel to process CR2 at r1 and r2. The fraction and the quality of generated components depend 
on the type of crude oil.  
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Table 8.2 shows the fraction coefficients of output for each crude oil type. Table 8.3 and Table 
8.4 yield values of sulfur content and density of each component generated from CR1 and CR2, 
while Table 8.5 yields values of octane concentration. We assume that processes are identical in 
both refineries.  
  A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 
CR1 0.029 0.236 0.314 0.223 0.087 0.111 
CR2 0.017 0.180 0.443 0.196 0.073 0.091 
Table 8.2 – Yields from CDU for one unit of CR1 and CR2 
 
  Sulfur Density   Sulfur Density 
A1 0 0  A1 0 0 
A2 0 0  A2 0 0 
A3 4,7 343  A3 1,48 272 
B1 0,283 272  B1 2,83 297,6 
B2 0,526 292  B2 5,05 303,3 
B3 0,98 295  B3 11 365 
 Table 8.3 – Sulfur content and density of   Table 8.4 – Sulfur content and density of 
components generated from CR1   components generated from CR2 
 
  Octane 
A1 0 
A2 78,5 
A3 0 
B1 65 
B2 0 
B3 0 
Table 8.5 – Octane concentration in components 
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As shown in Table 8.5, octane concentration in components is independent on the crude oil these 
components are generated from.  
Generated A components, are used directly in blending. B components can be processed further 
at the refineries. There are three type of each A and B components. The cost of processing one 
barrel of B component is 25$, 25$ and 24$ for B1, B2 and B3 at r1, and 24$, 25$ and 26$ at r2 
respectively. Table 8.6 shows the fraction coefficients of output for each B component. 
 
  C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
B1 0,129 0,807 0 0 0 
B2 0 0 0,3 0,59 0,21 
B3 0 0 0,31 0,59 0,22 
Table 8.6 – Amount of C component generated from one unit of B component 
 
We assume that there are five C components, which can be generated from B components.  Table 
8.7, Table 8.8 and Table 8.9 show density, sulfur and octane values of C components. Density 
and sulfur content in C components depend both on B components and crude oil B components 
are generated from. While octane concentration in C components is independent of which 
components these are obtained from.  
 
  CR1-B1 CR1-B2 CR1-B3 CR2-B1 CR2-B2 CR2-B3 
C1  272 0 0 272 0 0 
C2 272 0 0 272 0 0 
C3 0 292 295 0 297,6 303,3 
C4 0 292 295 0 297,6 303,3 
C5 0 294,9 292,1 0 300,6 300,3 
Table 8.7 – Density of C components 
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  CR1-B1 CR1-B2 CR1-B3 CR2-B1 CR2-B2 CR2-B3 
C1 0,283 0 0 1,48 0 0 
C2 0,283 0 0 1,48 0 0 
C3 0 0,526 0,98 0 2,83 5,05 
C4 0 0,526 0,98 0 2,83 5,05 
C5 0 0,3 0,304 0 1,61 1,57 
Table 8.8 – Sulfur content of C components 
 
  Octane 
C1 65 
C2 104 
C3 0 
C4 93,7 
C5 0 
Table 8.9 – Octane concentration in C components 
 
From the refineries components are sent to hubs. In our example we consider two hubs: h1 and 
h2. We assume that company produces four types of products. Table 8.10 shows maximum 
quality specifications related to density and sulfur, and minimum specifications of octane.  
 
  Octane Sulfur Density 
P1 90 3 500 
P2 86 3 500 
P3 0 0,5 306 
P4 0 3,5 352 
Table 8.10 – Quality requirements  
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Our example consists of five depots and five markets. We assume that maximum capacity for 
each of the depot is 10 000 units of products. Cost data that is used in our example is generated. 
Cost values are generated such that there are reasonable proportions between different costs.  
Costs related to blending, transportation, and operation of depots are shown in Appendix B.   
Demand parameters which are used in our models, have been generated. These are chosen such 
that they have moderate price elasticity. In Appendix B we have presented parameters used in 
price functions together with price elasticity, and minimum and maximum demand for each of 
these four products.  
  
 
Figure 8.1- Revenue functions 
Figure 8.1 shows nonlinear revenue functions for each of the four products used in our example. 
The piecewise linear functions are approximations of these four revenue functions, where each of 
the functions is divided into 10 equal segments. These parameters are also presented in Appendix 
B.  
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Chapter 9 - Numerical Tests on Cost-Based Methods and Benchmark Models 
In this chapter in addition to consider nonlinear and linear revenue functions, we consider two 
alternative cases: in the first case SD chooses which depots should operate and at the same time 
its premium depends on fixed costs, while in the second case this decision is not included in this 
planning process and is made by PD in advance. Because in the cost-based methods it is not 
possible to include fixed costs from depots in an appropriate way, we exclude the alternatives 
when production department takes these costs into account at the planning level. Hence, we 
consider only scenarios 3 and 4.  Depending on the case, different benchmark values should be 
used. In the first case we use the solution from IM1, while in the second case we use the solution 
from IM2.  
In our example we consider the alternative when PD decides to close two depots with highest 
operational costs: depot 2 and depot 4. Because feasible set in IM2 is smaller than in IM1, we 
expect that the solution of IM2 will be worse or equal to the solution of IM1.  
We start by calculating internal prices for each of these four products, with the procedures 
described in section 6. Then, we use these price values as input to SM1 and SM2. The solution of 
SM1/2 provides the information about the amount of each product at each depot, which the sales 
departments wants to order. This output is used as input to PM.  
The calculated internal prices are presented in Appendix C.  
We also solve IM1 and IM2.  
We start by presenting the results for nonlinear revenue models. Table 9.1 presents the results 
from benchmark models IM1 and IM2. 
  Benchmark    
  IM1 IM2 
Sale profit 8 622 383 8 618 889.576 
Fixed costs -730 000     -700 000 
Production costs -6 629 268,71 - 6 694 136.372 
 Profit BM 1 263 114,09 1 224 753.204 
Table 9.1 – Results: Nonlinear Benchmark 
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In the optimal solution of IM1, depots 3 and 4 are not in operation. Because we have assumed 
that PD has closed another depots, the optimal solution of IM2 is lower.  
The next table presents the results from our cost-based methods: 
  Case 1 (scenario 3) Case 2 (scenario 4) 
  Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2 
Profit SM 481 065,0442 922 452,418 989 092,7052 1 570 561,044 
INT.PRICE 5 195 803,513 4 673 101,981 6 347 221,703 6 893 040,998 
Fixed cost Included in SM Included in SM 700 000 700 000 
Cost PM 4,542,508,711 4,435,531,738 5 563 954,795 6 567 031,947 
Profit 1 134 359.846 1 160 022.661 1 072 359.613 1 196 570.095 
 %deviation 
from BM  
-10.19 % -8.16 % -12.44 % -2.30 % 
Table 9.2 – Results: Nonlinear Cost-Based Methods 
Profit SM represents the objective function value of SD.  Because this Profit includes internal 
costs (in term of internal prices SD paid to PD), we must add them back in order to calculate 
company’s profit. Cost PM, represents the cost to PD associated with production and primary 
transportation of products ordered by SD. As we can observe from table 9.2, method 2 gives 
better results in term of profit. In the solution of SM1 sales department found it optimally that 
only two depots should operate: depot 2 and depot 5. An interesting observation is that under 
method 2, the profit in case 2 is higher than in case 1. This happens because SD failed to choose 
the "right" depots, also the sold amount of products is lower than in case 2. We note, that if SD 
closed depot 2 and depot 4, then Profit SM would be lower, while the company’s profit would be 
higher. This example emphasizes the importance of finding the correct values of internal prices. 
We can observe that in the benchmark solutions sold amount is bigger than under the cost 
methods. The data indicates that some internal prices are set too high, and therefore SD has 
chosen to decrease the sale.  
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We repeat calculations with piecewise linear revenue function, and use SM1-L and SM2-L 
instead of SM1 and SM2. We also use linear benchmark models: IM1-L and IM2-L. The results 
are presented in Table 9.3 and Table 9.4. 
  Benchmark    
  IM1L IM2L 
Sale profit 8 616 537.415 8 614 697 
Fixed costs 730 000 700 000 
Production costs 6 627 785.873 6 693 821 
 Profit BM-L 1 258 751.542 1 220 876 
Table 9.3 – Results: Linear Benchmark 
The solutions of IM1 and IM1-L are very similar, and it is optimal to close the same depots. As 
expected the profit is lower than in nonlinear case because linear approximation of concave 
function leads to under approximation.  
  Case 1 (scenario 3) Case 2 (scenario 4) 
  Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2 
Profit SM 477 690,1013 919 274,8195 9,844,860,001 1,566,950,014 
INT.PRICE 5 184 328,399 4 681 644,181 6275875,5 6,836,507,486 
Fixed cost Included in SM Included in SM 700000 700000 
Cost PM 4 528 494,118 4 447 077,819 5,519,833,328 6,515,322,669 
Profit 1133524.382 1153841.182 1040528.172 1188134.831 
 %deviation 
from BM 
-9.95 % -8.33 % -14.77 % -2.68 % 
Table 9.4 –Results: Linear Cost-Based Methods 
We observe the same pattern in linear sales problems. Method 1 gives lower profit than method 
2. As in nonlinear case, SD finds it optimal to use depot 2 and depot 5 for operation, under both 
methods. Again, under method 2, the company’s profit is higher in case 2 than in case 1.  
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Chapter 10 - Numerical Tests on Lagrangean Decomposition  
In our computational study of LD we try two alternative ways of selecting step length, for 
calculation of Lagrangean multipliers 𝜆𝑝,𝑑 in each iteration. 
 (𝒕𝟏):   𝒕(𝒏) =
𝝈(𝒏)(𝑼𝑩(𝒏) − 𝑳𝑩𝑫)
∑ ∑ (𝝀𝒑,𝒅
(𝒏))
𝟐
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
 
  (𝒕𝟐):  𝒕(𝒏) =
𝝈(𝒏)(𝑼𝑩𝑫 − 𝑳𝑩𝑫)
∑ ∑ (𝝀𝒑,𝒅
(𝒏))
𝟐
𝒅∈𝑫𝒑∈𝑷
 
 
Initial values of Lagrangean multipliers 𝜇𝑑  are set to zero. We try three different kind of initial 
values for 𝜆𝑝,𝑑. The first alternative is to set initial values of the multipliers to zero, later denoted 
(𝜆0). The second alternative is to start with multiplier values set to the shadow price values for 
constraints from the integrated model, later denoted as (𝜆𝑆). And the third alternative is to start 
with internal prices found in the cost-based method in chapter 9, later denoted (𝜆𝐶). Initial start 
value for 𝜎 is 2. We update 𝜎 ← 0,9𝜎 if during the last five iterations change in UBD is less than 
10. We set maximum number of iterations equal to 200, in order to compare how fast different 
models converge. 
As in the previous chapter, depot 2 and depot 4 are closed in scenario 4.  
 
10.1 – Initial Lagrangean multiplier values (𝝀𝟎) 
In all convergence plots we use the following designations: 
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Nonlinear Sales Problems 
Next graphs show convergence of lower and upper bounds according to the four scenarios and 
two alternative calculations of step length. Initial values of all Lagrangean multipliers are set to 
zero and sales models are quadratic programming (QP) problems.  
Convergence plot - Scenario 1 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
 
Convergence plot - Scenario 2(𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
Convergence plot - Scenario 3(𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
 
Figure 10.1 – Convergence plots (𝑡1), (𝜆0) 
Convergence plot - Scenario 4 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎)
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Convergence plot - Scenario 1(𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎) 
 
Convergence plot - Scenario 2(𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎)
Convergence plot - Scenario 3(𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎)
 
Figure 10.2 - Convergence plots (𝑡2), (𝜆0) 
Convergence plot - Scenario 4(𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎)
From the graphs we can observe that different choices of decomposition of the original problem 
lead to different results. It emphasizes the importance of carefully selection of variables and 
constraints that are duplicated. Also different choices of step length lead to different convergence 
in different models.  
Table 10.1 shows the highest lower bound (feasible solution), the percent deviation of highest 
LBD and lowest UBD, and the percent deviation of the highest LBD from the optimal solution 
for each of scenarios after 5, 50 and 200 iterations, for each of the alternatives of step length 
calculations. In the last two rows we have showed iteration number when the gap between UBD 
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and LBD is within the tolerance of 1%.  Note that for scenarios 1, 2 and 3 the optimal solution is 
found by IM1, while for scenario 4 IM2 is used. 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Alt.1 After 5 iterations         
LBD 790456,4043 868557,008 998068,67 901906,07 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 1108,73 % 1041,78 % 821,68 % 510,13 % 
LBD/BM-1 -37,42 % -31,24 % -20,98 % -26,36 % 
Alt.2 After 5 iterations         
LBD 952973,65 868557,008 998068,67 968112,7 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 902,60 % 1041,78 % 821,68 % 223,16 % 
LBD/BM-1 -24,55 % -31,24 % -20,98 % -16,01 % 
Alt.1 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1252310,947 976926,328 1257275,6 1221800,5 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 4,24 % 46,31 % 2,62 % 1,09 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0,86 % -22,66 % -0,46 % -0,24 % 
Alt.2 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1251114,418 868557,008 1259593,7 1219485,5 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 4,61 % 153,22 % 2,79 % 3,53 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0,95 % -31,24 % -0,28 % -0,43 % 
Alt.1 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1255414,896 1002181,81 1260566,2 1222365 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 0,74 % 29,64 % 0,57 % 0,21 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0,61 % -20,66 % -0,20 % -0,19 % 
Alt.2 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1257420,721 1005001,43 1259628,7 1222097,1 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 0,53 % 29,77 % 0,29 % 0,27 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0,45 % -20,43 % -0,28 % -0,22 % 
Iteration number when UBD-
LBD/LBD<=1%         
Alt 1 106 - 83 56 
Alt 2 93 - 70 76 
Table 10.1 – Summary: Nonlinear SM (𝜆0)
The best convergence, as expected, is obtained in scenario 4. In this scenario it is easier for 
departments to come to a common solution because fixed costs are excluded. However, as we 
have already pointed out in the previous chapter, the optimal solution under this scenario may be 
lower, hence one can obtain a better results in other scenarios. Scenario 3 has showed the next 
best convergence. Unlike scenario 4, the best convergence is obtained under the second 
alternative of step length calculation (t2). Also, Scenario 3 has provided the highest feasible 
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solutions in many of iterations. Scenario 1 has showed a slower convergence than scenario 3. 
Scenario 2 has showed the worse convergence, and after 200 iterations the gap is still around 
30%. Under the best three scenarios deviation of feasible solution from the optimal one is at most 
0.86% after 50 iterations and 0.45% after 200 iterations. We notice that upper bounds in all four 
scenarios are relative similar, also in scenario 2. Therefore, the main reason for poor results under 
scenario 2 are low feasible solutions.  
To get more insights about the solutions in different scenarios, we have included several graphs 
which show supply/ demand of the departments. The first four graphs illustrate the total volume 
of products supplied by PD and ordered by SD in each of iteration. We have also included the 
total volume of products from the solutions of the benchmark models. The next four graphs 
illustrate demand and supply only for one type of product. Because the graphs for all types of 
products are very similar we choose to include graphs for only one product, P1.  All graphs are 
taken from the solution in which (t1) is used for step length calculation.  
 
Total volume Scenario 1(𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
 
Total volume Scenario 2(𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
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Total volume scenario 3(𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎)
 
Figure 10.3- Total Volume (𝑡1), (𝜆0) 
Total volume scenario 4(𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
 
 
P1 Scenario 1(𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
 
P1 Scenario 2(𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
 
P1 Scenario 3(𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
Figure 10.4- Volume P1 (𝑡1), (𝜆0) 
P1 Scenario 4(𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
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From the graphs, we can observe that the volume ordered by SD varieties less than the volume 
supplied by PD. Possible explanation, is that SD can control prices in the markets, while PD has 
to take product prices as given.  Therefore when internal prices change, SD can also change the 
prices in the markets by increase/decrease the volume ordered (and sold), while PD doesn’t has 
this flexibility.  
If we study the graphs for the total volume in scenarios 2 and 3, which are the scenarios in which 
only one department is taking fixed costs into account, we observe the following: the department 
that doesn’t take fixed costs into account supply/order less than it is optimal. In scenario 2 the 
amount ordered by SD, when number of iteration is high, is always lower than the optimal 
amount from IM1. The same is true for the supply from PD in scenario 3. In scenario 1, in which 
both departments take fixed costs into account and at the same time it is one more Lagrangean 
multiplier that provides a better coordination of the depot use, departments succeed to supply and 
demand equal total amount of products. The same is true in scenario 4.  
As we can notice from the graphs the main difference between scenario 2 and other scenarios is 
that the demand from SD is lower than the optimal. As we know a good feasible solution depends 
on good orders from SD, hence this explain the poor performance of scenario 2.  
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Linear Sales Problems 
The next graphs show the convergence plots under the linear sales models. In the same way as 
above two alternative calculations of step length are considered and all initial values of 
Lagrangean multipliers are set to zero. 
Convergence plot - Scenario 1(𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
 
Convergence plot - Scenario 2(𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
  
Convergence plot - Scenario 3(𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎)
 
Figure 10.5- Convergence plots: Linear (𝑡1), (𝜆0) 
Convergence plot - Scenario 4(𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎)
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Convergence plot - Scenario 1(𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎)
 
Convergence plot - Scenario 2(𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎)
Convergence plot - Scenario 3(𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎)
 
Figure 10.6 – Convergence plots: Linear (𝑡2), (𝜆0)  
Convergence plot - Scenario 4(𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎)
Table 10.2 shows the results from linear sales subproblems and has the same structure as Table 
10.1. 
Under linear sales problems the convergence in scenarios 1, 3 and 4 seems to be very similar. 
Under QP sales problems the tolerance of 1% is reached more quickly in scenario 4. While the 
convergences in scenario 1 and 3 are almost the same under both sales problems. Again scenario 
2 has showed a bad convergence with a significant gap after 200 iterations.  
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 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Alt.1 After 5 iterations         
LBD 867519,7946 866979,795 736675,7 948397,775 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 1000,79 % 1043,29 % 1148,05 % 479,95 % 
LBD/BM-1 -31,08 % -31,12 % -41,48 % -22,32 % 
Alt.2 After 5 iterations         
LBD 867519,7946 866979,795 736675,7 968112,696 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 1000,79 % 923,93 % 1121,30 % 223,16 % 
LBD/BM-1 -31,08 % -31,12 % -41,48 % -20,70 % 
Alt.1 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1249350,661 921053,904 1257046,69 1204487,26 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 3,17 % 58,52 % 2,01 % 5,56 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0,75 % -26,83 % -0,14 % -1,34 % 
Alt.2 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1239934,056 1080868,13 1203570,06 1128366,81 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 8,56 % 34,49 % 23,20 % 34,98 % 
LBD/BM-1 -1,49 % -14,13 % -4,38 % -7,58 % 
Alt.1 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1251499,661 1012103,11 1257923,21 1217586,38 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 0,62 % 27,92 % 0,61 % 0,36 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0,58 % -19,59 % -0,07 % -0,27 % 
Alt.2 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1256949,138 1080868,13 1257099,52 1217586,38 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 0,17 % 19,83 % 0,14 % 0,36 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0,14 % -14,13 % -0,13 % -0,27 % 
Iteration number when UBD-
LBD/LBD<=1%         
Alt 1 106 - 84 81 
Alt 2 93 - 85 105 
Table 10.2 – Summary: Linear SM (𝜆0) 
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10.2 Initial Lagrangean multiplier values different from zero 
When initial Lagrangean multiplier values have been set to zero (𝜆0), LD method has started by 
producing bad optimistic bounds and bad feasible solutions (pessimistic bounds) with big gaps 
between these two bounds. Starting with values of initial multipliers set to zero can be interpreted 
as assuming that production managers know nothing about a good solution. This may not be 
reasonable assumption, and normally managers should have some ideas about the values of 
internal prices. The ideas can be based on historical information or some other estimates. These 
estimates could be used as initial values for Lagrangean multipliers. In our work we use two 
different initial values in addition to zero. The first alternative is to use shadow price values of 
constrain I1 from IM2 as starting values (when all depots are open), (𝜆𝑆). The shadow price for a 
constraint, also cold dual value, can be interpreted as the change of the optimal objective function 
value when the right-hand-side is increased by one unit (Lundgren et al. 2010). We note that 
these values are unknown in practice, because the integrated model doesn’t exist and optimal 
solution is not known a priori. Therefore, the obtained results in our example may be better than 
in practice. The second alternative is to use internal prices which we have found in method 2 (in 
chapter 9), (𝜆𝐶).  The initial values for the second Lagrangean multiplier 𝜇𝑑 used in scenario 1, 
are set to zero as previously. Hence, we have assumed that managers don’t have any additional 
information about depots other than fixed costs. 
Below we have presented graphs, in which we have used (𝑡1) for step length calculation and QP 
sales problems. Other graphs together with tables are presented in Appendix D.  
Convergence plot - Scenario 1 (𝝀𝑺), (𝒕𝟏)
 
Convergence plot - Scenario 2 (𝝀𝑺), (𝒕𝟏)
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Convergence plot - Scenario 3 (𝝀𝑺), (𝒕𝟏)
 
Figure 10.7 – Convergence plots (𝑡1), (𝜆𝑆) 
 Convergence plot - Scenario 4 (𝝀𝑺), (𝒕𝟏)
 
Convergence plot - Scenario 1 (𝝀𝑪), (𝒕𝟏)
 
Convergence plot - Scenario 2 (𝝀𝑪), (𝒕𝟏)
 
Convergence plot - Scenario 3 (𝝀𝑪),(𝒕𝟏)
 
Convergence plot - Scenario 4 (𝝀𝑪),(𝒕𝟏)
 
Figure 10.8 – Convergence plots (𝑡1), (𝜆𝐶) 
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In all scenarios, the fastest convergence is obtained when 𝜆𝑆 are used as initial values for 
Lagrangean multipliers. In scenario 4 the difference between lower and upper bonds is very small 
already after the first iteration, while the obtained feasible solution is optimal. This can be 
explained by the fact that the initial internal prices have been taken from the optimal solution of 
benchmark model for this scenario.  
As expected when 𝜆𝑆 or 𝜆𝐶 are used as initial values, after a small number of iterations the gap 
between lower and upper bounds is significantly smaller than when 𝜆0 is used. Also after a few 
iterations, in all scenarios except scenario 4, 𝜆𝐶 gives better results than 𝜆𝑆. We can also observe 
that after "a big" number of iterations, 𝜆0 outperforms 𝜆𝐶. In some of the cases, method with 𝜆𝐶 
doesn’t manage to achieve 1% tolerance between lower and upper bounds, whereas in the same 
cases the tolerance is achieved when 𝜆0 is used. In these cases with (𝜆𝐶), we can observe that the 
lower bound gets stuck at some values while the upper bound continues to decrease. We have not 
found any significant differences between the results from linear and QP sales problems.  
Burton and Obel (1980) have investigated the behavior of different decomposition models 
(applied to different planning approaches) in the first few iterations under varying types of a 
priori information. The authors have showed that a priori information used by companies has 
effect on the performance of companies' plans.  Burton and Obel have claimed that relevant 
information leads to better results. From our observations we obtain a similar results after a small 
number of iteration. If company uses up to 50-60 iterations, then the best results are obtained 
when initial values of Lagrangean multipliers are based on some estimates or other available 
information. However, if company uses a large number of iterations or it uses convergence 
criteria for stopping, then starting with the estimates made by the company doesn’t necessarily 
lead to a better results.  
10.3 Comments on the Calculation 
Step length calculation 
As we have pointed out in chapter 7, the selection of step length is important to guarantee 
convergence. From our example we can observe that under different step length selections the 
convergence of lower and upper bounds have showed different behaviors. The most obvious 
difference between (𝑡1) and (𝑡2) alternatives is under method (𝜆𝐶), where the 1% tolerance 
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under QP sales problem is obtained only with (𝑡1). In linear sales problems, this tolerance has 
not been met, however in all scenarios, (𝑡1) gives tighter bounds than (𝑡2) . Also under method 
(𝜆𝑆) with linear sales problems, (𝑡1) seems to outperform (𝑡2). While in QP sales problems we 
cannot observe the same pattern. Also in method (𝜆0), we cannot conclude that one of the 
alternatives has showed better results than the other. In some cases (𝑡1) gives better results, in 
other cases (𝑡2) does it.  
The calculation of step length for the second Lagrangean multiplier 𝜇𝑑, associated with 
duplication of binary variables, is not carried out with the formulas (𝑡1) or (𝑡2). The results 
obtained with these formulas are very poor. In Appendix D we have showed these results under 
method (𝜆0) for QP sales problem.  
Also we have tried another updating of 𝜎 multiplier from the step length formula: 𝜎 ← 0,5𝜎. The 
results obtained under LD(𝑡2) are similar to the results under 0.9 updating rule. However, a 
much worse convergence is obtained under (𝑡1) alternative of step length calculation, which is a 
more traditional choice (Fisher, 1985). The results with 0.5 updating rule are presented in 
Appendix D for LD(𝜆0). Possible explanation for this outcome is that under this approach step 
length convergences to zero too quickly, and therefore we obtain a convergence to a point 
different from the optimal solution.  
As we have seen, the calculation of step length affects the solution process. Different problems 
formulation require different selection of step length in order to obtain fast convergence. The 
standard methods for selection of step length may not give the best convergence. LD will 
therefore require some computational effort in order to find a good step length selection 
Linear vs nonlinear sales problems 
In our example, the convergence of the lower and upper bounds occurs more slowly in cases with 
linear sales problems. Because in our nonlinear models we have used linear demand functions, 
the revenue function is quadratic and the sales subproblems are relative easy to solve. In reality 
demand functions can be more complicated and in order to model them SD would have to use a 
complicated function which could lead to non-convex sales subproblem, and hence optimal 
solution could not be guaranteed. In these cases it could be easier to model revenue with 
piecewise linear function, and avoid complex demand functions and non-convex problems.   
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10.4 Comparison of the results between the mechanisms 
The main idea of the cost-based methods is to reflect all variable costs associated with products 
down to depot stage. Internal prices which have been calculated by these methods, take into 
account the costs related to production and primary transportation. In contrast to these methods, 
LD also takes into account secondary distribution costs and revenue created by products in 
markets. 
In this section we compare the results from cost-based methods and LD. In chapter 9 we have 
assumed scenarios 3 and 4, when we have applied these methods. Hence we compare 
corresponding results from LD.  We start with 𝜆0 as initial values for Lagrangean multipliers in 
LD method. 
 
Non-linear - Scenario 3 (𝝀𝟎) 
 
Non-linear - Scenario 4 (𝝀𝟎) 
Figure 10.9 – Nonlinear: Cost-Based vs LD (𝜆0) 
As we have showed in chapter 9, cost-based method 2 has provided a relative good solution in 
scenario 4 relative to scenario 3. This explains that, the performance of method 2 compared to 
LD, is significantly better in scenario 4 than in scenario 3. In scenario 3 it takes approx. 15 
iterations before LD outperforms both cost-based methods. Whereas in scenario 4, LD 
outperforms method 2 only after approx. 40 iterations. . 
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Linear - Scenario 3 (𝝀𝟎) 
 
Linear – Scenario 4 (𝝀𝟎)  
Figure 10.10 – Linear: Cost-Based vs LD (𝜆0) 
In the linear sales problems in scenario 3, LD has outperformed both cost-based methods after 
approx. 20 iterations, when step length is calculated according to (𝑡1). If step length is calculated 
according to (t2), it takes a significantly higher number of iterations to outperform both cost-
based methods, approx. 40. In scenario 4 it takes approx. 20 iterations before LD outperforms 
method 1. Because method 2 has performed well in this case, it takes more iterations to 
outperform this method, especially under second alternative of step length calculation. 
In general, cost-based methods outperform LD (𝜆0) when the number of iterations is small, and 
opposite when the number of iterations is relative big.     
It doesn’t make sense to compare results from cost-based methods with LD(𝜆𝐶), because in this 
case LD will obtain the same result as in method 2 in the first iteration. Therefore the best 
feasible solutions of LD(𝜆𝐶) will never be worse than in the cost-based methods.  
Below, we compare results from LD(𝜆𝑆) with the cost-based methods. As we have showed in the 
previous section, LD(𝜆𝑆) gives optimal results from the first iteration in scenario 4. Therefore we 
compare results only from scenario 3. 
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Scenario 3 - Non-linear (𝝀𝑺)
 
Scenario 3 – Linear (𝝀𝑺) 
 
Figure 10.11- Scenario 3: Cost-Based vs LD (𝜆𝑆) 
As we can observe from figure 10.11, in both linear and QP sales problems, LD (𝑡1) outperforms 
both cost-based methods after 10 iterations. LD (𝑡2) has the fastest convergence at the beginning 
and outperforms cost-based methods already after approx.5 iterations.  
From these results we have observed that LD(𝜆𝑆) outperforms cost-based methods after a few 
iterations. As expected the number of iterations required to outperform cost-based methods is 
significantly smaller in LD(𝜆𝑆) than in LD (𝜆0). We have already pointed out that (𝜆𝑆) values 
would not be known in the absence of the optimal solution. However, we expect that the 
company is able to set realistic estimates of internal prices, and based on these estimates it would 
take less iterations to outperform cost-based methods, than when (𝜆0) is used. 
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PART 4: CONCLUSION 
Chapter 11 – Summary of Findings 
In this chapter we summarize our findings. We start with discussion about allocation of decisions 
and premium sharing rules, which are assumed in different scenarios. Then we discuss the main 
advantages and disadvantages with mechanisms proposed in our thesis. We conclude by 
summing up the work we have done.  
 
11.1 Discussion about Scenarios 
Allocation of decisions 
In scenario 4 we consider a case in which PD/company does not want to involve SD in the 
decision process about operation of depots. The reason behind this allocation of decision can be 
that the decision about drift of depots is of operational type, and therefore should be taken by 
operational units. Also such allocation of decision may lead to an easier planning process 
ensuring faster decisions making, and can therefore be preferred by the company. From the 
solution under the cost-based mechanism, we observe that in scenario 4 the profit obtained by the 
company is higher than in scenario 3, when Method 2 is applied. It can partly be explained by a 
relative good choice made by PD about operation of depots. This illustrates that the performance 
of the company in scenario 4 depends on the choice made by PD, and the solution can be both 
very good and very poor depending on which depots are closed. Therefore, when such 
distribution of decision is used, PD should have an idea about depots that should operate. Simple 
methods, like close down depots with highest fixed costs may lead to wrong decisions, which can 
be crucial for the company's performance.  
Because SD chooses from which locations products will be transported to the markets, we can 
also argue that SD should be responsible for the decision about operation of depots. This is 
assumed in scenarios 1, 2 and 3. As we have showed in our numerical example of LD 
mechanism, after some number of iterations scenarios 1 and 3 outperform scenario 4 in term of 
company’s profit, in all cases. However, under scenario 4 we obtain the fastest convergence.  
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Premium sharing Rule 
Because in scenario 4 the decision about operation of depots is taken by PD, premium to SD 
doesn’t depend on fixed costs. In scenarios 1, 2 and 3 SD is involved in the decision about 
depots, while fixed costs are taken into account only in scenarios 1 and 3. In scenario 2 sales 
department makes the decision about depots but doesn’t take into account any costs associated to 
them (except those that are incorporated in internal prices). As we have showed, in this scenario 
the solution is very poor relative to other scenarios. The main reason for that is that SD chooses 
too many depots for operation. If SD is responsible for operation of depots, it can also be 
reasonable that the department should take into account fixed costs. At the same time, it may be 
reasonable to assume that in order to achieve coordination and avoid suboptimal solutions PD 
should also take these costs into account. Therefore we have expected that in scenario 1 we will 
obtain a faster convergence than in scenario 3. But as we can observe from the results, scenario 3 
seems to outperform scenario 1 in nonlinear case. When linear sales problems are used the results 
between these two scenarios are very similar. Because scenario 3 provides the best results, it is 
very attractive to conclude that this is the best decomposition choice in this situation. However, 
we should be carefully to make such conclusion as the results obtained in our example may 
change with input data, and because it is clear that scenario 1 provides a better coordination 
between departments we should not exclude possibility that this scenario may be a better choice 
in some situations. On the other hand, scenario 1 may have a disadvantage in terms of premium 
calculation. Because in this scenario at the decision level, fixed costs are adjusted with 
Lagrangean multipliers, the premium to SD may be unreasonably low or high if the values of 
these multipliers are very small/large.  
In the cost-based methods, in scenario 3, the calculated internal prices have led to relative small 
sales in the markets and low profit. This is partly caused by fixed costs to depots. When premium 
to SD depends on fixed costs there is a risk that the department will decrease the sale in order to 
get lower fixed costs, and at the same time higher prices in the markets. By doing this SD will 
increase its premium, while profit to the company will not necessarily be improved.  
Summary 
We sum up our findings. The choice of allocation of the depot decision should be seen in context 
with mechanism used to decide internal prices. As we have seen, the results in different scenarios 
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depend on how internal prices are determined. When the cost-based methods are used, there is a 
relative high probability to obtain a solution which is far away from the optimum. Therefore, to 
entrust SD the decision about depots may be not the best choice. On the other hand, when LD is 
used, choices made by departments are corrected through the updating of internal prices 
(Lagrangean multipliers). In this situation it may be better to involve SD in the decision process 
about operation of depots. Fast convergence and easy planning process in scenario 4 must be seen 
in context with PDs possibility to make good choices about which depots should be operating 
without involving SD. 
If the company decides to delegate the depot decision to the sales department, then the costs 
associated with depots drift should be reflected in the premium of the department. In our 
numerical example, we have not found any evidence for why it would be better to assign the 
depot decision to both departments at the planning level, and at the same time we have argued 
that this could lead to an unrealistic SDs premium.  
 
11.2 Discussion about LD and Cost-based methods  
Ability to know when the optimal solution is found 
When the optimal solution is unknown, it’s difficult to make any conclusions about how good are 
the solutions provided by methods in a decoupled setting. One of the advantages with LD is that 
we can observe when the solution is the optimal one (or is close to optimal). LD provides an 
optimistic bound which is an upper bound in our problem (lower bound in minimization 
problem). If the value of the optimistic bound equals to the value of feasible solution then we can 
conclude that the optimal solution has been found. However, because the approach that we have 
used in order to find feasible solutions is a heuristic, an optimal solution cannot be guaranteed.  
We also expect that many of the real world problems in oil companies have non-convex 
constraints (for example blending constraints). In non-convex problems LD is still applicable, but 
as we have pointed out in chapter 7.1, upper bounding will not be guaranteed with the 
subgradient method. This implies that optimistic bound may not converge to the optimal solution 
and a duality gap will occur (Lundgren et al, 2009). As Guignard (2003) has pointed out, clever 
implementations of solving Lagrangean dual, with powerful heuristics imbedded at every 
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iteration, is important to achieve good solutions. In the cost-based methods proposed in our work, 
or some other cost-based approaches it is difficult to say whether the solution is near or far from 
optimum.  
Ability to obtain the optimal solution in a decoupled setting 
Often cost-based methods are used because they are easy to apply in a decoupled setting. 
However, as has been showed by Guajardo et al (2013b) traditional approaches for cost based 
pricing lack clarity in divergent supply chain problems and do not provide optimal results. Also 
in our work the proposed cost-based methods don’t achieve the optimal solution. The optimal 
solution (may in some cases be local optimal if the overall problem is non-convex) can be 
achieved if it is possible to integrate sales and production decisions into one problem. Also, as it 
was showed by Guajardo et al (2013b) if producer could incorporate information about sellers’ 
behavior when deciding the internal prices the resulting model could outperform traditional cost 
methods. In our work we have showed that by implementing the LD mechanism in a decoupled 
setting it is possible to achieve the same solution as in integrated planning and at the same time 
allow departments to maintain their autonomy. 
Solution after a few iterations 
In chapter 2 we have mention that one important property of the decomposition method is that a 
relative “good” solution should be obtained with a small number of information exchanges 
between departments. In the LD mechanism, difference between UBD and LBD indicates how 
good the solution is. Usually a good solution is characterized by a "small" gap between UBD and 
LBD. As we can observe from our numerical example, in most of the cases 50-100 iterations are 
required to obtain 1% tolerance ( 
UBD−LBD
LBD
 ≤ 0.01), while in some cases this tolerance is not 
reached. How many iterations are required to obtain a “good” solution depends on the percentage 
tolerance required. For instance, in our example 2% tolerance would require a significantly lower 
number of iterations, and would be reached in all cases except scenario 2. We also expect that the 
number of iterations required to obtain a given level of tolerance will increase with the size of 
problem. If company doesn’t has possibility to carry out many information exchanges, the 
company can restrict the number of iterations to some suitable number. In the situations with 
relative small number of iterations, as we have showed the bests results are achieved when 
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production managers use some estimates to find initial internal prices. The drawback of the 
restriction on information exchange, is that it may not be possible to say how close the obtained 
solution is to the optimal one, because even if the gap between optimistic and pessimistic bounds 
is big, the pessimistic bound may still be close to the optimal solution. Use of traditional cost-
based methods do not require exchange of information at the planning level, and therefore makes 
computation at this level much easier. Also if a priori information is not used in the LD 
mechanism, cost-based methods will most likely outperform LD if the number of iterations is 
small.  
Implementation of mechanisms 
Optimistic bounds obtained during the solution procedure are rarely (or never) feasible. Because 
of this, heuristics are implemented. In our problem we are interesting to find internal prices, 
which will ensure that SD makes profitable decisions. Therefore we choose the heuristic which is 
quite specific.  In our model we have made assumption that amount of available crude oil doesn’t 
restrict SD, in other words there are always enough resources to satisfy demand faced by the 
company. When this assumption is in place all solutions generated by the heuristic are feasible. If 
we had not made this assumption, then in many of iterations, the heuristic would have difficulties 
to find feasible solutions. This situation would arise, including the case in which λ0 are used as 
initial values for the Lagrangean multipliers, because low internal prices lead to huge orders from 
SD, which cannot be satisfied by the company with limited resources. Also as we have showed 
the step length calculation is important to guarantee convergence, and should be selected 
carefully according to specific of the problem. Because the solution process of LD demands a 
great amount of calculations and may be difficult to understand for practitioners, the cost-based 
methods may be preferred by the companies. 
 
11.3 Summary and Further Research  
In our work, we have studied the issues between production and sales planning processes in an oil 
company. In addition to decisions about production, distribution and sale we have considered 
possibility to include fixed costs associated to operation of depots (warehouses). We have 
considered several possible ways the decision about operation of depots can be allocated between 
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production and sales departments. Depending on this allocation, we have also considered 
different ways of calculation of sales department’s premium. According to the distribution of 
decisions and premium calculation we have formulated sales and production subproblems in a 
decoupled setting. In order to achieve coordination between departments we have used internal 
prices. We have proposed two mechanism for setting internal prices.  
To measure the results achieved in these mechanisms, we have also developed integrated models. 
These models have assumed centralized planning and have been used as theoretical benchmarks, 
because such planning may not be possible in reality.  
The idea of the first mechanism has been to find internal prices based on costs faced by PD, and 
we have suggested two such cost-based methods. The first costs-based method has not taken into 
account the cost interrelation between products at all, while the second method has incorporated 
this interrelation to some extent. In the numerical example, the second method has showed a 
better results than the first one in term of companies’ profit. However, the results have been 
below optimum. 
In the second mechanism, Lagrangean decomposition has been used to determine internal prices. 
According to the allocation of decisions and premium calculations several decompositions of the 
original problems have been considered. In our numerical example, we have showed that use of 
LD makes it possible to achieve equally good results in the decoupled planning as in the 
centralized planning, if company allows for some information exchange between departments at 
the planning level.  We have also showed that formulation of subproblems affects the 
convergence behavior. Also fixed costs associated to operation of depots lead to slower 
convergence. Several alternatives of updating convergence parameters in LD and different initial 
values of Lagrangean multipliers, have been considered. We have showed that the most common 
choice of step length calculation in subgradient method doesn’t necessarily lead to the best 
results. As we have expected, when values calculated on the base of some available information 
have been used as initial Lagrangean Multipliers, better results have been achieved after a few 
iterations. However, starting with multiplier values based on some a priori information doesn’t 
necessarily lead to a tighter bound.   
In the numerical example we have also showed, if company allows a moderate number of 
information exchange between departments, LD outperforms the cost-based methods.  
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In all models we have considered two different ways of revenue functions formulation. The first 
way has assumed quadratic model with linear demand functions, while the second one has 
assumed a piecewise linear approximation of the revenue functions, and has been modeled with 
binary variables. The linear models have showed somewhat slower convergence in LD in some of 
the cases. However, in most of the cases models have showed a similar results.  
All models presented in our work are single period models and don’t considered inventory 
possibility. In reality companies are dealing with multi-period models, which include inventory 
planning. Also a full size problems include much more variables and parameters. As we have 
seen in our work, in some cases, small changes in problem formulation and input have led to a 
significant change in the results. Hence, the question for further research is how to apply the 
suggested methodology to a more sophisticated problems, and how this sophistication will affect 
the solution processes and results. Another direction for further research is to consider other 
methodologies than traditional subgradient method to solve Lagrangean duals.  
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 A3 
Appendix A 
 
SM2 Linear 
Objective function 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑆𝑀2−𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 : ∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑ ∑ ∑ Cd,k
TRAN3 × zp,d,k 
𝑑∈𝐷𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
  
− ∑ ∑ 𝜋𝑝,𝑑 × q
𝑆
p,d
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃
                                                                     
Subject to (SML1) to (SML5), (S3) and (G2) and 
q𝑆p,d, zp,d,k, 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘, 𝑤𝑚,𝑝,𝑘 ≥ 0      𝑙𝑚,𝑝,𝑘 ∈ {0,1}                       
 
IM2: 
Objective function 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑀2 :   ∑ ∑ (𝐴𝑝 ∑ zp,d,k
𝑑∈𝐷
− 𝑏𝑝 ∑ zp,d,k
2
𝑑∈𝐷
)
𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑟
𝐵𝑢𝑦
𝑟∈𝑅𝑖∈𝐼
xi,r
− ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑟
𝑃𝑅𝑂
𝑟∈𝑅
 
𝑖∈𝐼
xi,r − ∑ ∑ ∑ Ce,r
PRO2
𝑟∈𝑅
ve,i,r
𝑖∈𝐼𝑒∈𝐸
− ∑ ∑ ∑ Cp,h
BLEND
ℎ∈𝐻
q̃p,d,h  
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑ ∑ Cr,h
TRAN1 (∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?p,e,i,r,h
𝑝∈𝑃𝑖∈𝐼𝑒∈𝐸
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?p,c,b,i.r
𝑏∈𝐵𝑝∈𝑃𝑖∈𝐼𝑐∈𝐶
)
ℎ∈𝐻𝑟∈𝑅
− ∑ ∑ ∑ Ch,d
TRAN2
𝑝∈𝑃𝑑∈𝐷
q̃p,d,h −
ℎ∈𝐻
∑ ∑ ∑ Cd,k
TRAN3 × zp,d,k 
𝑑∈𝐷𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
       (𝐼𝑀2) 
Subject to (P1) to (P11), (S1) to (S2), (I1) and (G2) and  
 
xi,r, ye,i,r, vb,i,r, ?̃?e,i,r, ?̃?c,b,i,r, ?̅?p,e,i,r,h, ?̅?p,c,b,i,r,h, zp,d,k , q̃p,d,h, 𝑞𝑝,𝑑, 𝜃𝑝,𝑘   ≥ 0     
 
 
 
 A4 
IM Linear 
Objective function 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑀𝐿 : ∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘 − ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑟
𝐵𝑢𝑦
𝑟∈𝑅𝑖∈𝐼
xi,r − ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑟
𝑃𝑅𝑂
𝑟∈𝑅
 
𝑖∈𝐼
xi,r
𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑ ∑ ∑ Ce,r
PRO2
𝑟∈𝑅
ve,i,r
𝑖∈𝐼𝑒∈𝐸
− ∑ ∑ ∑ Cp,h
BLEND
ℎ∈𝐻
q̃p,d,h  
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑ ∑ Cr,h
TRAN1 (∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?p,e,i,r,h
𝑝∈𝑃𝑖∈𝐼𝑒∈𝐸
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?p,c,b,i.r
𝑏∈𝐵𝑝∈𝑃𝑖∈𝐼𝑐∈𝐶
)
ℎ∈𝐻𝑟∈𝑅
− ∑ ∑ ∑ Ch,d
TRAN2
𝑝∈𝑃𝑑∈𝐷
q̃p,d,h −
ℎ∈𝐻
∑ ∑ ∑ Cd,k
TRAN3 × zp,d,k 
𝑑∈𝐷𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑ 𝐶𝑑
𝐹𝐼𝑋ℎ𝑑    (𝐼𝑀𝐿)
𝑑∈𝐷
 
 
Subject to (P1) to (P11), (SML1) to (SML5), (I1) and (G1) and  
xi,r, ye,i,r, vb,i,r, ?̃?e,i,r, ?̃?c,b,i,r, ?̅?p,e,i,r,h, ?̅?p,c,b,i,r,h,q̃p,d,h, 𝑞𝑝,𝑑, zp,d,k, 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘, 𝑤𝑚,𝑝,𝑘 ≥ 0  
ℎ𝑑 , 𝑙𝑚,𝑝,𝑘 ∈ {0,1}                       
 
IM2 - Linear: 
Objective function 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑀2 : ∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘 − ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑟
𝐵𝑢𝑦
𝑟∈𝑅𝑖∈𝐼
xi,r − ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑟
𝑃𝑅𝑂
𝑟∈𝑅
 
𝑖∈𝐼
xi,r
𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑ ∑ ∑ Ce,r
PRO2
𝑟∈𝑅
ve,i,r
𝑖∈𝐼𝑒∈𝐸
− ∑ ∑ ∑ Cp,h
BLEND
ℎ∈𝐻
q̃p,d,h  
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑ ∑ Cr,h
TRAN1 (∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?p,e,i,r,h
𝑝∈𝑃𝑖∈𝐼𝑒∈𝐸
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?p,c,b,i.r
𝑏∈𝐵𝑝∈𝑃𝑖∈𝐼𝑐∈𝐶
)
ℎ∈𝐻𝑟∈𝑅
− ∑ ∑ ∑ Ch,d
TRAN2
𝑝∈𝑃𝑑∈𝐷
q̃p,d,h −
ℎ∈𝐻
∑ ∑ ∑ Cd,k
TRAN3 × zp,d,k 
𝑑∈𝐷𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
       (𝐼𝑀2) 
Subject to (P1) to (P11), (SML1) to (SML5), (I1) and (G2) and 
xi,r, ye,i,r, vb,i,r, ?̃?e,i,r, ?̃?c,b,i,r, ?̅?p,e,i,r,h, ?̅?p,c,b,i,r,h,q̃p,d,h, 𝑞𝑝,𝑑, zp,d,k, 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘, 𝑤𝑚,𝑝,𝑘 ≥ 0 and 𝑙𝑚,𝑝,𝑘 ∈ {0,1} 
 A5 
Scenario 1 – L1SM-Linear 
Objective function 
𝐿1𝑆𝑀𝐿 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡:                ∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘 − ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑝,𝑑q
(𝑆)
p,d
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
 
− ∑ ∑ ∑ Cd,k
TRAN2 × zp,d,k 
𝑑∈𝐷𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑
𝐶𝑑
𝐹𝐼𝑋
2
ℎ
(𝑆)
𝑑
𝑑
− ∑ 𝜇𝑑ℎ𝑑
(𝑆)
𝑑∈𝐷
 
Subject to (L13) to (L14), (SL1)-(SL5) and  
q𝑆p,d, zp,d,k, 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘, 𝑤𝑚,𝑝,𝑘 ≥ 0   and   𝑙𝑚,𝑝,𝑘, ℎ𝑑
(𝑆)
 ∈ {0,1}                       
 
Scenario 2 – L2SM-Linear 
Objective function 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐿2𝑆𝑀𝐿 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡:     ∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘 − ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑝,𝑑q
(𝑆)
p,d
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
 
− ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐝,𝐤
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝟐 × 𝐳𝐩,𝐝,𝐤 
𝒅∈𝑫𝒌∈𝑲𝒑∈𝑷
 
Subject to (L14), (L18), (SL1)-(SL5) and 
q𝑆p,d, zp,d,k, 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘, 𝑤𝑚,𝑝,𝑘 ≥ 0  and  𝑙𝑚,𝑝,𝑘 ∈ {0,1}                         
 
Scenario 3 – L3SM-Linear 
Objective function 
𝐿3𝑆𝑀𝐿 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡:                ∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘 − ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑝,𝑑q
(𝑆)
p,d
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
 
− ∑ ∑ ∑ Cd,k
TRAN2 × zp,d,k 
𝑑∈𝐷𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
− ∑
𝐶𝑑
𝐹𝐼𝑋
2
ℎ
(𝑆)
𝑑
𝑑
 
Subject to (L13) to (L14), (SL1)-(SL5) and  
q𝑆p,d, zp,d,k, 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘, 𝑤𝑚,𝑝,𝑘 ≥ 0   and   𝑙𝑚,𝑝,𝑘, ℎ𝑑
(𝑆)
 ∈ {0,1}                       
 
 
 A6 
Scenario 4 – L3SM-Linear 
Objective function 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐿2𝑆𝑀𝐿 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡:     ∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘 − ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑝,𝑑q
(𝑆)
p,d
𝑑∈𝐷𝑝∈𝑃𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
 
− ∑ ∑ ∑ Cd,k
TRAN2 × zp,d,k 
𝑑∈𝐷𝑘∈𝐾𝑝∈𝑃
 
Subject to (L14), (L18), (SL1)-(SL5) and 
q𝑆p,d, zp,d,k, 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑝,𝑘, 𝑤𝑚,𝑝,𝑘 ≥ 0     and  𝑙𝑚,𝑝,𝑘 ∈ {0,1} 
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Appendix B 
 
  p1 p2 p3 p4 
h1 30 29 29 21 
h2 32 30 28 29 
Table 1.B – Blending costs of products 
 
  r1 r2 
h1 25 25.5 
h2 24.5 25 
Table 2.B – Transportation costs from refineries to hubs 
 
  d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 
h1 25 22 28 24 25 
h2 22 21 30 28 25.5 
Table 3.B – Transportation costs from hubs to depots 
 
  k1 k2 k3 k4 k5 
d1 24.9 29.5 37 39.1 36.9 
d2 35.5 26 27.1 39 29 
d3 39.3 27.2 25.9 35.3 38.5 
d4 38.7 39.4 35.7 25.5 26.4 
d5 37.6 38.9 36 25 24.9 
Table 4.B – Transportation costs from depots to markets 
 
d1 250000 
d2 255000 
d3 225000 
d4 250000 
d5 225000 
Table 5.B – Fixed costs from depot operation 
 
 
 
 A8 
Price functions: 
P1: 𝜃1 = 420 − 0.04𝑧1 
P2: 𝜃2 = 400 − 0.031𝑧2 
P3: 𝜃3 = 380 − 0.035𝑧3 
P4: 𝜃4 = 300 − 0.03𝑧4 
 
𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚   𝑬𝒊 =
𝝏𝒛𝒊
𝝏𝜽𝒊
𝜽𝒊
𝒛𝒊
: 
P1: 𝐸1 = −7.5% 
P2: 𝐸2 = −7.9% 
P3: 𝐸3 = −6.2% 
P4: 𝐸4 = −3.78% 
Elasticity was calculated according to the optimal quantum and price in IM for market 1.   
 
 
  min max 
P1 500 2500 
P2 500 2500 
P3 700 3000 
P4 1000 4000 
Table 6.B – Minimum and maximum demand for each product at each market 
 
 
 
 
 A9 
 
 
Premium Gasoline                   
Amount 500 700 900 1100 1300 1500 1700 1900 2100 2300 2500 
Revenue 200000 274400 345600 413600 478400 540000 598400 653600 705600 754400 800000 
Regular Gasoline                     
Amount 500 700 900 1100 1300 1500 1700 1900 2100 2300 2500 
Revenue 192250 264810 334890 402490 467610 530250 590410 648090 703290 756010 806250 
Distillates                     
Amount 700 930 1160 1390 1620 1850 2080 2310 2540 2770 3000 
Revenue 248850 323128.5 393704 460576.5 523746 583212.5 638976 691036.5 739394 784048.5 825000 
Fuel Oil                     
Amount 1000 1300 1600 1900 2200 2500 2800 3100 3400 3700 4000 
Revenue 270000 339300 403200 461700 514800 562500 604800 641700 673200 699300 720000 
Table 7.B – Amount and revenue break point in piecewise linear revenue function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A10 
Appendix C 
 
  p1 p2 p3 p4 
d1 312.2973599 299.84681 261.3083814 190.4932129 
d2 310.7989303 298.84681 260.3083814 186.4932129 
d3 316.7989303 305.34681 268.8083814 192.4932129 
d4 312.7989303 301.34681 264.8083814 188.4932129 
d5 313.7989303 302.34681 264.8083814 189.4932129 
Table 1.C – Internal prices calculated with Method 1 (without discount) 
 
 
  p1 p2 p3 p4 
d1 294.0051203 282.6039649 241.8003314 160.304109 
d2 292.5059055 281.6037031 240.8000697 156.3038473 
d3 298.5059055 288.1037031 249.3000697 162.3038473 
d4 294.5059055 284.1037031 245.3000697 158.3038473 
Table 2.C – Internal prices calculated with Method 2 (with discount) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A11 
Appendix D 
Step length: 𝝈 ← 𝟎, 𝟓𝝈 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Alt.1 After 5 iterations         
LBD 790456.4043 868557.008 998068.67 901906.07 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 1108.73 % 1041.78 % 821.68 % 510.13 % 
LBD/BM-1 -37.42 % -31.24 % -20.98 % -26.36 % 
Alt.2 After 5 iterations         
LBD 952973.65 868557.008 998068.67 968112.7 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 902.60 % 1041.78 % 821.68 % 223.16 % 
LBD/BM-1 -24.55 % -31.24 % -20.98 % -16.01 % 
Alt.1 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1224383.403 868557.008 1247419 1175944.9 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 4.55 % 57.74 % 6.53 % 7.02 % 
LBD/BM-1 -3.07 % -31.24 % -1.24 % -3.99 % 
Alt.2 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1250681.008 868557.008 1259593.7 1219485.5 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 3.50 % 153.22 % 2.79 % 3.53 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0.98 % -31.24 % -0.28 % -0.43 % 
Alt.1 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1224727.171 868557.008 1248802.5 1185749.7 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 4.03 % 53.64 % 4.86 % 4.52 % 
LBD/BM-1 -3.04 % -31.24 % -1.13 % -3.18 % 
Alt.2 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1254449.255 995029.247 1259593.7 1220798.5 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 0.83 % 30.69 % 0.42 % 0.39 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0.69 % -21.22 % -0.28 % -0.32 % 
Iteration number when UBD-
LBD/LBD<=1%         
Alt 1 - - - - 
Alt 2 87 - 66 66 
 
Table 1.D – Summary: Nonlinear SM (𝜆0) step length 0.5
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Scenario 1 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
 
Scenario 2 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
 
Scenario 3 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
 
Scenario 4 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎) 
 
Figure 1.D – Convergence plots (𝑡1), (𝜆0) step length 0.5  
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Scenario 1 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎) 
 
Scenario 2 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎) 
 
Scenario 3 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎) 
 
Scenario 4 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎) 
Figure 2.D – Convergence plots (𝑡2), (𝜆0) step length 0.5  
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  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Alt.1 After 5 iterations         
LBD 867519.7946 866979.795 736675.7 948397.775 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 1000.79 % 1043.29 % 1148.05 % 479.95 % 
LBD/BM-1 -31.08 % -31.12 % -41.48 % -22.32 % 
Alt.2 After 5 iterations         
LBD 867519.7946 866979.795 736675.7 968112.696 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 1000.79 % 923.93 % 1121.30 % 223.16 % 
LBD/BM-1 -31.08 % -31.12 % -41.48 % -20.70 % 
Alt.1 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1237940.112 939088.215 1190967.53 1127849.64 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 2.95 % 43.34 % 10.01 % 12.21 % 
LBD/BM-1 -1.65 % -25.40 % -5.39 % -7.62 % 
Alt.2 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1239934.056 1080868.13 1203570.06 1128366.81 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 8.56 % 26.97 % 23.20 % 34.98 % 
LBD/BM-1 -1.49 % -14.13 % -4.38 % -7.58 % 
Alt.1 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1237940.112 939088.215 1199420.65 1144460.34 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 2.66 % 40.78 % 7.48 % 9.98 % 
LBD/BM-1 -1.65 % -25.40 % -4.71 % -6.26 % 
Alt.2 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1256949.138 1080868.13 1257099.52 1217586.38 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 0.17 % 19.83 % 0.14 % 0.36 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0.14 % -14.13 % -0.13 % -0.27 % 
Iteration number when UBD-
LBD/LBD<=1%         
Alt 1 - - - - 
Alt 2 79 - 85 98 
 
Table 2.D – Summary: Linear SM (𝜆0) step length 0.5
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Scenario 1 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎)  
 
Scenario 2 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎)  
 
Scenario 3 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎)  
 
Scenario 4 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎)  
 
Figure 3.D – Convergence plots: Linear (𝑡1), (𝜆0)  step length 0.5
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Scenario 1 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎)
 
Scenario 2 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎)
 
Scenario 3 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎)
 
Scenario 4 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎)
Figure 4.D – Convergence plots: Linear (𝑡2), (𝜆0)  step length 0.5 
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Initial Lagrange multipliers – Shadow prices 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Alt.1 After 5 iterations         
LBD 1224750.914 832364.3 1124589.7 1224751 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 16.82 % 79.58 % 40.68 % 0.00 % 
LBD/BM-1 -3.04 % -34.10 % -10.97 % 0.00 % 
Alt.2 After 5 iterations         
LBD 1224750.914 832364.3 1223488 1218999.3 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 14.97 % 79.58 % 28.14 % 0.00 % 
LBD/BM-1 -3.04 % -34.10 % -3.14 % 0.00 % 
Alt.1 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1259519.299 973849.392 1262131.5 1224751 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 0.62 % 42.05 % 0.43 % 0.00 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0.28 % -22.90 % -0.08 % 0.00 % 
Alt.2 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1260244.685 998227.373 1259939 1224750.7 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 0.48 % 34.69 % 0.82 % 0.00 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0.23 % -20.97 % -0.25 % 0.00 % 
Alt.1 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1259581.735 991457.894 1262385.2 1224751 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 0.31 % 31.01 % 0.06 % 0.00 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0.28 % -21.51 % -0.06 % 0.00 % 
Alt.2 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1260244.685 998227.373 1260362.3 1224750.7 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 0.24 % 30.11 % 0.24 % 0.00 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0.23 % -20.97 % -0.22 % 0.00 % 
Iteration number when UBD-
LBD/LBD<=1%         
Alt 1 34 - 41 1 
Alt 2 27 - 49 1 
 
Table 3.D – Summary: Nonlinear SM (𝜆𝑆) 
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Scenario 1  (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑺) 
 
Scenario 2  (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑺) 
 
Scenario 3  (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑺) 
 
Scenario 4  (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑺) 
 
Figure 5.D – Convergence plots (𝑡2), (𝜆𝑆)  
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  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Alt.1 After 5 iterations         
LBD 1218530.3 818416.223 1093601.95 1220099.4 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 16.24 % 79.59 % 45.30 % 0.06 % 
LBD/BM-1 -3.20 % -34.98 % -13.12 % -0.06 % 
Alt.2 After 5 iterations         
LBD 1218530.3 866181.427 1141628.35 1218999.3 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 15.08 % 69.69 % 35.42 % 0.00 % 
LBD/BM-1 -3.20 % -31.19 % -9.30 % -0.15 % 
Alt.1 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1255275.789 962358.098 1257046.69 1220289.76 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 0.62 % 46.54 % 1.02 % 0.05 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0.28 % -23.55 % -0.14 % -0.05 % 
Alt.2 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1251440.963 1211424.84 1251470.46 1220289.76 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 1.44 % 12.09 % 1.93 % 0.05 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0.58 % -3.76 % -0.58 % -0.05 % 
Alt.1 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1255275.789 998843.932 1257099.52 1220289.76 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 0.30 % 29.64 % 0.14 % 0.05 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0.28 % -20.65 % -0.13 % -0.05 % 
Alt.2 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1251440.963 1211424.84 1255680.79 1220289.76 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 0.61 % 6.86 % 0.26 % 0.05 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0.58 % -3.76 % -0.24 % -0.05 % 
Iteration number when UBD-
LBD/LBD<=1%         
Alt 1 40 - 51 1 
Alt 2 74 - 60 1 
 
Table 4.D - Summary: Linear SM (𝜆𝑆) 
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Scenario 1  (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝑺) 
 
Scenario 2 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝑺)  
 
Scenario 3 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝑺)  
 
Scenario 4 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝑺)  
 
Figure 6.D - Convergence plots: Linear 
(𝑡1), (𝜆𝑆)   
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Scenario 1 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑺)
 
Scenario 2 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑺)
 
Scenario 3 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑺)
 
Scenario 4 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑺)
 
Figure 7.D - Convergence plots: Linear (𝑡2), (𝜆𝑆) 
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Initial Lagrange multipliers – Cost based internal prices 
 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Alt.1 After 5 iterations         
LBD 1243001,306 1012819,32 1160022,7 1196570,3 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 6,86 % 46,13 % 18,64 % 5,29 % 
LBD/BM-1 -1,59 % -19,82 % -8,16 % -2,30 % 
Alt.2 After 5 iterations         
LBD 1243001,306 1012819,32 1217759,1 1203197 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 6,86 % 46,13 % 13,02 % 4,84 % 
LBD/BM-1 -1,59 % -19,82 % -3,59 % -1,88 % 
Alt.1 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1251983,794 1012819,32 1253639,4 1213649 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 2,00 % 34,87 % 1,44 % 1,39 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0,88 % -19,82 % -0,75 % -0,91 % 
Alt.2 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1248489,593 1012819,32 1250293,9 1210296,2 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 2,03 % 33,44 % 2,01 % 1,86 % 
LBD/BM-1 -1,16 % -19,82 % -1,01 % -1,18 % 
Alt.1 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1253747,7 1012819,32 1254706,3 1214374,8 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 0,91 % 28,27 % 0,81 % 1,00 % 
LBD/BM-1 -0,74 % -19,82 % -0,67 % -0,85 % 
Alt.2 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1249166,879 1012819,32 1251548,6 1211801,3 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 1,37 % 28,26 % 1,15 % 1,29 % 
LBD/BM-1 -1,10 % -19,82 % -0,92 % -1,06 % 
Iteration number when UBD-
LBD/LBD<=1%         
Alt 1 106 - 83 56 
Alt 2 - - - - 
 
Table 5.D – Summary: Nonlinear SM (𝜆𝐶)
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Scenario 1 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑺) 
 
Scenario 2 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑺) 
 
Scenario 3 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑺) 
 
Scenario 4 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑺) 
 
Figure 8.D – Convergence plots (𝑡2), (𝜆𝑆)  
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  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Alt.1 After 5 iterations         
LBD 1245122,635 1009837,21 1153841,18 1189860,14 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 6,40 % 46,34 % 19,00 % 5,58 % 
LBD/BM-1 -1,08 % -19,77 % -8,33 % -2,54 % 
Alt.2 After 5 iterations         
LBD 1245122,635 1009837,21 1236671,67 1203196,99 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 6,40 % 46,34 % 10,03 % 4,84 % 
LBD/BM-1 -1,08 % -19,77 % -1,75 % -1,45 % 
Alt.1 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1245122,635 1009837,21 1245135,68 1207443,58 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 2,31 % 37,28 % 2,66 % 1,73 % 
LBD/BM-1 -1,08 % -19,77 % -1,08 % -1,10 % 
Alt.2 After 50 iterations         
LBD 1245122,635 1009837,21 1244805,2 1207443,58 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 1,99 % 36,64 % 2,12 % 1,85 % 
LBD/BM-1 -1,08 % -19,77 % -1,11 % -1,10 % 
Alt.1 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1245122,635 1009837,21 1245135,68 1207443,58 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 1,30 % 28,19 % 1,30 % 1,20 % 
LBD/BM-1 -1,08 % -19,77 % -1,08 % -1,10 % 
Alt.2 After 200 iterations         
LBD 1245122,635 1009837,21 1244805,2 1207443,58 
(UBD-LBD)/LBD 1,48 % 28,19 % 1,55 % 1,47 % 
LBD/BM-1 -1,08 % -19,77 % -1,11 % -1,10 % 
Iteration number when UBD-
LBD/LBD<=1%         
Alt 1 - - - - 
Alt 2 - - - - 
 
Table 6.D - Summary: Linear SM (λC) 
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Scenario 1 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝑪)  
 
Scenario 2 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝑪)  
 
Scenario 3 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝑪)  
 
Scenario 4 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝑪)  
 
Figure 9.D - Convergence plots: Linear (𝑡1), (𝜆𝐶)   
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Scenario 1 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑪)  
 
Scenario 2 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑪)  
 
Scenario 3 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑪)  
 
Scenario 4 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝑪)  
 
Figure 10.D - Convergence plots: Linear (𝑡2), (𝜆𝐶)   
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Alternative step length calculation for 𝝁 
 
  Alt.1 Alt.2 
After 5 iterations   
LBD 790456,4 952973,7 
(UBD-
LBD)/LBD 11,08731 9,025974 
LBD/BM-1 -0,3742 -0,24554 
After 50 
iterations     
LBD 1167496 1235546 
(UBD-
LBD)/LBD 0,127424 0,053859 
LBD/BM-1 -0,0757 -0,02183 
After 200 
iterations     
LBD 1167496 1245443 
(UBD-
LBD)/LBD 0,121471 0,016964 
LBD/BM-1 -0,0757 -0,01399 
    
Table 7.D - Summary: Alternative step length calculation for 𝜇 
 
Scenario 1 (𝒕𝟏), (𝝀𝟎)  
 
Scenario 1 (𝒕𝟐), (𝝀𝟎)  
Figure 11.D - Alternative step length calculation for 𝜇 
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Appendix E 
AMPL code – Integrated Model 1 (IM1): 
Mod file 
# Sets 
 
set I;                  # Set of crude oils 
set R;                  # Set of refineries 
set H;                  # Set of hubs 
set D;                  # Set of depots 
set K;                  # Set of markets 
set A;                  # Set of components that cannot be processed 
set C;                  # Set of components that was generated from components from set B 
set B;                  # Set of components that can either be processed or directly used  in blending 
set E:=A union B;       # Union of sets A and B 
set P;                  # Set of  products 
set QMIN;               # Set of minimum qualities 
set QMAX;               # Set of maximum qualities 
 
# Parameters 
 
param sup{I,R};                 # Available volume of crude oil i at refinery r 
param rho{I,E};                 # Amount of component e generated from one unit of crude oil i 
param rho2{B,C};                # Amount of component c generated from one unit of component b 
param s_p_m{P,QMIN};            # Value of required quality qmin in product p 
param s_b_m{E,QMIN};            # Value of quality qmin in component e 
param s_b2_m{C,QMIN};           # Value of quality qmin in component c 
param s_p_ma{P,QMAX};           # Value of required quality qmax in product p 
param s_b_ma{I,E,QMAX};         # Value of quality qmax in component e obtained from crude oil i 
param s_b2_ma{I,QMAX,C,B};      # Value of quality qmax in component c obtained from component b which was 
again obtained from crude oil i  
param C_BUY{I,R};               # Cost of purchasing one unit of crude oil i at refinery r 
param C_PRO{I,R};               # Cost of processing one unit of crude oil i at refinery r 
param C_PRO2{B,R};              # Cost of processing one unit of component b at refinery r 
param C_BLEND{P,H};             # Cost of producing one unit of product p at hub h 
param C_TRAN1{R,H};             # Cost of transporting one unit of any product from refinery r to hub h 
param C_TRAN2{H,D};             # Cost of transporting one unit of any product from hub h depot d 
param C_TRAN3{D,K};             # Cost of transporting one unit of any product from depot d to market k 
param a_demand {P};             # Coefficients of price function, where a picks up competitors action 
param b_demand {P};             # Coefficients of price function, where a picks up competitors action 
param max_dep{D};               # Maximum capacity at depot d 
param min_dem{P};               # Minimum demand of product p at market k 
param max_dem2{P};              # Maximum demand of product p at market k 
param C_FIX{D};                 # Fixed cost to operate depot d 
 
# Variables 
 
var x{I,R} >= 1;                # Amount of crude oil i purchased and processed at refinery r 
var y{E,I,R} >= 0;              # Amount of component e generated from crude oil i at refinery r 
var yp{B,I,R} >= 0;             # Amount of component b generated from crude oil i, used for further processing at 
refinery r 
var yp1{C, B, I,R} >= 0;        # Amount of component c generated from component b which was again produced 
form crude oil i at refinery r 
var y2{E,I,R} >= 0;             # Amount of component e obtained from crude oil i sent directly to blending at refinery  
 A29 
var y3{P,E,I,R,H} >= 0;         # Amount of component e obtained from crude oil i used in product p sent from 
refinery r to hub h 
var yp3{P,C,B,I,R,H} >= 0;      # Amount of component c obtained from component b which was again obtained 
from crude oil i, used in product p which was sent from refinery r to hub h 
var q{P,H,D}>= 0;               # Amount of product p at depot d which was sent from hub h 
var q1{P,D}>= 0;                # Amount of product p at depot d  
var z{P,D,K} >= 0;              # Amount of product p transported from depot d to marked k 
var h{D} binary;                # Binary variable which have value 1 when depot d is used, and 0 otherwise 
var sold_k{P,K};                # Amount of product p that was sold at market k 
var price{P,K};                 # Price of product p at market k 
 
# Objective function IM 
 
maximize Contribution:  
                        sum{p in P, k in K} (sold_k[p,k]*(a_demand[p])- (sold_k[p,k]^2)*(b_demand[p])) 
                        - sum{i in I,r in R} C_BUY[i,r]*x[i,r] 
                        - sum{i in I, r in R} C_PRO[i,r]*x[i,r] 
                        - sum{b in B,i in I,r in R} C_PRO2[b,r]*yp[b,i,r] 
                        - sum{p in P, d in D, w in H} C_BLEND[p,w]*q[p,w,d] 
                        - sum{p in P, r in R, w in H, e in E, i in I} C_TRAN1[r,w]*y3[p,e,i,r,w] 
                        - sum{p in P, r in R, w in H, c in C, b in B, i in I} C_TRAN1[r,w]*yp3[p,c,b,i,r,w]                      
                        - sum{p in P, d in D, w in H} C_TRAN2[w,d]*q[p,w,d] 
                        - sum{p in P, k in K, d in D} C_TRAN3[d,k]*z[p,d,k] 
                        - sum{d in D}C_FIX[d]*h[d]; 
 
# Constrains 
                                                                                 
subject to supply{i in I, r in R}:                              # (P1) 
        x[i,r] <= sup[i,r];                                              
subject to run_modes{e in E,  i in I, r in R}:                  # (P2) 
        rho[i,e]*x[i,r] = y[e,i,r];                      
subject to component1{a in A, i in I, r in R}:                  # (P3) 
        y[a,i,r] >=  y2[a,i,r]; 
subject to component2{b in B, i in I, r in R}:                  # (P4) 
        y[b,i,r] >=  y2[b,i,r] + yp[b,i,r];                      
subject to processing{c in C, b in B, i in I, r in R}:          # (P5) 
        rho2[b,c]* yp[b,i,r] = yp1[c,b,i,r];     
subject to products{e in E, i in I,r in R}:                     # (P6) 
        y2[e,i,r] >= sum{p in P, w in H} y3[p,e,i,r,w]; 
subject to products2{c in C, b in B, i in I, r in R}:           # (P7) 
        yp1[c,b,i,r] >= sum{p in P,w in H} yp3[p,c,b,i,r,w];                     
subject to blending_min {p in P, qm in QMIN, w in H}:           # (P8) 
        sum{d in D}q[p,w,d]*s_p_m[p,qm] <= sum{e in E, i in I, r in R}(y3[p,e,i,r,w]*s_b_m[e,qm])+sum{c in C, b in 
B, i in I, r in R}(yp3[p,c,b,i,r,w] * s_b2_m[c,qm]); 
subject to blending_max{p in P, qm in QMAX, w in H}:            # (P9) 
        sum{d in D}q[p,w,d]*s_p_ma[p,qm] >= sum{e in E, i in I, r in R}(y3[p,e,i,r,w]*s_b_ma[i,e,qm])+sum{c in C, 
b in B, i in I, r in R}(yp3[p,c,b,i,r,w]*s_b2_ma[i,qm,c,b]);   
subject to mass_balance{p in P, w in H}:                        # (P10) 
        sum{d in D}q[p,w,d] <= sum{e in E, i in I, r in R}y3[p,e,i,r,w]+sum{c in C, b in B, i in I, r in 
R}yp3[p,c,b,i,r,w]; 
subject to mass_balance2{p in P, d in D}:                       # (P11)  
        sum{w in H}q[p,w,d] = q1[p,d]; 
subject to fixed_cost{d in D}:                                  # (G1) 
        sum{p in P}q1[p,d] <= max_dep[d]*h[d]; 
subject to mass_balance3 {p in P, d in D}:                      # (I1) 
        sum{k in K}z[p,d,k] = q1[p,d];           
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subject to price_calc{p in P, k in K}:                          # (S1) 
        price[p,k] = a_demand[p]-b_demand[p]*sum{d in D}z[p,d,k]; 
subject to maximum_dem {p in P, k in K}:                        # (S2) 
        sum{d in D}z[p,d,k] <= max_dem2[p]; 
subject to maximum_dem23 {p in P, k in K}:                      # (S2) 
        min_dem[p]<= sum{d in D}z[p,d,k] ;                                               
subject to demand_amount {p in P, k in K}:                      # Extra constrain which are used just to calculete amount 
of product p which was sold at market k  
        sum{d in D}z[p,d,k] = sold_k[p,k]; 
                         
# Parameters which will be used to extra calculations 
param total{P};                                                 # Amount of sold product p that was sold at all markets 
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AMPL code – Linear Integrated Model 1 (IM1-L): 
Mod file 
 
# Sets 
 
set I;                  # Set of crude oils 
set R;                  # Set of refineries 
set H;                  # Set of hubs 
set D;                  # Set of depots 
set K;                  # Set of markets 
set A;                  # Set of components that cannot be processed 
set C;                  # Set of components that was generated from components from set B 
set B;                  # Set of components that can either be processed or directly used  in blending 
set E:=A union B;       # Union of sets A and B 
set P;                  # Set of  products 
set QMIN;               # Set of minimum qualities 
set QMAX;               # Set of maximum qualities 
set N := 1..11;         # Number of breakpoints 
set M := 1..10;         # Set within M  –  number of segments (there are one less segment then there are breakpoints) 
 
# Paramenters 
 
param sup{I,R};                 # Available volume of crude oil i at refinery r 
param rho{I,E};                 # Amount of component e generated from one unit of crude oil i 
param rho2{B,C};                # Amount of component c generated from one unit of component b 
param s_p_m{P,QMIN};            # Value of required quality qmin in product p 
param s_b_m{E,QMIN};            # Value of quality qmin in component e 
param s_b2_m{C,QMIN};           # Value of quality qmin in component c 
param s_p_ma{P,QMAX};           # Value of required quality qmax in product p 
param s_b_ma{I,E,QMAX};         # Value of quality qmax in component e obtained from crude oil i 
param s_b2_ma{I,QMAX,C,B};      # Value of quality qmax in component c obtained from component b which was 
again obtained from crude oil i  
param C_BUY{I,R};               # Cost of purchasing one unit of crude oil i at refinery r 
param C_PRO{I,R};               # Cost of processing one unit of crude oil i at refinery r 
param C_PRO2{B,R};              # Cost of processing one unit of component b at refinery r 
param C_BLEND{P,H};             # Cost of producing one unit of product p at hub h 
param C_TRAN1{R,H};             # Cost of transporting one unit of any product from refinery r to hub h 
param C_TRAN2{H,D};             # Cost of transporting one unit of any product from hub h depot d 
param C_TRAN3{D,K};             # Cost of transporting one unit of any product from depot d to market k 
param amount{N,P};              # Sold amount of product p corresponding to breakpoint m 
param rev {N,P};                # Revenue from product p corresponding to breakpoint m 
param max_dep{D};               # Maximum capacity at depot d 
param min_dem{P};               # Minimum demand of product p at market k 
param max_dem2{P};              # Maximum demand of product p at market k 
param C_FIX{D};                 # Fixed cost to operate depot d 
 
# Variables 
 
var x{I,R} >= 1;                # Amount of crude oil i purchased and processed at refinery r 
var y{E,I,R} >= 0;              # Amount of component e generated from crude oil i at refinery r 
var yp{B,I,R} >= 0;             # Amount of component b generated from crude oil i, used for further processing at 
refinery r 
var yp1{C, B, I,R} >= 0;        # Amount of component c generated from component b which was again produced 
form crude oil i at refinery r 
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var y2{E,I,R} >= 0;             # Amount of component e obtained from crude oil i sent directly to blending at refinery  
var y3{P,E,I,R,H} >= 0;         # Amount of component e obtained from crude oil i used in product p sent from 
refinery r to hub h 
var yp3{P,C,B,I,R,H} >= 0;      # Amount of component c obtained from component b which was again obtained 
from crude oil i, used in product p which was sent from refinery r to hub h 
var q{P,H,D}>= 0;               # Amount of product p at depot d which was sent from hub h 
var q1{P,D}>= 0;                # Amount of product p at depot d  
var z{P,D,K} >= 0;              # Amount of product p transported from depot d to marked k 
var h{D} binary;                # Binary variable which have value 1 when depot d is used, and 0 otherwise 
var w {N,P,K} >=0;              # Weight for product p, breakpoint m  
var revenue {P,K} >= 0;         # Revenue from product p at market k 
var y10 {M,P,K} binary;         # Binary variable, takes value 1 if segment m for product p is used, and 0 otherwise 
var price{P,K};                 # Price of product p at market k 
 
 
# Objective function (SM1-Linear)  
 
maximize Contribution:  
                        sum{p in P, k in K} revenue[p,k] 
                        - sum{i in I,r in R} C_BUY[i,r]*x[i,r] 
                        - sum{i in I, r in R} C_PRO[i,r]*x[i,r] 
                        - sum{b in B,i in I,r in R} C_PRO2[b,r]*yp[b,i,r] 
                        - sum{p in P, d in D, w2 in H} C_BLEND[p,w2]*q[p,w2,d] 
                        - sum{p in P, r in R, w2 in H, e in E, i in I} C_TRAN1[r,w2]*y3[p,e,i,r,w2] 
                        - sum{p in P, r in R, w2 in H, c in C, b in B, i in I} C_TRAN1[r,w2]*yp3[p,c,b,i,r,w2]                   
                        - sum{p in P, d in D, w2 in H} C_TRAN2[w2,d]*q[p,w2,d] 
                        - sum{p in P, k in K, d in D} C_TRAN3[d,k]*z[p,d,k] 
                        - sum{d in D}C_FIX[d]*h[d]; 
 
# Constrains 
                                                                                 
subject to supply{i in I, r in R}:                                              # (P1) 
        x[i,r] <= sup[i,r]; 
subject to run_modes{e in E,  i in I, r in R}:                                  # (P2) 
        rho[i,e]*x[i,r] = y[e,i,r];                      
subject to component1{a in A, i in I, r in R}:                                  # (P3) 
        y[a,i,r] >=  y2[a,i,r]; 
subject to component2{b in B, i in I, r in R}:                                  # (P4) 
        y[b,i,r] >=  y2[b,i,r] + yp[b,i,r]; 
subject to processing{c in C, b in B, i in I, r in R}:                          # (P5) 
        rho2[b,c]* yp[b,i,r] = yp1[c,b,i,r]; 
subject to products{e in E, i in I,r in R}:                                     # (P6) 
        y2[e,i,r] >= sum{p in P, w2 in H} y3[p,e,i,r,w2]; 
subject to products2{c in C, b in B, i in I, r in R}:                           # (P7) 
        yp1[c,b,i,r] >= sum{p in P,w2 in H} yp3[p,c,b,i,r,w2];                   
subject to blending_min{p in P, qm in QMIN, w2 in H}:                           # (P8) 
        sum{d in D}q[p,w2,d]* s_p_m[p,qm] <= sum{e in E, i in I, r in R}(y3[p,e,i,r,w2]*s_b_m[e,qm])+sum{c in C, b 
in B, i in I, r in R}(yp3[p,c,b,i,r,w2]*s_b2_m[c,qm]); 
subject to blending_max{p in P, qm in QMAX, w2 in H}:                           # (P9) 
        sum{d in D}q[p,w2,d]* s_p_ma[p,qm] >= sum{e in E, i in I, r in R}(y3[p,e,i,r,w2]*s_b_ma[i,e,qm])+sum{c in 
C, b in B, i in I, r in R}(yp3[p,c,b,i,r,w2]*s_b2_ma[i,qm,c,b]);       
subject to mass_balance{p in P, w2 in H}:                                       # (P10) 
        sum{d in D}q[p,w2,d] <= sum{e in E, i in I, r in R} y3[p,e,i,r,w2] + sum{ c in C, b in B, i in I, r in 
R}yp3[p,c,b,i,r,w2]; 
subject to mass_balance2 {p in P, d in D}:                                      # (P11) 
        sum{w2 in H}q[p,w2,d] >= q1[p,d]; 
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subject to fixed_cost {d in D}:                                                 # (G1) 
        sum{p in P}q1[p,d] <= max_dep[d]*h[d]; 
subject to mass_balance3 {p in P, d in D}:                                      # (I1) 
        sum{k in K}z[p,d,k] = q1[p,d];                   
subject to demand_amount {p in P, k in K}:                                      # (SL1) 
        sum{d in D}z[p,d,k] = sum{n in N} amount[n,p]*w[n,p,k];                  
subject to demand_revenue {p in P, k in K}:                                     # (SL2) 
        revenue[p,k] = sum{n in N} rev[n,p]*w[n,p,k];                            
subject to weights {p in P, k in K}:                                            # (SL3)                                          
        sum{n in N}w[n,p,k] = 1; 
subject to segment {p in P, k in K}:                                            # (SL4) 
        sum{m in M}y10[m,p,k] = 1; 
subject to logic1{p in P, n in N, m in M, k in K: n = 1 and m=1}:               # (SL5)                  
        w[n,p,k] <= y10[m,p,k]; 
subject to logic2{p in P, n in N, m in M, k in K: n = m and n>=2 and n<=10}:    # (SL5) 
        w[n,p,k] <= y10[m,p,k]+y10[m-1,p,k]; 
subject to logic3{p in P, n in N, m in M, k in K: n =11 and m=10}:              # (SL5) 
        w[n,p,k] <= y10[m,p,k];  
                         
# Parametrs withc are used for extra calculation                         
param sale_prof;                         
param fixed; 
param prod_cost; 
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AMPL code – Mod File:  Scenario 1 (Nonlinear): 
The following mod file includes three models, which are used in LD calculations in scenario 1: L1-SM, 
L1-PM, and PM. 
# Extra Set 
 
param rep >=0 integer;  # Number of iteration 
set REP:= 0..rep;       # Iteration number 
 
# Sets which are used in LSM  
 
set D;                  # Set of depots 
set K;                  # Set of markets 
set P;                  # Set of  products 
 
# Sets which are used in LPM 
 
set I;                  # Set of crude oils 
set A;                  # Set of components that cannot be processed 
set C;                  # Set of components that was generated from components from set B 
set B;                  # Set of components that can either be processed or directly used  in blending 
set E:=A union B;       # Union of sets A and B 
set QMIN;               # Set of minimum qualities 
set QMAX;               # Set of maximum qualities 
set R;                  # Set of refineries              
set H;                  # Set of hubs 
                         
# Parameters which are used in LSM       
                         
param lamda{P,D,REP};   # Value for Lagrangian multiplier lamda 
param lamda2{D,REP};    # Value for Lagrangian multiplier mu 
param C_TRAN3{D,K};     # Cost of transporting one unit of any product from depot d to market k 
param a_demand {P};     # Coefficients of price function, where a picks up competitors action 
param b_demand {P};     # Coefficients of price function, where a picks up competitors action 
param max_dep{D};       # Cost of transporting one unit of any product from depot d to market k 
param C_FIX{D};         # Fixed cost to operate depot d 
param min_dem2{P};      # Minimum demand of product p at market k 
param max_dem2{P};      # Maximum demand of product p at market k 
 
# Parameters which are used in LPM 
 
param sup{I,R};                 # Available volume of crude oil i at refinery r 
param rho{I,E};                 # Amount of component e generated from one unit of crude oil i 
param rho2{B,C};                # Amount of component c generated from one unit of component b 
param s_p_m{P,QMIN};            # Value of required quality qmin in product p 
param s_b_m{E,QMIN};            # Value of quality qmin in component e 
param s_b2_m{C,QMIN};           # Value of quality qmin in component c 
param s_p_ma{P,QMAX};           # Value of required quality qmax in product p 
param s_b_ma{I,E,QMAX};         # Value of quality qmax in component e obtained from crude oil i 
param s_b2_ma{I,QMAX,C,B};      # Value of quality qmax in component c obtained from component b w 
param C_BUY{I,R};               # Cost of purchasing one unit of crude oil i at refinery r 
param C_PRO{I,R};               # Cost of processing one unit of crude oil i at refinery r 
param C_PRO2{B,R};              # Cost of processing one unit of component b at refinery r 
param C_BLEND{P,H};             # Cost of producing one unit of product p at hub h 
param C_TRAN1{R,H};             # Cost of transporting one unit of any product from refinery r to  
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param C_TRAN2{H,D};             # Cost of transporting one unit of any product from hub h depot d 
param min_dem{P};               # Minimum production of product p 
param max_dem{P};               # Maximum production of product p 
 
# Parameters which are used in PM 
 
param lev{P,D};                 # Amount of product p that should be available at depot d 
 
# Extra parametrs 
  
param UB{REP};                  # Parameters with are used in calculations  
param UB1{REP};                 # Parameters with are used in calculations  
param Min_UB{REP};              # Parameters with are used in calculations  
param Revenue_sale;             # Parameters with are used in calculations 
param LB{REP};                  # Parameters with are used in calculations 
param Max_LB{REP};              # Parameters with are used in calculations 
param LB1{REP};                 # Parameters with are used in calculations 
param mult{REP};                # Parameters with are used in calculations 
param dif{P,D,REP};             # Parameters with are used in calculations 
param dif_2;                    # Parameters with are used in calculations 
param step{REP};                # Parameters with are used in calculations 
param dif_lamda2{D};            # Parameters with are used in calculations 
param dif_2_lamda2;             # Parameters with are used in calculations 
param step_lamda2 {REP};        # Parameters with are used in calculations 
param cost_LB;                  # Parameters with are used in calculations 
param start_lamda{P,D};         # Initial value for Lagrangian multiplier lamda 
param start_lamda2{D};          # Initial value for Lagrangian multiplier mu 
 
# Variables which are used in LSM 
 
var buy{P,D} >= 0;              # Amount of product p orders by sale department at depot d 
var z{P,D,K} >= 0;              # Amount of product p transported from depot d to marked k 
var h{D} binary;                # Binary variable which have value 1 when depot d is used by sale department , and 0 
otherwise 
var sold_k {P,K};               # Amount of product p that was sold at market k 
 
# Variables which are used in LPM 
 
var x{I,R} >= 1;                # Amount of crude oil i purchased and processed at refinery r 
var y{E,I,R} >= 0;              # Amount of component e generated from crude oil i at refinery r 
var yp{B,I,R} >= 0;             # Amount of component b generated from crude oil i, used for further processing at 
refinery r 
var yp1{C, B, I,R} >= 0;        # Amount of component c generated from component b which was again produced 
form crude oil i at refinery r 
var y2{E,I,R} >= 0;             # Amount of component e obtained from crude oil i sent directly to blending at refinery  
var y3{P,E,I,R,H} >= 0;         # Amount of component e obtained from crude oil i used in product p sent from 
refinery r to hub h 
var yp3{P,C,B,I,R,H} >= 0;      # Amount of component c obtained from component b which was again obtained 
from crude oil i, used in product p which was sent from refinery r to hub h 
var q{P,H,D}>= 0;               # Amount of product p at depot d which was sent from hub h 
var q1{P,D}>= 0;                # Amount of product p at depot d  
var h_pl{D} binary;             # Binary variable which have value 1 when depot d is used by production department , 
and 0 otherwise 
 
# Variables which are used in PM 
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var x_p{I,R} >= 0;              # Amount of crude oil i purchased and processed at refinery r  
var y_p{E,I,R} >= 0;            # Amount of component e generated from crude oil i at refinery r 
var yp_p{B,I,R} >= 0;           # Amount of component b generated from crude oil i, used for further processing at 
refinery r 
var yp1_p{C, B, I,R} >= 0;      # Amount of component c generated from component b which was again produced 
form crude oil i at refinery r 
var y2_p{E,I,R} >= 0;           # Amount of component e obtained from crude oil i sent directly to blending at refinery  
var y3_p{P,E,I,R,H} >= 0;       # Amount of component e obtained from crude oil i used in product p sent from 
refinery r to hub h 
var yp3_p{P,C,B,I,R,H} >= 0;    # Amount of component c obtained from component b which was again obtained 
from crude oil i, used in product p which was sent from refinery r to hub h 
var q_p{P,H,D}>= 0;             # Amount of product p at depot d which was sent from hub h 
var q1_p{P,D}>= 0;              # Amount of product p at depot d  
 
 
# Objective function L1-SM 
 
maximize Contribution:  
                        sum{p in P, k in K} (sold_k[p,k]*a_demand[p]- sold_k[p,k]^2*b_demand[p]) 
                        - sum{p in P, d in D, per in REP: per=rep} lamda[p,d,per]*buy[p,d] 
                        - sum{p in P, k in K, d in D} C_TRAN3[d,k]*z[p,d,k] 
                        - sum{d in D}0.5*C_FIX[d]*h[d] 
                        - sum{d in D, per in REP: per=rep}lamda2[d,per]*h[d]; 
# Constrains L1-SM 
 
subject to inn{p in P, d in D}:                         # (L14) 
        sum{k in K} z[p,d,k] = buy[p,d]; 
subject to demand_amount{p in P, k in K}:               # Extra constrain which are used just to calculete amount of 
product p which was sold at market k                
        sum{d in D}z[p,d,k] = sold_k[p,k]; 
subject to fixed_cost {d in D}:                         # (L13) 
        sum{p in P, k in K}z[p,d,k] <= max_dep[d]*h[d]; 
subject to maximum_dem {p in P, k in K}:                # (L16) 
        sold_k[p,k] <= max_dem2[p]; 
subject to maximum_dem23 {p in P, k in K}:              # (L16) 
        min_dem2[p] <= sold_k[p,k] ; 
         
# Objective function L1-PM 
 
maximize Prod_lag:      sum{p in P, d in D, per in REP: per=rep} lamda[p,d,per]*q1[p,d] 
                        - sum{i in I,r in R} C_BUY[i,r]*x[i,r] 
                        - sum{i in I, r in R} C_PRO[i,r]*x[i,r] 
                        - sum{b in B,i in I,r in R} C_PRO2[b,r]*yp[b,i,r] 
                        - sum{p in P, d in D, w in H} C_BLEND[p,w]*q[p,w,d] 
                        - sum{p in P, r in R, w in H, e in E, i in I} C_TRAN1[r,w]*y3[p,e,i,r,w] 
                        - sum{p in P, r in R, w in H, c in C, b in B, i in I} C_TRAN1[r,w]*yp3[p,c,b,i,r,w]                      
                        - sum{p in P, d in D, w in H} C_TRAN2[w,d]*q[p,w,d]      
                        - sum{d in D}0.5*C_FIX[d]*h_pl[d] 
                        + sum{d in D, per in REP: per=rep}lamda2[d,per]*h_pl[d]; 
 
 
# Constrains L1-PM 
                                                                                 
subject to supply{i in I, r in R}:                                      # (L1) 
        x[i,r] <= sup[i,r]; 
subject to run_modes {e in E,  i in I, r in R}:                         # (L2) 
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        rho[i,e]*x[i,r] = y[e,i,r];                      
subject to component1{a in A, i in I, r in R}:                          # (L3) 
        y[a,i,r] >=  y2[a,i,r]; 
subject to component2{b in B, i in I, r in R}:                          # (L4) 
        y[b,i,r] >=  y2[b,i,r] + yp[b,i,r]; 
subject to processing {c in C, b in B, i in I, r in R}:                 # (L5)  
        rho2[b,c]* yp[b,i,r] = yp1[c,b,i,r]; 
subject to products{e in E, i in I,r in R}:                             # (L6) 
        y2[e,i,r] >= sum{p in P, w in H} y3[p,e,i,r,w]; 
subject to products2{c in C, b in B, i in I, r in R}:                   # (L7) 
        yp1[c,b,i,r] >= sum{p in P,w in H} yp3[p,c,b,i,r,w];                     
subject to blending_min{p in P, qm in QMIN, w in H}:                    # (L8) 
        sum{d in D}q[p,w,d]* s_p_m[p,qm] <= sum{e in E, i in I, r in R} (y3[p,e,i,r,w] * s_b_m[e,qm]) + sum{c in C, 
b in B, i in I, r in R} (yp3[p,c,b,i,r,w] * s_b2_m[c,qm]) ; 
subject to blending_max {p in P, qm in QMAX, w in H}:                   # (L9) 
        sum{d in D}q[p,w,d]* s_p_ma[p,qm] >= sum{e in E, i in I, r in R} (y3[p,e,i,r,w]* s_b_ma[i,e,qm]) + sum{c in 
C, b in B, i in I, r in R} (yp3[p,c,b,i,r,w] * s_b2_ma[i,qm,c,b]) ;  
subject to mass_balance {p in P, w in H}:                               # (L10) 
        sum{d in D}q[p,w,d] <= sum{e in E, i in I, r in R} y3[p,e,i,r,w] + sum{ c in C, b in B, i in I, r in 
R}yp3[p,c,b,i,r,w]; 
subject to mass_balance2 {p in P, d in D}:                              # (L11) 
        sum{w in H}q[p,w,d] = q1[p,d]; 
subject to demand {p in P}:                                             # (L17) 
        min_dem[p] <= sum{d in D} q1[p,d] <= max_dem[p]; 
subject to fixed_cost2 {d in D}:                                        # (L12) 
        sum{p in P}q1[p,d] <= max_dep[d]*h_pl[d];        
 
# Objective function PM 
 
minimize Cost:  
                        sum{i in I,r in R} C_BUY[i,r]*x_p[i,r] 
                        + sum{i in I, r in R} C_PRO[i,r]*x_p[i,r] 
                        + sum{b in B,i in I,r in R} C_PRO2[b,r]*yp_p[b,i,r] 
                        + sum{p in P, d in D, w in H} C_BLEND[p,w]*q_p[p,w,d] 
                        + sum{p in P, r in R, w in H, e in E, i in I} C_TRAN1[r,w]*y3_p[p,e,i,r,w] 
                        +sum{p in P, r in R, w in H, c in C, b in B, i in I} C_TRAN1[r,w]*yp3_p[p,c,b,i,r,w]                     
                        + sum{p in P, d in D, w in H} C_TRAN2[w,d]*q_p[p,w,d]; 
                         
# Constrains PM 
subject to supply_p{i in I, r in R}:                                    # (P1)                                   
        x_p[i,r] <= sup[i,r]; 
subject to run_modes_p {e in E,  i in I, r in R}:                       # (P2) 
        rho[i,e]*x_p[i,r] = y_p[e,i,r]; 
subject to component1_p{a in A, i in I, r in R}:                        # (P3) 
        y_p[a,i,r] >=  y2_p[a,i,r]; 
subject to component2_p {b in B, i in I, r in R}:                       # (P4) 
        y_p[b,i,r] >=  y2_p[b,i,r] + yp_p[b,i,r]; 
subject to processing_p {c in C, b in B, i in I, r in R}:               # (P5) 
        rho2[b,c]* yp_p[b,i,r] = yp1_p[c,b,i,r]; 
subject to products_p{e in E, i in I,r in R}:                           # (P6) 
        y2_p[e,i,r] >= sum{p in P, w in H} y3_p[p,e,i,r,w]; 
subject to products2_p{c in C, b in B, i in I, r in R}:                 # (P7) 
        yp1_p[c,b,i,r] >= sum{p in P,w in H} yp3_p[p,c,b,i,r,w];                         
subject to blending_min_p {p in P, qm in QMIN, w in H}:                 # (P8) 
        sum{d in D}q_p[p,w,d]* s_p_m[p,qm] <= sum{e in E, i in I, r in R}(y3_p[p,e,i,r,w]*s_b_m[e,qm])+sum{c in 
C, b in B, i in I, r in R}(yp3_p[p,c,b,i,r,w]*s_b2_m[c,qm]); 
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subject to blending_max_p {p in P, qm in QMAX, w in H}:                 # (P9) 
        sum{d in D}q_p[p,w,d]* s_p_ma[p,qm] >= sum{e in E, i in I, r in R}(y3_p[p,e,i,r,w]* s_b_ma[i,e,qm])+sum{c 
in C, b in B, i in I, r in R}(yp3_p[p,c,b,i,r,w]*s_b2_ma[i,qm,c,b]);   
subject to mass_balance_p {p in P, w in H}:                             # (P10) 
        sum{d in D}q_p[p,w,d] <= sum{e in E, i in I, r in R} y3_p[p,e,i,r,w]+sum{ c in C, b in B, i in I, r in 
R}yp3_p[p,c,b,i,r,w]; 
subject to mass_balance2_p {p in P, d in D}:                            # (P11) 
        sum{w in H}q_p[p,w,d] >= q1_p[p,d]; 
subject to demand_p{p in P, d in D}:                                    # (P12) 
        q1_p[p,d]  >= lev[p,d];                  
 
# Parameters which will be used to extra calculations 
 
param total_s{P,REP}; 
param total_p{P,REP}; 
 
AMPL code – Run File:  Scenario 1 (Nonlinear): 
The following run file includes the algorithms, which is used in scenario 1. The run file is connected with 
the mod file presented above.  
# Ampl syntax commands  
reset; 
model C:\Users\Julia\Desktop\Masteroppgave\ampl\Ref\lag\allknitro.mod; 
data C:\Users\Julia\Desktop\Masteroppgave\ampl\Ref\lag\allknitro.dat; 
option solver knitro; 
option display_precision 0; 
option display_round 5; 
problem Prodproblem: x, y, yp, yp1,  y2,  y3,  yp3,  q, q1, h_pl, Prod_lag , 
supply, run_modes, component1, component2, processing , products, products2,   
blending_min, blending_max, mass_balance,mass_balance2, fixed_cost2, demand ; 
problem Saleproblem: buy, z, h,sold_k, Contribution, inn, demand_amount, 
fixed_cost,maximum_dem,maximum_dem23; 
problem Costprod: x_p, y_p, yp_p, yp1_p,  y2_p,  y3_p,  yp3_p, q_p, q1_p, 
Cost, supply_p, run_modes_p, component1_p, component2_p, processing_p, 
products_p, products2_p, blending_min_p, blending_max_p, mass_balance_p, 
demand_p, mass_balance2_p ; 
 
# Script  
let rep := 0;                                                                   
# Iteration 0 
let {p in P, d in D, per in REP: per=rep} lamda[p,d,per] := start_lamda[p,d];   
# Values for lamda in 1 iteration  
let {d in D, per in REP: per=rep} lamda2[d,per] := start_lamda2[d];             
# Values for mu in 1 iteration  
let Min_UB[rep] := 100000000000000  ;                                           
# Start value for UBD 
let Max_LB[rep] := 0 ;                                                          
# Start value for LBD 
let mult[rep] := 2;                                                             
# Initial value for siqma 
 
repeat {                                                                        
# Start loop 
solve Saleproblem;                                                              
# Solve LSM 
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solve Prodproblem;                                                              
# Solve LPM 
 
for {p in P, d in D}{                                                           
# Calculation of input for PM from output of LSM 
if  buy[p,d] <= 0 then  
        let lev[p,d] := 0; 
        else { let lev[p,d] := buy[p,d]};};  
 
solve Costprod;                                                                         
# Solve PM 
 
let UB1[rep]  := Contribution + Prod_lag;                                               
# Calculation of UBD responding to this iteration  
#let UB[rep]  := min(Contribution + Prod_lag,Min_UB[rep]);                              
# Calculation of LBD which will used in step calculation alternative 2 
let UB[rep]  := Contribution + Prod_lag;                                                
# Calculation of LBD which will used in step calculation alternative 1 
let{p in P}total_s[p,rep] := sum{d in D}buy[p,d];                                       
# Calculation of all sold products by sale department  
let{p in P}total_p[p,rep] := sum{d in D}q1[p,d];                                        
# Calculation of all produced products by production department  
let Revenue_sale := sum{p in P, k in K} (sold_k[p,k]*(a_demand[p])- 
sold_k[p,k]^2*(b_demand[p])) 
        -sum{p in P, k in K, d in D} C_TRAN3[d,k]*z[p,d,k]- sum{d in 
D}C_FIX[d]*h[d];   # Calculation of profit which sale department  have 
generated under this iteration  
let LB1[rep] := Revenue_sale - Cost;                                                    
# Calculation of LBD under this iteration 
# Calculation of gradient  
let {p in P,d in D} dif[p,d,rep] := buy[p,d]-q1[p,d]; 
let dif_2 := sum{p in P,d in D}(dif[p,d,rep]^2); 
let {d in D} dif_lamda2[d] := h[d]-h_pl[d]; 
 
let LB [rep] := max(LB1[rep],Max_LB[rep]);                                              
# Calculation of highest LBD  
let step[rep] := (UB[rep]-LB [rep])*mult[rep]/dif_2;                                    
# Step size for lamda  
let step_lamda2[rep] := 482000/(2*(rep +1 ));                                           
# Step size for mu  
 
 
if rep = 200 then break;                                                                
# Stop loop if rep equals 200(can be any number) 
else {   
        let rep := rep + 1;                                                             
# Next iteration  
        let Min_UB[rep] := UB[rep-1];                                                   
# Update lowest UBD  
        let Max_LB[rep] := LB[rep-1];                                                   
# Update highest LBD  
        # Calculation of lamda for next iteration   
        for {p in P, d in D, per in REP: per=rep}{ 
        if  lamda[p,d,per-1]+step[per-1]*dif[p,d,per-1] >= 0 then  
                let lamda[p,d,per] := lamda[p,d,per-1]+step[per-
1]*dif[p,d,per-1]; 
        else { let lamda[p,d,per] := 0.01};} 
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        # Calculation of mu for next iteration   
        for {d in D, per in REP: per=rep}{ 
                if  lamda2[d,per-1]+step_lamda2[per-1]*dif_lamda2[d] > 0 then  
                        let lamda2[d,per] := lamda2[d,per-1]+step_lamda2[per-
1]*dif_lamda2[d]; 
        else { let lamda2[d,per] := 0.01};} 
        # Update sigma if changes in UBD was small under last 5 iteration  
        if rep >= 6 then  
        if sum{per in REP:per<= rep-1 and per>= rep-5}(UB[per-1]-UB[per])< 10 
then let mult[rep] := mult[rep-1]*0.9 ; 
        else {let mult[rep] := mult[rep-1]      ;} 
        else {   
        let mult[rep] := mult[rep-1]; };};}; 
         
# Display comands 
display UB,LB,UB1,LB1; 
#display total_s,total_p; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
